168. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
Rhodesia: The Parties to the Dispute
The major parties to the Rhodesian dispute have entered a new round of political and military maneuvering following the announcement of the UK–US settlement proposals and move to involve the UN in a settlement. The Rhodesian and South African governments, the four Rhodesian nationalist factions, and the five front-line African presidents all favor some form of political solution. Most of the parties, however, have little hope that there will be any early resolution of the dispute, and are keeping their options open as they try to strengthen their positions. Neither the Rhodesian government forces nor the nationalist guerrillas are strong enough militarily to impose their will on their enemies.
The Smith Government
The UK–US proposals add to the growing pressure on Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith. He and much of the white community find some of the proposals unacceptable and want further negotiations. They are particularly concerned about provisions for the disbandment of much of the present security forces during a transition period before a new government comes to power. Smith is trying to move ahead with his own internal plan for a settlement with moderate blacks which would exclude what he views as the more radical nationalist groups.
Smith’s chief asset in recent years has been the divisions among his black nationalist opponents, which he again hopes to exploit with his current settlement plan. His victory in the recent election, in which his party captured all of the seats in parliament reserved for whites, has enabled Smith to solidify his position as Rhodesia’s dominant white political figure that had been threatened by the defection of 12 right-wing members of parliament last spring. Smith also counts on South Africa to continue to provide support vital to his government’s existence, including some military supplies and trade routes through which almost all of Rhodesia’s exports and imports pass.
[Page 486]Smith is facing a number of problems, however, that eventually seem certain to bring down his regime. The country is experiencing a serious drain on its limited white manpower. Rhodesia has less than 270,000 whites, compared to more than six million blacks, and the net emigration rate for whites has been averaging more than 1,000 a month. This exodus, coupled with extended military call-ups as a result of the guerrilla war and low business confidence in the future are contributing to a decline in the country’s economy.
The Rhodesian security forces, which now maintain about 20,000 personnel on active duty, are still able to defeat any guerrilla groups they can find. Cross-border raids into Mozambique and warnings about similar raids into Zambia have apparently set back plans of guerrillas based in these countries for larger attacks. Nevertheless, hit-and-run raids by the guerrillas in widespread areas of Rhodesia are keeping the security forces stretched thin and lowering white morale. An escalation of these attacks or a collapse of settlement efforts could sharply increase the white exodus.
South Africa
South African Prime Minister Vorster has been urging Smith to reach a settlement with the black nationalists since 1974, and he is concerned that the West will take a harder line toward South Africa if Smith rejects the Anglo-American proposals. Although South Africa is unlikely to increase its military support for Rhodesia if the fighting increases, and Vorster now seems particularly anxious for an early settlement, he probably will not much put pressure on Smith to accept the UK–US proposals. The South Africans have consistently maintained that they will not force the Smith government to accept a settlement by cutting off Rhodesia’s foreign trade routes.
South Africa does not want a radical Zimbabwe government on its border, and fears that this could happen under the UK–US proposals. The South Africans would prefer a government headed by the moderate black leaders whom Smith is trying to involve in his internal plan, and may hope, as Smith does, that such a government would eventually win acceptance from the West and the black African countries.
The Nationalists
The Rhodesian nationalists are as divided as ever, despite numerous attempts by the front-line presidents and others to persuade them to unite. There seems to be virtually no chance that the leaders of the four main nationalist factions, which foresee each other as rivals for power in an independent Zimbabwe, will agree to any meaningful cooperation.
The two black leaders whom Smith wants to include in his settlement plan—Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa—are com [Page 487] peting for political position inside Rhodesia. Although both have been considering a deal with Smith, they are unlikely to join forces. Both have expressed support for the UK–US proposals because they believe they can win a fair election, but they are concerned that the proposals might lead to a transfer of power to their rivals. They also believe that Smith will reject the UK–US proposals, and they may decide that their interests will be best served by seeking a deal with him.
Sithole, who was almost written off as a nationalist leader last year, may be gaining strength among Rhodesia’s blacks. An astute politician who has stature as the founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in the early 1960s, Sithole recently gained the support of several nationalist leaders who defected from Muzorewa’s faction. Sithole is not now associated with the ZANU leadership, but he may have some sympathizers among guerrilla commanders ostensibly loyal to ZANU. Sithole claims to be in touch with these commanders inside Rhodesia and says they are disenchanted with their faction’s weak political position.
Sithole’s chief problem lies in his inability to develop any organized military following because of the front-line presidents’ support of his rivals and their denial of bases and training to his cadre. He also must build his political organization from scratch, since he was in jail or in exile for some 13 years before he returned to Rhodesia last July.
Muzorewa probably has the largest following of the nationalist leaders, and his African National Council has operated legally inside Rhodesia since 1971. Much of his personal popularity stems from his opposition to an unpopular settlement-plan proposed by the British in 1971.
[2 lines not declassified] His Council is in disarray as a result of the recent defections to Sithole. The opposition of the front-line states has also prevented Muzorewa from procuring military training for his followers, although he probably has some supporters among the guerrillas.
