204. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 4038. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Owen/Vance Meeting With Patriotic Front Afternoon April 14.
Summary: In course of meeting afternoon April 14, Patriotic Front leaders Nkomo and Mugabe presented positions on three crucial elements of settlement. PF willing to accept UN peace-keeping force under certain conditions, but continues to demand effective control over the police during the transitional period—PF proposes new composition and functions for the Governing Council which reduces the Resident Commissioner’s role to titular head of the army and generally powerless member of Governing Council on which PF will predominate by two to one. End summary.
1. After brief opening remarks by Owen in which he expressed hope that we could pick up where we left off in Malta, Nkomo began his presentation with predictable PF questioning concerning whether agreements reached in Dar es Salaam would be binding ones. He and Mugabe asked whether Dar was to be a “serious” meeting or simply another round of consultations. Owen responded that he hoped we could reach agreements on the AAP and move to a meeting of all parties with those agreements. Secretary Vance stated that we would hope to be able to go to an all-parties meeting with common views. Ambassador Young pointed out that “All of our cases are stronger if we are able to reach consensus. We will be in no position to move forward if there is no consensus among us.” Owen noted that as there must be a negotiated settlement, certain things such as the ceasefire [Page 600] will have to be agreed upon by all parties. He did note that “we stand behind our proposals we put down in September.” In response to Nkomo’s question, “What happens if Salisbury says no to all-party talks?” Owen responded that he would not give up attempts to reach a final agreement.
2. Mugabe said that Owen’s responses were “not very assuring.” However, with some prompting from Secretary Vance, Mugabe and Nkomo proceeded to outline PF positions on three essential elements: (a) composition of Governing Council, (b) role of the UN force, and (c) police.
3. Governing Council (GC)—PF has changed position from Malta at which they suggested a 4–1–1 ratio (PF-Resident Commissioner-Rhodesian regime) for the GC. New position is that GC should be composed of twelve members (eight PF, three Rhodesian regime, and Resident Commissioner). Ministries of Defense and Law and Order should be held by PF members. The GC itself would have full legislative authority over all matters. Resident Commissioner would be Supreme Commander who would exercise powers on advice of GC. The only reserved power of Resident Commissioner would relate to combatting an external threat.
4. In response to heavy, but polite, questioning from Owen, Vance and Carver, Nkomo and Mugabe said that PF-controlled Ministries of Defense and Law and Order would be in day-to-day charge of defense forces. Decisions would be reached by consensus between GC and the Resident Commissioner. They discounted possibility that there would be differences among the Ministers and the Resident Commissioner.
5. Owen responded that PF’s position is fundamental change from what is envisaged in the AAP. In effect, PF proposed cabinet form of government in which military commander, in this case the Resident Commissioner, would act under direction of Governing Council. If such were the case, there would be no need for a Resident Commissioner with the powers and functions outlined in the AAP to administer the transitional period. Repeating on several occasions that he was not necessarily opposed to such a system, Owen nevertheless clearly stated that the British Parliament would not accept responsibility for administering the transition under such circumstances. He asked the PF to stop playing with words and to recognize that they were suggesting a fundamental shift in approach.
6. In relation to the 8–3–1 balance of the GC, Owen noted that it would be difficult to convince the world that free elections could be held when one of the parties contesting the election maintained a two to one majority on the Council.
7. With some passion—notable in a meeting characterized by subdued tones—Nkomo argued that the world fully understood what was [Page 601] happening in Rhodesia and that the gains won by the sacrifices of the people of Zimbabwe must be safeguarded against erosion during the electoral process.
8. Secretary Vance noted that the real question is the major change the PF has put forward about the powers of the Resident Commissioner. Mugabe interjected that it was a change for the better. Nkomo said that the PF has come a long way to meeting the Anglo-American suggestions, to which Owen asked good-naturedly if he were saying that with a straight face. Mugabe asked how we have modified our position since Malta, how far had we gone to meet the PF’s point of view. Ambassador Young noted that balance of power on the GC is not of great importance. In his view, whole GC is a waste of time and if he were running an election campaign he would not put his best people on the GC, but in the countryside to get votes. “All I am concerned about is free and fair elections to give the people of Zimbabwe a chance to choose a new government,” said Ambassador Young. Nkomo noted that because the Americans had defeated the British, “you didn’t have to have them conduct your elections—if you did, you’d know what we are worrying about.”
