Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

113. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

New York, March 20, 1979, 2347Z

Secto 3013. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (U) Namibia: March 19 Meeting of Contact Group Ministers With NNF and SWAPO (D).

1. (C–entire text).

2. Representatives of the Namibia National Front (NNF) and SWAPO (D) met with the Western Ministers at 3:45 pm March 19. Brian O’Linn and R. Rukoro spoke for NNF; Andreas Shipanga for SWAPO (D).

3. Vance—The Contact Group (CG) stands behind its proposal. It is fully commited to democratic elections. It will follow the whole transition process with this end in mind. There has been a misunderstanding following the Feb 26 report of the SYG.² We believe the report is consistent with our proposal. The SYG is working with us to ensure that SWAPO bases outside Namibia and SWAPO’s armed personnel inside cannot interfere with the political process. The SYG is working on who would qualify for confinement inside Namibia and under what conditions. Therefore, we believe SWAPO armed personnel would have no impact. We hope the transition process can start as soon as possible and that remaining issues can be resolved here in New York.

O’Linn (NNF)—The NNF has several concerns. The latest SYG interpretation is extremely vague. It doesn’t provide for monitoring in Angola and Zambia by UNTAG—and not merely by the Front Line (FL).

Regarding bases inside Namibia, in a de facto sense there is none in the territory. No party should get a psychological or military advantage as a result of the ceasefire. We agree with the SAG statement on this.³

The bases issue could turn out to have no great significance on the other hand, there could be 20 instead of 5 SWAPO bases.

The NNF would like further clarification on what is meant by “bases”. We note that within a week of the election results’ becoming known South African forces must withdraw. The plan also says that SWAPO bases must be closed. Does this mean guerrillas could pick up arms and be let loose on the public?

The NNF does not share the SAG and DTA attitude that dates are that significant. We want a solution.

The NNF interprets the SYG’s report to mean that there would be no monitoring outside of Namibia. We think that this is inconsistent with the plan. Regarding bases inside Namibia, it is also inconsistent, but if it could be shown that it doesn’t have the meaning we attach to it then it could be a different matter.

Vance—We are talking of implementation details. Clarifications are in order. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the SYG’s report relate to restrictions on SWAPO bases in Namibia and outside Namibia.

Richard (UK)—On SWAPO bases inside Namibia, the proposal is clear, but unfleshed. In the course of discussions, it became clear that the question of SWAPO guerrillas who might be in Namibia hadn’t been adequately dealt with. We felt the problem would have to be neutralized.

Regarding use of the term “base”, the main concern was to identify and concentrate. Perhaps, “designated area” or “reception area” should have been used. But unfortunately, “base” was used. That SWAPO did at one time propose marching 2500 guerrillas into Namibia was not directly connected.

As for monitoring bases outside Namibia, this was raised by the SAG. We said we would try to get this, that it was desirable. We said we would do our best, but that it was not called for in the original plans. Botswana and Zambia have agreed to the establishment of liaison offices; Angola has not, although there may be some confusion over composition—military or civilian.

O’Linn—If the purpose is to “neutralize” SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia at a ceasefire, would they later be able to get back their arms? That would make them the only political party with arms in Namibia. What would be the precise procedures? On the second point, we understand that the SYG replied to the SAG citing the importance of monitoring—monitoring by UNTAG. What justifiable objections would sovereign Front Line States have then to monitoring?

Richard—(Quoted para 11 of SYG’s Feb 26 report) Nuts and bolts would have to be worked out by the SYG when he finds out how many of the (armed SWAPO personnel) there are.

McHenry—Concerning the assertion about what the SYG said on monitoring, the SAG’s Dec 22 letter⁴ spoke in general terms. SYG never said monitoring by UNTAG (outside of Namibia).

Shipanga (SWAPO–D)—We’ve accepted the Five power proposal, the SYG’s September report, and with certain reservations, his latest report. There are uncertainties in Namibia because of the present situation. There is black unemployment. White liberals are leaving. Many whites, after the so-called December elections, have lost faith in local politicians. They are becoming desperate. SWAPO–D issued a Feb 28 statement that the atmosphere created by the South African radio and some local politicians is destructive. Whites believe the West is trying to push Namibia into the hands of Marxists. The threat of an action plunging the country into disaster must not be taken lightly. Meanwhile, Sam Nujoma is causing concern and strengthening the hand of those who want to go it alone. Some whites are forming secret armies. This can’t be taken lightly.

The Five have made every effort to bring about a peaceful settlement. Uncontrolled events—from South Africa and Sam Nujoma—are dashing the people’s hopes. SWAPO–D has issued a public statement condemning the SAG raids (into Angola).

On the monitoring of SWAPO forces in neighboring countries, the Front Line know fully the background. Only if it is true there are no bases outside Namibia, then is there no problem. But when the SYG’s Representative has to designate bases in Namibia, then we cannot understand it. We already have tribal armies, which are really terrorist armies. The Ovambo home guard has beaten and shot at SWAPO–D representatives. Citizens army and commandos support most extreme causes. Namibia needs real demilitarization. We believe in a peaceful transition to independence. We cannot agree to any creation of military bases in Namibia. Since Nujoma is not here, what guarantee can we have about anything decided here?

Vance—The purpose of the Five’s proposal and the SYG’s report was and is to provide a method for disarming those who have weapons so there can be elections free of intimidation. The suggestion regarding armed SWAPO personnel is meant to take care of that problem, to ensure that they won’t wander around armed. That also applies to the other groups to which you referred.

