Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

229. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, March 30, 1979

SUBJECT

• The Rhodesian Elections

You asked for additional information concerning the upcoming internal elections in Rhodesia and how they will affect our Rhodesia policy.²

The Rhodesians have not announced a timetable, but the phased election process is expected to begin April 10 and culminate in the installation of a new administration in late May or early June. The following is an approximate timetable:

April 10	—White Rhodesians vote to elect 20 white members of parliament.
April 17–21	—Blacks vote to elect 72 black members of parliament from slates put forward by the internal black leaders.
Late April	—The 50 white members of the current parliament meet to nominate 16 candidates for the remaining 8 white seats in the new parliament.
May 1	—Results of the April 10 (white) and April 17–21 (black) elections are announced.
May 7	—The 72 black parliamentarians and 20 elected whites meet to elect the remaining 8 white members of parliament from the 16 candidates previously nominated.
May 10	—The 72 blacks nominate 10 black members to the new 30-member senate; 10 white senators are nominated by the 28 white parliamentarians; and 10 others are nominated by the council of tribal chiefs, with 5 from each of the 2 principal tribes.
May 17	—The house and senate meet jointly to elect a state president.
May 21	—The president appoints a new prime minister, presumably from the party or coalition that holds a majority of seats in the house.
May 28	—The prime minister appoints a 20-member cabinet, on which each party will be represented in proportion to the number of seats it holds in parliament.
June 1	—The old parliament is dissolved and the new administration installed.

Ian Smith’s Rhodesia Front party is expected to win all 28 white seats. Black voter turnout will depend upon a variety of factors, but could exceed 50 percent. Earlier Rhodesian predictions of a 20 percent black turnout may have deliberately understated the expected turnout in the hope that a higher level of participation would be interpreted as a significant demonstration of black support for the internal settlement.

Despite declining support, Muzorewa remains the most popular of the internal black leaders and may win an absolute majority of seats in the new parliament. This would assure his appointment as prime minister. If he fails to win an absolute majority, the 28 white members of parliament could play a pivotal role in selecting the prime minister. In any event, whites will be able to block amendments of the constitution and major legislation, which require a 78 vote majority, for at least 10 years. They will be assured at least 5 cabinet posts and continued control over the military, police, civil service and judiciary through their dominance of extra-parliamentary commissions. Ian Smith will likely remain in the cabinet, possibly as defense minister.

THE CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT

The installation of a new administration will trigger the second condition of the Case-Javits Amendment (attached),³ which requires that you make a determination, either positive or negative, on the fairness of the elections as a prerequisite for the lifting of sanctions. (While the legislative intent of the first condition of the amendment would appear to have been satisfied by the agreement of the Salisbury parties to attend an all-parties conference, it can be argued that Salisbury’s unwillingness to engage in meaningful preparatory discussions raises justifiable doubts about their willingness to “negotiate in good faith.” It would be difficult, however, to sustain a negative determination on the amendment on this basis alone.)

The extent of voter participation is among the factors that must be taken into consideration in making your determination. In this connection, the conference committee report stipulates that a low turnout caused by guerrilla activities to disrupt the election should not necessarily preclude a positive determination. By the same token, however, the report states that the possibility that many people may refrain from voting as an expression of opposition to the internal settlement should be taken into account in considering a negative determination.

The legislation also requires a judgment as to whether “all the people of Rhodesia and all organized political groups have been given a fair opportunity to participate fully in the election without regard to ethnic identity or political affiliation.” Thus, consideration must be given not only to the manner in which the elections are conducted, but also to the conditions under which they are held. Without prejudging the outcome or your determination, it is possible to identify a number of factors that will have to be weighed, including:

—The inability of black Rhodesians to vote in the January 30 white referendum that approved the constitution on which the new government is to be based; and the likelihood that many blacks may boycott the elections to demonstrate their disapproval;

—The state of war and enforcement of martial law throughout most of the country;

—The announced intention of the Patriotic Front to disrupt the elections;

—Whether Salisbury’s offer of conditional amnesty to the guerrillas is a meaningful offer of full political participation;

—The ban on Patriotic Front political activities and the detention of an estimated 3,000 ZANU and ZAPU supporters;

—Pressures already being exerted by security forces, Rhodesian authorities, tribal leaders, and white employers to ensure a high black voter turnout;

—Evidence of intimidation by the 10,000 newly recruited “auxiliary” forces to compel support for Muzorewa or Sithole.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Whether positive or negative, your determination on Case-Javits will have an effect on future policy options:

—Many in the public and the Congress are predisposed to regard the April elections as deserving of recognition and support. A negative determination is therefore likely to trigger a move in the Congress to lift sanctions over the Administration’s objections. To avoid a veto, proponents of such a move will seek to attach a sanctions lifting amendment to a critical piece of legislation. Defeating such a move would require a strong Administration campaign. Even though it could prove unsuccessful, a strong campaign would be essential to maintaining the credibility of our opposition to the lifting of sanctions.

—African states and most of the international community are already disposed to regard the April elections as inherently illegal and unrepresentative, and a device to perpetuate white domination. Soon after the new government is installed, we expect the Africans to convene the Security Council and present a resolution condemning the internal settlement process and declaring the elections null and void. Thus a positive determination on Case-Javits would damage our standing and credibility internationally and in the United Nations and our ability to influence future events in southern Africa, and could lead African governments to withdraw their support for our Namibia efforts. It would also alienate important domestic constituencies, including liberals and blacks. National black leaders in particular have already indicated that they will devote active attention to the way the Administration handles the Case-Javits Amendment.

The strategy which you approved March 7⁴ was designed to position the Administration to manage these inevitable domestic and international pressures in the weeks ahead by:

—Re-emphasizing our commitment to a fair and impartial settlement;

—Stressing that, whatever the outcome, the April elections will not solve the Rhodesian problem or end the conflict, and the consequent need for the U.S. to preserve its ability to influence developments and work for a settlement in the future;

—Stating positively the conditions under which the Administration would support lifting sanctions and extending recognition to Rhodesia in order to provide our supporters an alternative to the positions of those actively lobbying on behalf of the internal settlement.

It is nevertheless important that whatever determination is made on the elections be broadly credible and supportable with both our domestic audiences and the international community. We will need to be able to cite the best possible sources of information about the elections. The fate of the McGovern-Hayakawa resolution⁵ to send congressionally-sponsored observers is still uncertain; but we are likely to have reports from a variety of sources, including journalists and private organizations, our own and British diplomatic reporting, and covertly collected intelligence. In order to defend against criticism that the Administration lacked firsthand information about the elections, we also intend to:

—Task the CIA for as much reporting as possible on the elections; and

—Arrange for low-level, unpublicized visits by Department officers immediately prior to and after the elections. In so doing, we will make clear that these visits do not alter our decision not to send official observers.

LOOKING AHEAD

Given the present preoccupation of the Salisbury parties with their elections, the focus of attention in South Africa on the information scandal and Namibia, and the elections in Britain, the prospects for early progress on Rhodesia are not promising. Given this situation, the strategy you approved March 7 places us in the best possible position to weather the problems and uncertainties of the weeks ahead.

We have carefully avoided raising expectations of a new diplomatic initiative that could commit us more deeply without producing a solution. Moreover, we have on record a clear and simple restatement of our policy which is both defensible domestically and credible with our friends in Africa and elsewhere.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 4/1–18/79. Confidential.
2. See footnote 3, Document 228.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. See footnote 4, Document 226.
5. See footnote 2, Document 225.