Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, February 1, 1978, 0143Z

25973. Fol rpt Valletta 0118 action SecState USUN NY info Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Maputo, Pretoria 30 Jan 78. Quote

118. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Full Text of First Day’s Malta Meeting With Patriotic Front.

1. Following is full text of first day’s sessions (morning and afternoon) of January 30 between UK/US, chaired by Foreign Secretary Owen and Ambassador Young, and Patriotic Front.

2. Owen opened hour and a half morning meeting by saying that he had not and will not waiver from the basic principles of the Anglo-American proposals as a basis for an internationally acceptable solution for Zimbabwe. Although he did not claim that only the Anglo-American Plan (AAP) would work, he insisted that its principles must be observed if a Rhodesian settlement is to be seen as fair by international opinion. To achieve that, it was impossible to exclude any significant section of opinion in Rhodesia. Owen admitted that it was difficult to negotiate on any one element of a Rhodesian settlement package apart from the others. He observed that no ceasefire could be achieved until the persons concerned with fighting agreed on such issues as law and order, the transitional arrangements and the independence constitution, and he recognized that those doing the fighting would not lay down their arms until they felt the process had become irreversible. We had tried to lay out our plan in such a way that the time scale and its irreversibility would be evident. Referring to the Geneva experience, Owen alluded to the problems which had arisen working out arrangements for an interim government, and pointed out how this experience had shaped the present emphasis in the AAP on a British Resident Commissioner balanced by a UN presence. He noted the other elements which the plan contained, including the proposals for the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), changes in the police force, the transition period and the independence constitution. He insisted that the UK and US public would measure the whole package by the yardstick of fair, free elections. Again asserting UK–US seriousness about the talks, Owen offered to explore any area which the PF wished.

3. Responding, Nkomo said it was useful to have met because it was urgently necessary to clarify the purpose of the talks between the UK and the PF. The PF had believed, when the British assigned a military man, Lord Carver, to meet with them and when the Secretary General had also appointed a military man as his representative, that it was understood the talks would be between those who were engaged in combat. The PF agreed that the subject of the meeting should be the interim arrangements which had to be settled as a prerequisite to a ceasefire. There could be no ceasefire, he said, until it had been made clear that the new set-up (the transitional arrangements) represented what the PF had been fighting for.

4. Nkomo argued that the interim arrangements were not simply a “political set-up”, but rather a “political set-up in the context of a military situation.” He said that the PF was not opposing other black political leaders, or trying to block free, fair elections. The PF had taken up arms to bring about a change in Rhodesia, and believed it necessary that the PF “superintend” what they were trying to bring about. He thought that the UK and the UN understood the nature of the transition, which was from a “war situation” to independence, and not a normal colonial transfer of power.

5. Nkomo, noting the presence of the Americans at the table, said in his view the US was there only to lend strength to the British position and did not really have a role defined in the proposals.

6. Nkomo did not agree that elections were the crucial element in Rhodesian settlement, but only one element, albeit an important one. He feared that the need for elections could be used to delay the formal coming of independence. He could see a situation in which in the months preceding a scheduled election there were riots and disturbances, and these could be used as pretexts to delay both the elections and independence.

7. Nkomo regretted not having been able to meet earlier with Lord Carver to discuss military disputes. He closed his presentation by asking Owen if the group had assembled to discuss substantive issues with a view to implementation of the AAP as modified by these discussions.

8. Owen said his answer was yes. On those points on which we could make firm commitments, we would make them. If firm commitments were impossible, we would say so. Owen pointed to Nkomo’s use of the term “superintend” as a point on which considerable detailed discussion would be necessary, as it could be a major problem.