McHenry—Citizens commandos and forces are to have controls placed on them. The command structure will be broken down. Arms are to be monitored. The citizens force is to be demobilized and controlled. On armed SWAPO personnel in Namibia, the plan is to put some controls on them. Our concern is that this has been confused with bringing armed men at the time of the ceasefire into Namibia from outside. The SYG wants to see that the ceasefire is not abused. The SYG must or would have some procedures in mind.

Shipanga—Will they (armed SWAPO personnel) be confined to specified locations with arms?

McHenry—Yes. Restricted to locations designated by the Special Representative, with arms.

Shipanga—There are two dangers. First, the number and location—whether 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. SWAPO personnel in a camp might try to break out; the SAG would consider it a major violation and reply.

McHenry—That’s why we have the UN force.

Shipanga—Second, citizens commandos and tribal armies giving up arms while SWAPO has its would be impossible.

McHenry—It is entirely possible that the SYG might use the same procedures on citizens forces, tribal armies, and on SWAPO. It would be unwise to have too much specificity, but SYG will have to decide these matters.

Shipanga—SYG should make more clear what he means.

McHenry—It would be useful to get some indications of the SYG’s thinking in your discussions (with him).

O’Linn—Our fears haven’t been eliminated. The question of eliminating guerrillas wandering around remains. We are told the intention is to disarm them. Now we are told they will retain arms. South African forces would withdraw, and SWAPO would then be the only political party with armed guerrillas. Also, how do we know how many armed bases they would have? There is danger of intimidation and psychological fear.

Vance—We think it can be clarified and we will get in touch with the SYG about such a clarification.

O’Linn—(Reads from SYG’s January letter about UNTAG mandate;⁵ quotes concerning restriction to base.) If there were no bases in Namibia, then it must mean bases outside Namibia. The only reasonable assumption is that it must mean monitoring outside. The SYG says that there are no specific provisions for monitoring outside. This needs clarification.

Vance—In our meetings with the Front Line, we came to the understanding that “scrupulous observance” of the ceasefire meant that it would be done and that military people in their countries would have appropriate liaison with UNTAG forces so that the means would be there to do so. There has been a proposal for a civilian link. So far, Botswana and Zambia have agreed, but Angola has not yet done so.

Shipanga—Knowing some of the governments concerned, we can’t honestly trust their word that they’ll observe the ceasefire, especially when they can’t contemplate what one termed in today’s Security Council debate as the “legal representative” losing.

Owen—It would be extremely serious for any Front Line country to connive with forces crossing the border with a UN force—including units from African states—on the border. It’s monitoring of the border and ways of doing so to which I attach most importance. A combination of the Front Line’s commitment and the UN force is surely a good safeguard against penetration of the country.

Regarding monitoring of forces in Namibia, how this is done is important. Restriction to base is to prevent armed SWAPO personnel from wandering around with arms. Unfortunately, the term “base” is not a good one. When armed personnel go to designated areas, then anyone outside would be in violation. It is extremely important with South African forces, ethnic forces, and SWAPO forces that there be weapons control. The SYG will have to grapple with the problem and strike a balance with the overall concept, the need for reassurance, and for necessary detail.

Vance—We will be keeping in touch with you on questions that should be answered.

Rukoro (NNF)—Secretary General Waldheim’s latest report is a proposal with the objective of overcoming the problems of SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia. It is subject to further clarification.

On bases, aside from psychological effects and the matter of principle, there is no logical reason in favor of the provision for confining armed people inside the country. It is not conducive to a peaceful climate. There is a major risk of abuse, especially in the absence of clear definitions of “base” and procedures to be used. The Five should come out with their own position on these matters. It is hard to see how paragraph 11 is not a fundamental departure from the spirit of the Western proposal. Should any party—especially Mr. Nujoma’s—have armed men, it could use them as a threat. As a matter of principle, we are against paragraph 11. SWAPO guerrillas should get two options: either report to UNTAG, surrender arms, and join the political process, or go to an existing SWAPO base or wherever they came from.

We have experience in African politics. We know what would happen. Should SWAPO lose, we would have no guarantee. Our destiny is at stake and we don’t want to take a risk.

(Turning to question of SWAPO bases outside of Namibia, Rukoro quoted selectively from SYG’s implementation reports.) There is no doubt who would monitor SWAPO bases in Zambia and Angola—it is UNTAG. Until these questions are answered, there will be real problems.

McHenry—I think we should go over on the working level the elements of the proposal. On the last point at no point is UNTAG any place else but Namibia. End of session.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790129–0786. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bonn, Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Khartoum, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Maputo, USUN, Ottawa, Paris, and Pretoria.
2. See footnote 2, Document 112.
3. Not further identified.
4. In telegram 322951 to Pretoria, December 23, 1978, the Department transmitted the text of the December 22 letter to Waldheim. The letter read in part: “Questions on which there should be further consultation, such as the size and composition of the military component of UNTAG, and other matters which have already been brought to the attention of the Western powers, be resolved satisfactorily with the Administrator-General. Special reference is made to paragraph 12 of the settlement plan accepted by the South African Government on 25 April 1978 with a view to monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighboring states.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780531–0126)
5. Text of an advance copy of Wardheim’s letter was transmitted in telegram 7 from USUN, January 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790002–0418)