100. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1
5423. Subject: Namibia: Secretary Vance’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Botha.
1. Secretary Vance met with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha during afternoon Nov 27 at Amb Young’s residence in Waldorf Towers to discuss Namibia. Botha was accompanied by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie. Amb Leonard accompanied Secretary Vance.
2. Botha started the meeting with a long background exposition revolving around how painful the charges of bad faith on the part of South Africa had been for him. He said the events of the past few weeks had done him personal damage politically. Botha said there was a bad reaction in South Africa and Namibia over his current visit to New York. He was accused of crawling on his knees to Waldheim.
3. South Africa had accepted the U.N. plan but that had been a controversial decision. They had agreed to eliminate racial discrimination in Namibia. They had agreed that there would be fair one-man, one-vote elections with the U.N. presence. Now South Africa was being asked to make final decisions immediately. Botha said he would try to persuade the body elected in December to convene itself before December 20 to begin consultations. He could not understand why the U.N. and the Western Five could not wait another couple of weeks for answers. Botha argued that it would have been better for South Africa to have rejected the UN plan weeks ago and proceeded with the December elections if it really was determined to have an internal settlement.
4. Nevertheless South Africa had accepted the U.N. plan and it could promise to use its best efforts to persuade those elected in December to accept the plan and cooperate in its implementation. He assured the Secretary that the SAG had no intention of using a good turnout as a basis for telling the U.N. that South Africa would not proceed with the Waldheim plan. But, no firm agreements could be made before the election was out of the way. South Africa would not be so foolish as to go back on its word and try to impose an internal settlement. A good turnout would be a basis for telling the Southwesters that they had “made their point”.
[Page 268]5. When Botha raised the issue of the numbers and composition of UNTAG troops the Secretary asked him why he couldn’t agree during this visit concerning these issues. Fourie said they discussed troop numbers in Pretoria with the Five Ministers, who had said that the number would not be above 4,550. The Secretary responded that it was not that simple, that the Ministers’ use of numbers was based on their information from SYG Waldheim. The Secretary reminded Botha that the Ministers had not promised the South Africans they could get a lower figure from the Secretary General. Their response had been merely that if the South Africans wished they could discuss a smaller size UNTAG military component with the SYG.
6. The Secretary said he wanted to address Botha’s concerns systematically. With regard to the Ahtisaari visit, the Ministers had thought there was a good chance for his visit. They had felt they had resolved three issues in their Pretoria meetings, but the December elections remained a problem. Then SAG statements concerning the significance of the elections and the invitations to observe the elections which had been issued to the UN press corps had heightened suspicions that South Africa was headed toward an internal settlement. The result was a real struggle in the Security Council after their return from Pretoria. A bad mood developed due to South Africa’s actions.
7. The Secretary said that due to the prevailing suspicions and negativism, some progress was necessary during Botha’s current visit. Otherwise, it would be difficult to keep the process alive. He suggested that Botha discuss and agree upon—even if ad referendum—a date in January for the arrival of UNTAG in Namibia. If no progress is achieved he warned that we would be headed toward Chapter 7 actions, including sanctions, under the Charter of the UN. He urged that Botha try to clear up the question of the composition and number of UNTAG troops.
8. Amb Leonard assured Botha that we do not question his good faith but many govts do not think there has been an unconditional decision on the part of the South African Govt to accept and implement the UN plan. This suspicion has been reinforced by South Africa’s insistence on going ahead with the December 4 elections. We need some progress from this current visit to be able to handle these suspicions.
9. Concerning sanctions, Botha remarked that he was under the impression, gained from some African govts, that there was no strong pressure toward sanctions. The Secretary and Amb Leonard assured him the opposite was true.
10. Referring again to the elections, Botha explained that once they were carried out there would be a whole new ball game. He implied that the way would be open for implementation of the UN plan. The South African Govt would tell those persons elected that they had won the elections and could do so again under UN supervision. Even though [Page 269] the proclamation under which the elections are being held indicates that the body elected would be a Constituent Assembly and draft a constitution, that does not mean the constitution would be approved by the South African Govt. He could not discount totally the possibility that an internal settlement would develop but he believed that such a development would be “highly unlikely”. He referred to a statement by Democratic Turnhalle Alliance official Dirk Mudge last week to the effect the UN supervised elections would produce a Constituent Assembly. He said that he (Botha) had drafted that statement for Mudge.
11. Again, on the subject of number and composition of UNTAG military personnel, the Secretary suggested that Botha meet with Waldheim alone to discuss this matter. It was something that the South Africans and the Secretary General would have to work out. The Five could make no commitments.
12. During the meeting, Botha indicated that his five p.m. meeting with Waldheim would be cancelled. He would phone Prime Minister P.W. Botha to inform him of the discussion with the Secretary and the suggestions that had been made. In addition, a cable would be sent. They would expect a response tomorrow morning before meeting with the Secretary General.
13. Comment: We believe that some progress was made during the meeting with Botha and Fourie. The tone of the meeting was not bad. The South Africans understand the things that must be done to keep the process moving.
14. This is a partial report on the Secretary’s meeting with Botha, but covers, we believe, the major points concerning Namibia. A more complete memcon of the discussion is being prepared. As the cable has not been reviewed by the Secretary, we are transmitting it to the Dept for review and appropriate distribution.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2653. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis.↩