9. Nkomo, obviously anxious to have Owen make a counter-proposal on the GC numbers question, asked once again if the UK–US had developed any new thinking on the issue. Owen responded that at Malta we had modified our position significantly away from the total power we had initially thought necessary for the Resident Commissioner. Owen did not offer any new position on this matter.
10. UN forces—Mugabe noted that at Malta PF had accepted role of UN in observing elections. PF has now reconsidered its position about presence of UN peacekeeping force and “although we remain opposed to such presence, we are prepared to consider a UN force provided the role and functions are clearly defined as nothing more than to supervise the process of decolonization.” Mugabe also said that the term of the UN force must be restricted to end with the granting of independence. In response to Secretary Vance’s and Owen’s specific questions about the nature of the PF’s objection to a UN peacekeeping force, Nkomo and Mugabe provided no details except to indicate that the UN force’s role in supporting the civil power would not be acceptable if the civil power’s intention was one of recolonization.
11. Owen noted that the UN force does not come under the control of the Resident Commissioner but rather is the responsibility of the UN Secretary General. He asked General Chand to comment. With considerable precision, Chand noted his agreement that there must be a clearcut mandate for the force, which the UN has learned from past experience. He asserted that with daily liaison with all the political parties and the military commanders, the UN would be able to supervise the cease-fire and otherwise aid the peaceful transition.
[Page 602]12. Police—Nkomo noted that the whole question of the UN role depended on what other forces would be in existence. He said that at Malta Anglo-American position was that both PF and Rhodesian armies would be kept in barracks and that law and order would be maintained by the police on the assumption that they were a civil and neutral force. This assumption is totally unacceptable to the PF, which views the police as an element of the forces it is currently fighting. Nkomo said that the PF is prepared to work with acceptable elements of both the police and military forces but that these must be incorporated into “the forces for change,” that is, the PF. The UN could observe the maintenance of law and order by the PF-controlled police force. In response to a sharp question from Owen, Nkomo responded that he was thinking of a ratio of two to one in favor of the PF for the composition of the police force.
13. Owen noted that at Malta we had responded to the anxiety of the PF about the police by putting forward the concept of a UN police role. “There is no sense beating around the bush,” said Owen, “with two to one PF predominance in police we could not convince the world that there would be free elections.” Mugabe interjected that the British would accept if it were two to one in favor of Smith. Owen ignored the barb and countered with, “We think we could neutralize the police force with changes that would be made by the new Commissioner.”
14. In closing the meeting, Owen summed up the PF position on the Government [Governing] Council, the police and the UN force. In describing the latter, he emphasized that the PF was still opposed to the concept but would accept it, if the UN role were clearly defined. Secretary Vance noted, and Nkomo and Mugabe agreed, that in fact the PF was accepting the UN force.
15. Front Line was represented at meeting by Mwale (Zambia), Mkapa and Slaim (Tanzania), Mogwe (Botswana) and Deputy Foreign Minister Lima (Angola). Garba arrived near the end of the meeting. Chissano and Vieira reached Dar after the afternoon session. Observers did not address the meeting.
Comment: After meeting, Tanzanian representatives noted in private conversation that PF’s positions could hardly be considered resumption of Malta. Ambassador Salim noted that he believed the PF was putting forward an intentionally hard line as a preliminary bargaining position. Owen’s performance was restrained but, as in the case of his summary of the PF’s position on the UN force. He was apparently interested in helping the PF paint itself into the narrowest of corners. Carrying through on the attitudes adumbrated in his morning conference with the Secretary, Owen did not reject anything proposed by the PF, but simply and purposefully noted that such terms could [Page 603] not be accommodated in the settlement worked out under the Anglo-American Proposals.
- Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS Memcons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Pretoria, London, Lagos, Gaborone, Maputo, Lusaka, USUN, and Cape Town. Vance was in Dar es Salaam to discuss Rhodesia with Owen and the Patriotic Front.↩