103. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

707. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: (C) Message From Secretary General to the Heads of State of the Frontline States, the Five; Nigeria and Sudan.

1. (C–entire text).

2. Para three below contains the text of identical telegrams concerning Namibia sent late last night (Feb 19) from Secretary General Waldheim to the Heads of State or Government of the Frontline States, [Page 274] the Five, Nigeria, and Sudan (as OAU Chairman). Mission comment follows septel.2

3. Following is text of telegram.

Begin text:

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the recent visit of my Special Representative, Mr. M. Ahtisaari, to Southern Africa3, in connexion with the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). On the basis of my Special Representative’s findings, I am now in the process of finalizing my report4 to the Security Council, which I hope to submit by the end of this week.

I should mention that while both the Government of South Africa and SWAPO have agreed to co-operate in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435, they give differing interpretations as to certain practical aspects of implementation. I intend to address myself to these questions in my forthcoming report to the Security Council. I have already had an opportunity of discussing these matters with representatives of the Frontline States as well as representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The purpose of this letter is to bring to your attention these issues, together with my views as to the manner in which they can best be settled in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435, and to enlist your support. The outstanding issues and my proposals are set forth in the annex to this letter. In addition there remains the question of the military component of UNTAG. Here again, the positions of the parties still need to be reconciled. In preparing my initial suggestions, [Page 275] which have already been brought to your attention, I had to balance a number of factors: equitable geographical distribution, reasonable political acceptability, willingness of the proposed troop-contributing countries to participate, and in the case of logistics the capacity to perform the required tasks. In the present circumstances, I continue to believe that my original suggestions best meet these requirements.

I realize that the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 is possible only with the co-operation of the parties. I am also aware of the importance that your government places upon achieving a settlement resulting in a free Namibia and the establishment of peaceful conditions in the area. I deeply appreciate the invaluable assistance you have already extended to us, and in this spirit I address this urgent appeal for your support which is vital to the success of our current endeavour.

I am addressing identical letters to the Heads of State or Government of Angola, Botswana, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia; and to the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim

Secretary General

United Nations

Outstanding issues and proposals

The following would form the basis for the proposals which I intend to incorporate in my report:

(1) Return of Namibians and SWAPO personnel

Regarding the return of Namibians, I would request the South African Government scrupulously to adhere to the relevant terms of the proposal which make clear that all Namibians are to be permitted to return without risk of arrest or intimidation. Suitable reception facilities would be operated under the close supervision of the UNHCR, and returnees would be free to travel onward to whatever part of the country they might wish. In this connexion the proposal provides for the peaceful return of SWAPO personnel from outside the territory through designated entry points. This would mean without arms or military equipment.

(2) Monitoring of restriction to base of SWAPO armed forces

I would emphasize that the proposal makes no provision for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases outside Namibia. However, [Page 276] any SWAPO armed forces inside Namibia at the time of the ceasefire would be restricted to bases designated by the Special Representative and monitored by UNTAG.

(3) Role of the Security Council

I would make clear that there is no basis, in regard to the proposal, for unilateral determination actions by any party. Should implementation of any aspect of the proposal be jeopardized by the failure of any party to carry out its provisions, I would bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council.

(4) Co-operation with neighboring countries

I would refer to the assurances of co-operation which I have received from the neighboring countries in regard to the terms of the proposal concerning the transitional arrangements. In order further to facilitate this co-operation, I have sought the approval of the Governments of Angola, Botswana and Zambia for the establishment of UN liaison offices in their countries.

(5) Ceasefire arrangements

In accordance with normal practice the ceasefire should apply simultaneously to both South African and SWAPO armed forces. To this end I would address identical letters to both parties proposing a specific hour and date for the ceasefire to begin. In that letter I would also request both parties to inform me in writing of their agreement to abide by the terms of the ceasefire.

End text.

Young
  1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Information Management Section, 1979 Briefing, Fact Sheets, Visit, and Conference Books for the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and other Senior Officials, Lot 80D110, Box 1, Namibia, Proximity Talks, March 18–20, 1979. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.
  2. In telegram 712 from USUN, February 21, Young reported on the Contact Group’s concerns about Waldheim’s message: “In particular the Group regretted that Waldheim had failed to emphasize: (a) the urgency of resolving the remaining issues (the idea that the opportunity for implementation is here and that delay may be very costly); (b) the balanced nature of the solutions he proposed for the remaining issues (the Contact Group draft had gone to great lengths to show the differing points of view on the various outstanding issues and therefore to display the reasonableness and even-handedness of Waldheim’s proposed solutions). In addition, the overall brevity of the ‘outstanding issues and proposals’ section of Waldheim’s message resulted in a lack of precision and comprehensiveness.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790079–1058)
  3. Ahtisaari visited South Africa and Namibia January 13–22.
  4. In telegram 802 from USUN, February 26, the Mission transmitted Waldheim’s report to the UN Security Council. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Information Management Section, 1979 Briefing, Fact Sheets, Visit, and Conference Books for the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and other Senior Officials, Lot 80D110, Box 1, Namibia, Proximity Talks, March 18–20, 1979) The February 26 report is summarized in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 1071–1072.