124. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State1
867. From Embassy Cape Town. Dept please pass White House. Subject: Namibia: P.W. Botha’s Reply to President Carter.
1. (Confidential–entire text)
2. Following in paragraph 3 below is text of letter dated April 11, 1979 from Prime Minister P.W. Botha to President Carter. The signed original, which was handed to Embassy Political Counselor by DFA Liaison Officer Neil van Heerden (Acting for DFA Secretary B.G. Fourie who is on Easter vacation) is being forwarded by pouch. Van Heerden’s general comments on Namibia are reported septel;2 his only comment about the letter per se was that P.W. had regarded President Carter’s letter of April 6 as a threat,3 although an inquiry to Ambassador Sole in Washington had brought the reply that no threat was intended. This is mentioned in P.W.’s reply, but ironically my own direct assertion of this point to P.W. Botha (Cape Town 830)4 is not mentioned. The salient feature of the letter is a carefully crafted repetition of South Africa’s position that the Secretary General’s report of February 26, 19795 introduced unacceptable deviations from the UN plan, specifically on the issues of monitoring SWAPO bases and allowing the establishment of such bases in Namibia. The letter dismisses the clarifications resulting from the recent Proximity Talks and says that the SAG will be influenced by the consultations in which Namibia’s “democratic [Page 355] parties” are currently engaged. It is an unencouraging, essentially negative reply.
3. Begin text of letter: “Dear Mr President
Thank you for your letter of 6 April 1979 which was handed to me by Ambassador Edmondson on 9 April 1979. I appreciate your candour and am sure you expect the same frankness from me. I also agree with you that we are at a point where understanding each other is of extraordinary importance.
We stand by the U.N. settlement plan which categorically provided for the monitoring of SWAPO bases and did not provide for the establishment after cease-fire of such bases in the territory.
Any objective analyst would agree that the Secretary-General’s report of 26 February 1979, introduced deviations which materially alter the proposal which we originally accepted and increase the already considerable risks involved to a point where the safety of the people of South West Africa can no longer be guaranteed. The 16 points which were subsequently submitted to us by the Five Foreign Ministers,6 do not affect these deviations.
The South African Government has stated all along that it would be guided by the wishes of the people. The leaders of the democratic parties are currently engaged in consultations on these important matters.7 The South African Government will be influenced by their views.
I was perturbed by your reference to the implications for our relations with the United States and the inevitability of U.N. action against South Africa, as this seemed to me to be a direct threat. This I immediately pointed out to your Ambassador.8 Subsequently, our Ambassador in Washington was informed that no threat was intended. I would be grateful to receive your confirmation.
As in the past, we remain ready to discuss the implementation of the original settlement proposal as well as Southern African issues in general, without accepting the right of others to dictate to us. Sincerely, P.W. Botha”. End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–1512. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- The April 11 conversation with Van Heerden is reported in telegram 869 from Cape Town, April 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790167–0148)↩
- See Document 120.↩
- See Document 122.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 112.↩
- In telegram 1306 from USUN, March 25, the Mission transmitted the 16 points of the Contact Group, which included assurances from SWAPO and the Front Line States that the cease-fire agreement would be strictly enforced outside of Namibia and that SWAPO forces in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire would be under UNTAG supervision. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790137–0859)↩
- See Document 121.↩
- See Document 122.↩