9. Ambassador Young intervened to say that there was no question but that the UK and the US were in Malta as a result of a military situation, but that situation had not brought Smith to Malta. Because the PF’s military pressure had not brought Smith down, the UK–US had agreed to use diplomatic pressure either to bring Smith down or to the negotiating table. But that effort had in part depended on Front Line agreement and essentially on PF agreement to the principles of the plan. It also depended in part of the willingness of the South African Government to take some action at the appropriate time to replace Smith. Through no one’s fault, that had not worked out. Since Steve Biko’s death² our chances for South African cooperation were much less. The Front Line Presidents had been divided on the principles of the AAP, and there had been other disagreements on some elements of the plan. Our effort now, he said, should be to try to come up with arrangements which may not be all that the Patriotic Front wants but would be all it needed. He reaffirmed that the US had never waivered in its support for the AAP, and for an internationally acceptable solution.

10. Moreover, Ambassador Young stressed, we had seen our plan as focusing on the military situation. One of the keys to undercutting Smith, we believed, was to remove the threat of civil war after independence. This would cut sharply into the willingness of many of Smith’s supporters to go on fighting.

11. Robert Mugabe then asserted his belief that the UK–US team regarded this forum as no better than discussions with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau.³ The PF, he said, saw this forum as the only possible way to bring about peace and an irreversible process leading to independence. Dr. Owen spoke of arrangements which must satisfy all groups and shades of opinion in Rhodesia. If the purpose of this meeting was to discuss arrangements to bring about peace from a war situation, then talks with those who had the power to bring about peace could not be considered the equivalent of talks with those who lacked that power.

12. Mugabe asked if the UK was committed to finding peace, or if it still believed that the PF was only one of many parties to the Rhodesian quarrel. He said the PF had been given the impression by Owen and Young in Lusaka that the only parties were the PF, the British and the Rhodesian Front (which the PF considered part of the British side). Therefore, when Lord Carver said he was going to Salisbury to get the views of the internal Nationalist parties, the PF considered this an act of duplicity. If the UK wanted to bring about peace, then it should talk to the PF to the exclusion of parties that had no military forces. Mugabe concluded by sharply asking Dr. Owen where he stood on this issue.

13. Owen, refusing to rise to the bait, said he stood behind the British-American proposals of September 1.⁴ They attempted to straddle the problem which Mr. Mugabe had defined. There was no question but that military problems must be discussed with people who had military capabilities. We were trying to arrange a meeting between the two fighting forces and there was no dispute on such a need for the meeting or about the idea that only persons who commanded military forces could discuss military topics. But on non-military matters, if we seek to exclude other parties, then we will be unable to justify that action. This meeting is an attempt to clarify those aspects which are military. But there should be no doubt that the UK would treat all persons who seek to run in an election equally. Nonetheless, there were important elements which the military men must discuss.

14. Nkomo asked if we could agree that a ceasefire can only be discussed intelligently if we know what will take the place of the present set-up, and that knowledge of the internal arrangements are important to the ceasefire. He returned to this point a number of times. Owen agreed that it was impossible to achieve a ceasefire unless these matters were clarified. [garble] arrangements if others besides the fighters enter into discussions. Following those talks we could discuss an independence constitution and purely political arrangements. Owen agreed but insisted that some elements of the interim arrangements would not relate only to a ceasefire.

15. Nkomo argued that ZIPA and the young men and women who make it up were not a political instrument acting in favor of some people. ZIPA, he said, is a military instrument fighting for all the people of Zimbabwe. He understood, however, the difficulty faced by Dr. Owen, how to separate “the Siamese twins” of military and political topics so that they survive the operation. But he must assert that the young people who are doing the fighting were part of Zimbabwe and were greatly interested in what kind of a settlement was negotiated.

16. Owen agreed that this was the precise problem. We recognized the PF claim to have a role and refuse to accept that the transition period would see no role for its liberation forces. At the cost of some criticism, we had made provision for this in our plan. We accepted this as a reality but had a problem in agreeing that “superintending” should carry through to such things as demarcating constituencies and administering elections. We understood the PF point of view but they had to be aware that if the British Government was going to take responsibility for the settlement it must be passed through the House of Commons, and the House would not agree to one party in an election superintending that election.

17. Owen said that if the PF won a military victory, it could make its own arrangements and write its own constitution. But in the ambiguous situation which existed, the PF could not expect him to negotiate with the other side, when they still retained some substantial military capability, as though they had been defeated. Moreover, the British could not ignore the claims of the other Nationalists.

