Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

354. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 5, 1979, 1:45–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Rhodesia and Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• State:

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Assistant Secretary Richard Moose, African Affairs
  • Mr. Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning

• USUN:

  • Ambassador Donald McHenry

• CIA:

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Mr. Frank Carlucci
  • Mr. William Parmenter

• JCS:

  • Lt General William Smith

• Defense:

  • Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
  • Dr. Owen Roberts
• • Treasury:
  • Mr. Gary Hufbauer
  • Mr. James Griffin
• • White House
  • Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Mr. David Aaron
  • NSC
  • Mr. Jerry Funk

This meeting considered three principle problems:

—The Namibian situation, with emphasis on the present difficulties concerning monitoring arrangements for SWAPO forces, and the necessity of getting a favorable response from the South Africans on the proposals growing out of the Proximity Talks in New York in late March.²

—The question of the desirability of extending diplomatic recognition to Angola.

—The Rhodesian problem, which is being forced to a critical stage by virtue of the internal elections in the latter half of April, and which not only presents us with seemingly intractable difficulties in trying to move the various parties toward a peaceful solution, but also raises serious domestic political considerations concerning the lifting of sanctions under the terms of the Case-Javits Amendment.³ (S)

On Namibia, it was agreed that a short rather personal letter from the President to Prime Minister Botha⁴ would be helpful in encouraging the South African Government to respond in a positive way to the proposals growing out of the Proximity Talks. These proposals were designed to deal with the two principal problems being raised by SAG at the present time: The monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola, and the establishment of one or two centers in Namibia to gather together and monitor SWAPO forces now in Namibia. (S)

It was recognized that SAG may well fail to accept these proposals entirely, but that a reasonably positive response was necessary to keep settlement hopes alive, and that another Presidential letter could well be crucial in obtaining that positive response. It was noted that a negative response would almost certainly trigger serious moves in the UN Security Council toward sanctions, and that such moves would present us with serious political and economic problems. (S)

On Angola, the Committee was divided on the question of the desirability of extending recognition, and agreed to so report to the President. (S)

In favor of recognition, it was argued that: (1) Angola had been cooperative with us in dealing with SWAPO on the Namibian problem, and could be important in the future; (2) recognition would give us influence and leverage useful in reducing Cuban influence and presence; and (3) we had important and potentially growing commercial interests in Angola. (S)

It was also argued that recognition would help maintain and build upon our general credibility with Black Africa. (S)

The other view was that while it was desirable to carry on a dialogue with the Angolans about steps leading to a normalization of relations, we should not give recognition without some quid pro quo concerning the massive Cuban military presence and its threat of further intervention in both Namibia and Rhodesia. (S)

It was further argued that an immediate recognition would not only fail to guarantee any basis for Cuban withdrawal nor any Angolan movement toward genuine non-alignment, but would weaken our position in Southern Africa, and that therefore we should use the possibility of recognition as a tool to bring about a reduction in Soviet and Cuban presence and influence. (S)

With respect to domestic politics, two views were also expressed: (1) that recognition was now supportable on the Hill; and (2) that immediate recognition without quid pro quo would be perceived on the Hill as weakness and a vacillating change of long-standing policy. (S)

On Rhodesia policy, the meeting considered two basic options for present action: (1) that we stay with our long-standing and recently restated policy of urging acceptance of a political process leading ultimately to UN-supervised elections;⁵ (2) that, in light of the high probability that Congress will attempt to lift sanctions, and may succeed,⁶ we should work out a new strategy, which would utilize this factor to pressure the internal government and the Patriotic Front to begin serious negotiations on a political settlement. (S)

It was also suggested that following the elections, there may well be an attempt to split the Front to bring either Nkomo or Mugabe into the internal government, and that if this begins to happen we should be prepared to support such a move. (S)

Serious questions regarding this later “split-front” policy were raised, but the meeting showed a great deal of interest in working out the details of basic Option Two, i.e., using sanctions as a tool to gain movement toward negotiations. Such an option would require a well planned and carefully scripted series of approaches to our Congressional leadership, the Front Line States, the Republic of South Africa, the Patriotic Front, and the Internal Government, beginning in April and continuing through May. (S)

The meeting agreed that this Option Two had somewhat limited chances of substantive success, but could have the effect of being a positive factor with respect to domestic political considerations. (S)

It was further agreed that the details of Option Two should be worked out on an urgent basis for careful consideration at a follow-up meeting to be scheduled for the immediate future. (S)

To recapitulate:

—On Namibia, it was agreed to send another short personal Presidential letter to Botha urging acceptance of the proposals regarding SWAPO monitoring growing out of the recent New York Proximity Talks.

—On Angola, there was a division of opinion on the question of extending recognition.

—On Rhodesia, there was careful consideration of a proposal to alter our present strategy to include using the sanctions question to pressure the parties to negotiate, and it was agreed to work out further details for an urgent follow-on meeting. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 4/1–18/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. See Documents 111–117.
3. See footnote 3, Document 223.
4. See Document 120.
5. For text of Vance’s March 17 statement, see Department of State, Bulletin, June 1979, p. 22.
6. Reference is to the Helms Amendment, introduced in June 1978, in an attempt to remove sanctions that had been reinstated in March 1977. See footnote 2, Document 210.