Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

261. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 28, 1977, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• South Africa:

  • Ambassador R. F. Botha

• U.S.:

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Brzezinski inquired whether Mr. Botha was related to the General Botha of Boer War fame. Botha replied that he was. Brzezinski related that as a child he had refought the war many times with his toy soldiers, and had always been on the side of the Boers. Botha replied that he was happy to hear it. Brzezinski then added: “I’m always in favor of national liberation movements—consistently”. Botha replied “I’m not so happy to hear that”.

Botha explained that his purpose in coming to see Brzezinski was to tell him that South Africa feels that “we’ve been let down by the Americans”, and why. Out of last year’s extended conversations in Germany, Switzerland, etc., had come a series of papers which constituted “at least an understanding, at most an agreement”. As far as South Africa was concerned these were not British proposals but were a joint British-American effort. They culminated in the well known 5-Point Plan² which was “typed on American typewriters”. Two points were not spelled out, and were included in brackets. These concerned the proposal for white ministers in the two security positions, and a white Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Botha acknowledged that Kissinger made no promises on these at the meeting in Pretoria where he, Smith and Volster were all present.³

At that meeting, Botha said, Smith accepted the 5-Point Plan in principle. It was a very painful, solemn, but “touching and sincere” meeting. Upon reading the plan, Smith turned to Kissinger and said “so you want me to sign my own death note”. But Botha emphasized that whatever happened later, at that time Smith did accept the 5-Point Plan as the basis for serious negotiations.

A few days later, the American Embassy informed the South African government that the plan could now include the two bracketed points, and again according to Botha, the new version was typed at the American Embassy. The Americans gave the South Africans and the Rhodesians “no warnings, no caveats” that this would be anything other than a bona fide negotiation plan. Smith accepted this and presented the 5-Point Plan unchanged in his statement of September 24. But just a few days later the African front-line Presidents met, and started to shoot down these proposals.⁴

Botha then talked at length of the key South African concern that a plan be developed which would allow for an interim period so that the Rhodesian economy could be kept intact. Otherwise, Rhodesia’s fate would resemble Mozambique’s which is now dependent upon South Africa for food, energy and other forms of support. If the Rhodesian economy is not preserved, then whoever comes to power there—black or white—will simply have to depend on some outside nation for economic help, and there still will not be African rule.

Concerning the present status of negotiations, Botha said “there is no way we can get out of this unless an agreement is an agreement.” He urged that the Americans require all sides to stick to what they agree to. Only in this way can the government of South Africa play a constructive role in holding Smith to his agreement. But if Americans continue to “tell blacks that you want peace at all costs, they will keep raising the price.” South Africa will not break its word. But now, “you are missing golden opportunities for peace.” Botha closed by emphasizing again that the only way to stop further Russian intrusion in Africa is through economic growth, and therefore through a gradual transition to majority rule that will not damage the Rhodesian economy.

Brzezinski replied that he was grateful to Botha for sharing his thoughts so openly with him, and emphasized that he cannot engage in negotiations since that is the job of the Secretary of State. However, he wanted to put the conversation in a broader historical context. He sees the problem in the Southern African arc as a case of adjustments to changing political and social conditions coming too late. If you compare Mozambique for example, to Nigeria or the Ivory Coast or Senegal, the difference is that in the latter case historical trends were understood and anticipated, while in Mozambique they were resisted until too late. The lesson for us all, and for South Africa in particular, is that we do live in a world of extraordinary change. The United States cannot afford to become involved in a struggle where objectively or subjectively it would be seen as being against blacks, nor would it accept a position where our policies would force blacks into an alliance with communists.

He remarked that we must remember that the aspirations of the Southern African blacks are “fundamentally legitimate” even if certain individuals may seem too radical or ill prepared to govern. The problem with Mr. Smith is that for years he has resisted these legitimate goals. This is why we have to take into account the mood of the African blacks.

Brzezinski emphasized that if the black-white struggle in Southern Africa also becomes a red-white conflict “it will be a disaster”. He added that no one in South Africa should be under the illusion that if this happens we will side with the whites against the blacks simply because that would be the anti-red position. Botha answered that “we have no illusions”. Brzezinski replied that he understood that, but believed that Salisbury may harbour illusions, and this would be very dangerous. Brzezinski emphasized that “the longer this goes on, the greater the chance for the two conflicts to interlock”. There is no opportunity for too many more delays. He closed by adding that Botha should understand that his position on Southern Africa was “not divorced from the human dimension” or from his personal admiration for the historical role of the South African whites—referring again to his opening remarks.

Botha remarked that he understood what Brzezinski was saying, but that he did not feel that Americans fully appreciated the South African “fear of domination”. Brzezinski replied that that was probably true, but that the South Africans should understand the overriding need for accommodation. “Once you begin to see the radicalization of your younger black generations it will be too late”. Brzezinski added that from his own historical studies, he believes that once an urban working class acquires political consciousness the momentum is too great to stop.

Botha turned to the subject of Namibia, saying that he believes that there is real hope for peace, but “we won’t be able to turn the territory over to SWAPO—no one could survive that in South Africa”.

He closed with a very strong appeal to South African nationalism. “In South Africa we have never shared power. We fought the British, and our nationalism now is as strong as ever. We will do it again. We do not fear to fight as long as we don’t have to fight the Russians. Brzezinski asked: “But who’s going to keep them out?” Botha replied “if necessary we will raise an army of a million men—black and white”. Brzezinski said yes, they could do that, but isn’t it a “grim prospect”. Botha did not reply. Brzezinski finished the conversation by urging Botha that his government make sure that Mr. Smith has no illusions as to American intentions. He urged the need to “make it clear to Smith once and for all” that the U.S. will never intervene in the conflict on the side of a minority white government, even if the communists were involved.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 1–9/77. Confidential. The meeting took place at the White House.
2. The Five Point Plan is included in Tab 1 to Document 264.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 206.
4. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 212.