18. Nkomo quickly said he thought we had arrived at a practical problem. Here we must pinpoint what we mean by the question of superintending the ceasefire. It was complicated question and we should now discuss what it means. He said that he believed Dr. Owen had given a commitment that the fighting forces should discuss the prerequisites for a ceasefire, and this meant discussing the interim arrangements. The framework must be agreed and then fit in with the other political elements. Although there were other aspects to be considered, Nkomo said the general supervision of the arrangements must be in the hands of those doing the fighting.

19. Ambassador Young said he thought that the issues had been defined very well. He was very pleased that we had come so far in such a short time. Working in this spirit, he said he thought we could get much further. He believed that since we had made such progress it would be good to break for lunch on this very good note, with one clear problem now defined on the table.

20. As the morning meeting broke up, Nkomo and Mugabe raised again an issue that had been brought up before the formal session had gotten underway. They suggested that for the rest of the sessions the observers of the Front Line and Commonwealth States be invited to sit in on the meeting. Owen resisted this at first but said he was willing to discuss it further, and finally (at lunch) agreed that Front Line observers could attend further sessions but at the request of, or as part of the PF delegation. The Front Line observers were willing to attend on this basis, but the Commonwealth representative (Nigerian) probably will not do so. We favored allowing them all in without condition, but Owen was adamant.

21. Comment: We got off to a good start, even though Foreign Secretary Owen was disappointed at his inability to dissuade PF from tabling their plan. Owen fears that a PF proposal will add undesirable rigidity to further discussions. Nevertheless, the meeting had a generally serious and businesslike tone, with cordial atmosphere and little of the expected rhetoric or bombast from the PF. Owen kept his initial comments short and positive, and Nkomo responded in kind. Only emotional moment came when Mugabe accused British of duplicity over Lord Carver’s discussions with Muzorewa and Sithole, a charge to which Owen did not respond.

22. PF seems anxious to explore possibilities for moving towards some measure of agreement on interim arrangements. Both Nkomo and Mugabe arrived with sizeable delegations (26 and 19 respectively), including both military commanders and legal advisors, again conveying an impression of intent to pursue serious negotiations. Further substantive comment follows septel.⁵

23. Atmosphere at lunch, hosted by Ambassador Laingen for all delegations, including observers, was also very cordial, with good interaction on all sides. Private discussions which Owen and Young were able to conduct with Nkomo and Mugabe during lunch were similarly cordial and free of rhetoric.

24. Over lunch in separate converations with Joshua Nkomo both David Owen and Dick Moose developed some new insights into the PF position, or perhaps more accurately, Nkomo’s own outlook.

25. Nkomo told Moose that when he spoke in the morning session of the PF “superintending” the transition he did not have in mind an “exclusive exercise of power” but they did want to be able to “direct” what was done. He denied that the PF wanted to “do everything”. Most functions, he said, could be performed by others so long as the PF had some means of ensuring that “the direction is not lost.” Nkomo also said that the “structures” which might be created for this purpose could include “others” but that these “others” need not be named.

26. David Owen told us that in his conversation Nkomo evidenced awareness of the domestic political problems posed for the US and UK Governments by the internal talks and the PF position on the transition. According to Owen (who may have led him on) Nkomo acknowledged that Mugabe was a “problem”.

27. Nkomo also suggested to Moose that the afternoon session be cut short so that the PF could work on a paper which it wished to present containing transition and constitutional proposals. Although the paper was already written, Nkomo said, it needed a bit of touching up.

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “superintending” the interim period must take account of both military and administrative arrangements. To be able to discuss the ceasefire, he said, it is important that the interim arrangements (i.e., administrative as well as military) reflect the position of those actually doing the fighting. He then said it might now be appropriate for the PF to table its own papers on interim arrangements. Mugabe interjected that the papers would outline the general principles upon which the interim administrative arrangements should be based.