The Patriotic Front, a nominal alliance between Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), is supposed to direct most of the Rhodesian guerrillas. Despite the efforts of the front-line presidents to persuade the two factions to cooperate, ZANU and ZAPU run separate guerrilla operations from bases in Mozambique and Zambia respectively. Although the two factions generally operate in different areas of Rhodesia, their guerrilla forces have clashed on several occasions, detracting from the effort against Smith. There have been indications that Nkomo wants to hold back most of his guerrillas from the fighting until after a settlement so that they can be available for possible use against ZANU.
Leaders of both of the Front’s factions have been critical of some aspects of the UK–US proposals. They realize that they lack the political [Page 488] strength inside Rhodesia to win a free election and want their own forces, rather than a UN force, in control during the transition period so that they can determine the results of an election.
Nkomo has strengthened his position vis-a-vis Mugabe, largely by rapidly building up the ZAPU guerrilla force in Zambia during the past year. Although ZAPU probably maintains less than 500 guerrillas inside Rhodesia, it may have nearly 10,000—some of whom are still undergoing training—at bases in Zambia. This force has increased from about 1,500 late last year. ZAPU cadre are also receiving military training in Angola, Cuba, and the USSR, some of it in conventional warfare rather than guerrilla tactics. ZAPU has long enjoyed close ties with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets have increased arms deliveries to ZAPU in recent months.
Nkomo, the foremost nationalist leader since the 1950s, has maintained his political stature among Rhodesia’s blacks. He is more experienced than his rivals and apparently is viewed as the senior partner in the Patriotic Front by some of the front-line presidents.
Unlike his three rivals, however, Nkomo’s political position suffers from the fact that he draws most of his support from a minority tribal group—the Ndebele—which represents only about 15 percent of Rhodesia’s black population. Moreover, his organization inside Rhodesia has been weakened by recent arrests of its cadre by the government, and may also be damaged because Nkomo now operates from outside of Rhodesia. Although Nkomo’s position as the ZAPU leader does not appear in danger, the faction’s growing military strength apparently has led to increased rivalry among lower level leaders.
Mugabe’s ZANU still maintains the largest guerrilla force. It may have nearly 3,000 fighters inside Rhodesia at any given time, and at least another 1,000 at bases in Mozambique. ZANU may also have up to 20,000 personnel awaiting or undergoing training in Tanzania and Mozambique. The ZANU guerrillas get arms from the USSR and East European countries channeled to them by the front-line presidents. ZANU leaders have complained, however, that their force is not as well armed as the Soviet-equipped ZAPU force. China apparently agreed recently to send more military aid to ZANU, with which it has had close ties in the past.
The ZANU leadership is badly divided by personal rivalries. Mugabe serves only as the faction’s political spokesman, and has no control over the military effort. The ZANU guerrillas are handicapped by poor training and lack of discipline, and they have not performed well against the Rhodesian security forces. Moreover, neither Mugabe nor any of the other ZANU leaders are well known among Rhodesia’s blacks and they have practically no political organization inside the country.
[Page 489]Front-Line Presidents
The presidents of Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola are all involved in the effort to overturn white rule in Rhodesia, but only the first three play an important role. Tanzanian President Nyerere, who has reacted favorably to the UK–US proposals, acts as the unofficial chairman of the presidents, and sometimes mediates between his colleagues. Tanzania provides training bases for ZANU forces, serves as a conduit for arms largely to ZANU, but also to ZAPU, and has sent several hundred troops to Mozambique to help protect against Rhodesian cross-border raids.
Mozambique and Zambia, which border on Rhodesia and where virtually all of the trained guerrillas are based, are in the forefront of the military effort against the Smith government. Mozambican President Machel, like Nyerere, has indicated his support for the UK–US settlement effort. Machel continues to support the guerrilla struggle more extensively than his fellow presidents, however, and he would prefer a “revolutionary” government in Zimbabwe. His closest ties are with the ZANU leaders, who are based in Mozambique, but it is not clear whether he fully supports Mugabe.
Zambian President Kaunda also supports the UK–US effort, but fears it will not succeed in forcing Smith from power. A staunch supporter of Nkomo, Kaunda is worried that Smith will implement his own plan and freeze Nkomo out of a settlement. Kaunda has been under considerable criticism from domestic opponents for supporting the guerrilla war, which has contributed to Zambia’s growing economic problems. Although in recent months Zambian troops have frequently initiated shooting incidents with Rhodesian security forces across their common border, Kaunda has been more cautious than Machel in giving direct military support to the guerrillas because he fears Rhodesian retaliation.
Botswanan President Khama and Angolan President Neto are both preoccupied with internal problems and play only a secondary role in the Rhodesia situation. Although Botswana tries to discourage armed guerrillas from entering Botswanan territory, it serves as a transit point for ZAPU recruits crossing the border from Rhodesia enroute to Zambia. Botswana lacks sufficient military strength to keep out either the guerrillas or Rhodesian security forces pursuing them. Neto has supported Nkomo in meetings of the front-line presidents, and recently allowed ZAPU to set up training bases in Angola. Soviet weapons are forwarded through Angola to the ZAPU force in Zambia.
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80T00071A, Production Copy Files (1976–1979), Box 10, Rhodesia: The Parties to the Dispute. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Drafted in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency.↩