Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

188. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 17, 1978, 3:30 p.m.

Attendees

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Assistant Secretary Richard Moose
  • Director, Planning Staff, Tony Lake

• Defense

  • Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Walter Slocombe
  • LGEN William Y. Smith, JCS

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
  • William Parmenter, NIO

• USUN

  • Ambassador Andrew Young
  • Dr. Anne Holloway

• NSC

  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Reginald Bartholomew
  • Thomas Thornton (notetaker)

The situation. The announcement of an agreement among Smith and the “internal” nationalist leaders marks a new stage in the Rhodesian problem² even though it leaves many problems unsolved. It is not certain that the black signatories will hang together and major questions, especially relating to the army and the form of the transitional government, are still open. We cannot estimate with confidence how the Patriotic Front (PF) leaders will react if a settlement seems to be gathering momentum. The Front Line Presidents would also be faced with difficult problems relating to their economies, domestic political situations and relations to their guerrilla clients. Although the military situation is not likely to be any worse for the Rhodesian government in the short term, the prospect of greatly increased Soviet and Cuban involvement looks likely if the PF does not join a settlement. The FL states may, against their own interests, accept an enlarged Cuban and Soviet presence even though this may have little short-term impact on the PF capabilities, given their low absorptive capability. The political costs for the US, especially in terms of complications of our Africa policy, could be great.

US domestic factors. Public opinion welcomes the apparent settlement and will react negatively if we seem to be opposing it. Even Sen. Clark and Rep. Solarz tell us they find it hard to maintain distance from the internal settlement. We cannot just put our heads down, however; we need to do something to maintain the initiative without committing ourselves prematurely for or against the internal settlement.

Analysis and response. Our objective remains movement towards a solution of the kind offered by the Anglo-US proposal: majority rule emerging from an electoral process, preferably in a peaceful manner. The momentum created by the Anglo-US proposal contributed to the positive aspects of the internal settlement. The internal settlement can be a significant step in the capitulation of the Rhodesian whites—the start of an inexorable and accelerating transfer of power once they see that black rule is becoming a reality. The touchstone of the success and acceptability of the Salisbury agreement will be how rapidly it promises to get Smith out. It may be able to do this more rapidly than either continued guerrilla struggle or the Anglo-US plan.

In public we should take some of the credit for the positive aspects of the Salisbury agreement and describe it as a possible “constructive step, provided it leads to a rapid transition to majority rule.” We should view it with restraint, however, and keep our options open.

If we are to play an effective role in the settlement process (we will have to, in order to protect our political position), then we must keep the initiative and maintain our credibility with all parties. To do this, we need to inform ourselves better on the prospects for a rapid transition to black rule under the Salisbury proposals. We also need to coordinate with the British (who are under great domestic pressure and probably would be glad to see us carry the ball by ourselves for a while). Further, we should take the next step in our dialogue with the PF and Front Line presidents—in terms of telling them that they bear a burden of responsibility for the Salisbury proposals because they failed to respond adequately to the Anglo-US plan. We should not put ourselves in the position of offering new proposals, but, rather, ask them what suggestions they have now beyond sterile calls for us to oust Smith. Our goal should be to build a bridge between the PF and the Salisbury parties, drawing the former into the settlement process and thereby giving it more credibility, while reducing the danger of protracted guerrilla warfare. We would not push the Anglo-US plan at this point but keep it on the table as a standard against which any settlement must be judged, and a possible vehicle for bringing all parties together.

Action assignments

1. CIA should prepare an analysis of a situation in which the internal settlement moves forward while Nkomo and Mugabe continue to fight. Military aspects should be given particular attention.³

2. STATE/AF should prepare press guidance reflecting the sense of the meeting and clear it, after which it will be promulgated and binding on all US Government officials and spokesmen.

3. If we come under pressure in the UN in the form of resolutions likely to reduce our flexibility, we should seek delay. USUN should build a case for this by briefing key Africans on our views and plans along the lines described above.

4. Assistant Secretary Moose and Stoney Cooks (USUN) should travel as follows: to London to meet with the British and talk to Sithole;⁴ onward to a place in Europe where they can meet with Muzorewa (depending on his schedule); thence to Africa to meet with all parties to the situation including Rhodesians, Front Line Presidents, PF leaders and South Africans. This trip should be started as soon as possible. The mandate of the team is: to coordinate what we are doing with the British; to learn from Sithole and Muzorewa, to the extent possible, what the prospects are under the Salisbury agreement for a rapid removal of Smith and transition to real black rule; to find out what the PF and Front Line presidents realistically want to do and want us to do; and without making specific proposals or commitments, to encourage a linking of the internal settlement with the PF.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 67, PRC 052, 2/17/78, Southern Africa—Rhodesia. Secret; Sensitive. The minutes are not attached and were not found.
2. On February 15, Smith and the “internal” Nationalists issued a statement announcing an agreement had been reached “on constitutional issues.” The final agreement was signed on March 3. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, pp. 28944–28946)
3. Not found.
4. See Document 190.