30. Owen responded by saying that he was leery of papers inasmuch as they tended to make positions rigid, but that he would be willing to consider whatever formulations the Front might have. Nkomo replied that the Front had previously been faulted for not having provided its ideas in writing and was now prepared to do so. Owen said that he had no objections to having the Front’s ideas, but that he would have to reserve judgment on the content. He reiterated that the UK could not accept any formula that interfered with the fairness of the elections.

31. Mugabe restated his understanding of the agreed approach which was that agreement should be reached between the PF, UK and US. Once this is done the US and UK will bring the necessary pressures on Smith to implement the agreement. Owen recalled that the original idea was for a meeting between the military commanders of the Patriotic Front and the Smith regime in Malta to work out the military arrangements for the transition. Owen said he still believes this is a good idea. Nkomo objected that this would appear to give Smith a veto over any agreement. Owen responded that this was not the case, but if there was to be a serious effort to negotiate this would also mean an attempt to extend the area of agreement to as many parties as possible. In the absence of Smith’s agreement, the UK would be obliged to implement whatever agreement it regarded as fair and reasonable.

32. Owen then asked Young to comment, and latter pointed to Smith’s having exercised a veto on the UK/US proposals along with several other parties. This predisposition of non-agreement in effect constituted a vetoing of the talks with little progress being made. However, if the Patriotic Front came to agreement at the end of the current talks, then the UK and US, given their prior commitment, would have to deliver Smith. Young described two ways in which this might be done. For example, if the Patriotic Front were to come to direct agreement with the Rhodesian Front on military arrangements, perhaps this might quicken the process toward majority rule. On the other hand, if that scenario did not occur, then the US and UK would have to apply pressures through the South Africans on Smith and that might take an extended period. Young cautioned that the Patriotic Front should not exclude the shortest possible route to gaining majority rule, i.e., through negotiation, and indicated that the upcoming Proximity Talks on Namibia in New York⁶ could provide a good indication of SAG’s current attitude toward an internationally acceptable solution in Rhodesia as well.

33. Both Nkomo and Mugabe objected vigorously to the idea that Smith could be persuaded to negotiate the transfer of power directly with the Patriotic Front. They insisted that we must come out of the present talks in Malta with the framework on which the US, UK and PF agreed is reasonable and fair. The US and UK must then use their powers to remove Smith and implement the agreement. Mugabe emphasized that the PF position is to negotiate with Britain and not with Smith. Owen agreed that our purpose now is to move to a situation in which at least we and the PF are in agreement and Smith is the one who must then be moved toward acceptance.

34. Owen suggested that pending the completion of PF papers for the interim arrangements, the conference might go on to discuss other areas. He noted that the British had completed documents outlining the independence constitution, the structure of the interim government, the structuring of the national army, the role of the UN force, and the role of the police. He mentioned in particular the need for discussion of the role of the Resident Commissioner, noting that the British paper provided for a transitional council, a military council to supervise the transitional military arrangements and a council to advise on establishment of the ZNA.

35. Both Nkomo and Mugabe balked at the idea of discussing other areas before their own proposals were tabled. Mugabe in particular bristled at the mention of a transitional council, pointing out that the ZNA had not fought all these years merely for a position on an advisory body. Neither saw any merit on embarking on the kind of discussion Owen had proposed since they had no clear idea as to where it might lead.

36. They reiterated their readiness to discuss the role of the Resident Commissioner vis-a-vis their own role during the transition and stated, in response to Owen’s prodding, that they were not insisting on an exclusive role for the PF during the transition. Owen again pressed to find out how soon the PF papers would be ready and urged that they be turned over this evening in order to allow time for careful review. It was agreed that the conference would recess until 10:00 am January 31.

Laingen

Unquote

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780047–0719. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davidow (AF/S); approved by Edmondson.
2. See footnote 11, Document 171.
3. Reference is presumably to the Carver-Chand talks. See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 172.
4. For text of the proposals, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, pp. 28645–28648.
5. See Document 183
6. The Namibia Proximity Talks took place February 11–12. See Documents 79–82.