Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

34. Memorandum From the United States Representative to the United Nations (Young) to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance¹

New York, March 27, 1979

SUBJECT

• Recognition of Angola

The present political turmoil in South Africa requires contingency planning. The information scandal² and possible elections in South Africa threaten to undermine the peaceful change we have sought to nurture in southern Africa. We must try not to let this happen. One step we can take is to normalize relations with Angola now. This step will give us greater diplomatic leverage and influence in the critical months ahead. It will further our political and economic interests in southern Africa.

Our Policy

For the past two years, our policy objectives in southern Africa have been:

1) stable conditions to facilitate trade and development;

2) political and economic approaches toward majority rule and democratic conditions;

3) minimizing Soviet influence, violence, and chaos which impede our objectives.

We have approached these objectives by attempting to serve as a bridge between South Africa and the Front Line States. We have worked in cooperation with our western allies to find a common ground for negotiated solutions to southern Africa’s conflicts.

With great difficulty, we have maintained a mediating role and preserved a somewhat tarnished credibility among all parties. We have contained violence and limited internationalization of conflicts though we have been unable to produce meaningful settlements of either Rhodesian or Namibian situations.

Turmoil in South Africa

Now we see South Africa threatened again with internal scandal which eliminates the immediate possibility of their contributing positively to change. It will take many months before they might emerge with a government strong enough to give leadership without creative external pressure.

This increases the potential for Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Namibia and the further military involvement of South Africa in Rhodesia as they seek to create a “laager type unity” to diffuse their internal pressures.

It will inevitably mean more calls for sanctions from African states and will continually put us on the defensive in regard to Soviet-Cuban propaganda and expanded military efforts.

Domestic Implications

A Senate vote to send observers to Rhodesia and/or end sanctions³ returns us to the days of the Byrd Amendment and brands the U.S. once again the supporter of racism and colonialism.

This will be more difficult to deal with now than in the 60’s and 70’s. African states are stronger economically and politically and will tend to exercise that power in the UN, trade negotiations, OPEC (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon).

At a time when we must increase exports to help in our control of inflation and unemployment, it effectively poisons the atmosphere for our corporations and puts them at a disadvantage against the German, Japanese, Eastern Europeans, and now Brazilian competitors.

We can also suffer severe set-backs domestically. While there is little in the way of an organized African policy among Black voters, any collapse of our African policy will be used to confirm the growing cynicism and racial distortion of Administration policies.

The Front Line States

It is now of critical importance to strengthen our relations with the Front Line and Nigeria. Events are escalating rapidly. Our ability to influence events are rapidly being diminished by the naive Congressional moves toward Ian Smith.⁴ This pushes Africa away from us and literally forces them toward Soviet dependence.

It is very much in our national interest to minimize a cold war view of Africa. We can demonstrate our continued superiority and concern by emphasizing the “development aspects” of African politics in lieu of temporary frustrations of Western efforts on liberation and majority rule.

Development has always been our major weapon in competition with the Soviets. Our private sector is capable of putting millions of dollars into investment and technology in African development. Nowhere is this more appreciated than in those states where Soviet influence has been dominant but is now waning. Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola are key examples of countries whose development has been stifled by Soviet exploitation and inefficiency.

Angola

The normalization of relations with Angola would provide us with a method of demonstrating our strength. It would permit Angola to become genuinely non-aligned. It would provide the basis for Cuban withdrawal and put us in a better position to prevent or to deal with possible chaos resulting from the explosive conditions in Rhodesia and Namibia.

There is considerable business interest in Angola. Gulf Oil is anxious for additional energy concessions. Boeing is involved in Angola’s airport development. The European community has begun work on several infra-structure projects.

Angola has been very helpful in our attempts to find a UN solution for Namibia.⁵ They brought SWAPO along even when it required real pressure. They have several interests in a Namibia settlement, but one important factor is their desire for recognition by the U.S.

They responded very positively to our urgings that they end the Katangan attacks on Zaire, and with great effort, they began removing the Katangans away from the border.

They have conducted a series of private and government negotiations with South Africa. The private talks resulted in Anglo-American and DeBeers taking over their diamond production. But while the government talks went well, the Angolans find themselves humiliated by the bombings of their territory by South Africa and only pro forma criticism from the West.

Now we find the Angolans balking a bit at additional support for the Secretary General’s report on UNTAG.⁶ There have been difficulties in communication technically, but there is also some obvious disillusionment on their part. Most African states give us some of the blame for the military power of South Africa and Rhodesia. This is especially true in Angola where they fought for years against Portugal’s NATO-supplied weapons.

The next months will be critical for our efforts in southern Africa. We will be required to influence events and contain disaster without military involvement. Full diplomatic involvement with all the Front Line States, including Angola, will be essential if we are to have any possible change of:

1) continuing supervision of UNTAG;

2) monitoring flow of refugees into Namibia;

3) preserving credibility sufficient to perform in potential Rhodesian collapse or escalation; and

4) influencing possible political re-integration of UNITA into Angolan government.

These goals are not to be seen as bargaining points with Angola. They are in our interest and only possible if we have a well-respected Ambassador on the scene cultivating relations at the highest levels of the Angola government. A chargé d’affaires will be treated accordingly and have little influence within Angolan events, though it would be a strong signal to other African states.

The combination of a strong U.S. Embassy and the increase of U.S. business activity would assure us of a non-aligned Angola willing and able to wean herself from total Soviet dependency.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 3/13–31/79. Secret.
2. The scandal involved a series of allegations and disclosures about the misappropriation of secret funds controlled by Dr. Cornelius (Connie) Mulder’s Department of Information in 1978. The scandal led to Mulder’s resignation in November 1978 and to B.J. Vorster’s resignation as State President on June 4, 1979. Cabinet changes were announced on June 14. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, pp. 29835–29836)
3. See footnote 2, Document 225.
4. Not further identified. Reference is presumably to an invitation by a group of Republican Senators for Smith and members of the Executive Council to visit the United States in October 1978, “for the purpose of winning official US support for the transitional Government and its programme.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, pp. 29438–29439)
5. Angola, along with the other Front Line Presidents, worked to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflicts in Namibia and Rhodesia.
6. In telegram 918 from USUN, March 5, the Mission reported on a conversation between the British and the Angolans as follows: “1) Messages from the Five concerning a) liaison offices; b) need for early reply to the Secretary General’s proposals had been considered by President Neto and advisers until 2.00 am this morning; 2) Neto had subsequently telephoned Waldheim direct to say Angola could not (repeat not) agree establishment of an UNTAG liaison office.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790101–0713)