Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

371. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State¹

Cape Town, January 25, 1980, 1248Z

154. From Embassy Cape Town. Subject: (S) US-South African Nuclear Dialogue. Ref: (A) State 9602² (B) Cape Town 0065.³

1. S-Entire text.

2. I delivered text of letter and annex in para 7 reftel A to SAG Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie on January 24, reviewing for him again the USG conclusions on the September 22 event in the South Atlantic, as provided to one of his officers earlier on January 14 (ref B), and noting that we were prepared to resume our efforts to achieve a nuclear settlement on the assumption that South Africa’s nuclear policy remained as stated in former Prime Minister Vorster’s 1977 assurances to President Carter.⁴ Noting the role of Congress in the steps outlined in my letter, I added that if we come to an agreement in principle, we may need to be in a position to say to the Congress that those assurances are still in effect.

3. After reading the annex carefully, Fourie asked if he was correct in assuming that the steps outlined in the annex all constituted part of a package and that the obligation to fulfill the intention (to accede to the NPT), the announcement of which would be among the required steps listed in para 2 of the annex, could be made contingent by South Africa upon the successful review and simultaneous coming into effect of the agreement mentioned in para 3 of the annex. I said that this was my understanding. He said that was how he thought he remembered the Joint Minute, that is, that the SAG would not be obligated to carry out a stated intention to accede to the NPT until the simultaneous coming into effect of the overall agreement on fuel for Koeberg, which could actually follow the supply of HEU for Safari (once the SAG intentions were announced).

4. In discussing our mutual comprehension of the process, the following informal listing of steps was distilled to simplify what would be involved. (The parenthetical notes are my own and were not discussed with Fourie.)

A. Step one would be SAG confirmation to the USG that it was in agreement with the procedure proposed and that it would, at the same time that the US Executive Branch recommends that the NRC license the export of HEU fuel for Safari (as specified in the Joint Minute), announce its intention to take steps (A), (B) and (C) of paragraph 1 of the annex. (Note: The assumption here is that a recommendation of a licence to NRC will effectively guarantee its issuance, since Safari is already under safeguard.)

B. Step two, presumably, would be agreement on the timing of subsequent steps, including negotiation and conclusion of a contract for the supply of Safari fuel, and on whether the SAG announcement and USG recommendation would come before the Safari fuel contract was concluded or afterward.

C. Step three: begin contract negotiations. (Also, presumably begin safeguard development program and cooperation on reduction of Safari fuel enrichment levels.)

D. Step four: either during step three negotiations, or after the contract is concluded, but in either case at a simultaneous time to be established in advance, the USG delivers a recommendation to the NRC that the NRC license the agreed amount of HEU fuel for Safari and the SAG releases the announcement described and agreed upon in step one. (Note: presumably, HEU for Safari could be supplied as soon as the necessary contract is concluded, even if subsequent steps are still in process.)

E. Step five: the USG and SAG begin priority renegotiation of US–SA agreement (permitting supply of fuel to Koeberg) to meet the criteria of the US Non-Proliferation Act.

F. Step six: USG submits renegotiated agreement to Congress for review.

G. Step seven: by express provision in the renegotiated agreement, upon successful completion of congressional review, the agreement is approved to come into effect upon deposit by South Africa of an instrument of accession to the NPT.

H. Step eight: South Africa deposits instrument of accession and the renegotiated US–SA cooperation agreement comes into effect automatically.

5. Fourie asked about the question of peripheral safeguards which the SAG raised before. I responded that this would have to be explored as part of the safeguards development program in step (B) of the annex, adding that I thought we had answered their questions on this subject as completely as possible in the absence of such a development program having actually begun.

6. Fourie said that he would have to study the Joint Minute and the file of our previous exchanges and consult with the experts before he could comment further. He added that AEB President, Dr. Wynand de Villiers, and possibley UCOR Chairman, Dr. Ampie Roux, would be coming to Cape Town on Wednesday, January 30, and that he would discuss it with them then. I reminded Fourie of my request that our letter be brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, which he acknowledged by saying that Ministers usually wouldn’t even look at the subject without some form of explanatory exposition by the experts. I said I understood this but felt that it was important that they know of the US approach, given the growing pressures in the UN and the urgency of achieving some significant progress toward a nuclear settlement.

7. Comment: Fourie gave every appearance of regarding our approach with serious interest, although he commented that the “South Atlantic event” had created a rather poor atmosphere. His main concern seemed to be whether we had answered the earlier SAG questions (which he could not remember in detail, even though I tried to get him to concentrate on the importance of getting the agreement process started rather than on the technical aspects. Regarding para 8 of ref A, I doubt very much that the SAG would say that joint settlement prospects are “dead” at any time, unless the USG itself were to take some action (e.g. conditional support for sanctions) that SAG regarded as an ultimatum or too openly coercive in nature. Thus, the most likely SAG response other than agreement (for which the chances seem slim) would be to request further information on technical aspects of the proposed agreement or for assurances on the commercial secrecy of their enrichment process. Unfortunately, there is no assurance that their reply will be very prompt as attention is currently focussed on the opening of Parliament⁵ (February 2).

Edmondson

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058–0017. Secret; Nodis.
2. See Document 370.
3. In telegram 65 from Cape Town, January 15, the Embassy reported that the South African Government was informed of the imminent release of the press statement on the findings of the panel investigating the South Atlantic event. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058–0013)
4. See Document 311.
5. In telegram 671 from Cape Town, March 20, the Embassy reported that Ambassador Edmondson had asked Fourie for a reply on March 18. Fourie said that the matter had been discussed by the Cabinet, but he “needed a couple hours to prepare himself to deal with this complex subject.” Due to their conflicting travel schedules, Edmondson suggested Fourie meet with Minister-Counselor Howard K. Walker, who was fully briefed on the subject. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 1/80–1/81)