The President has read your reclama on next steps in Angola. He has noted
that you should consult on the Hill, and has directed that you report
the results of your consultations.2 I include a
copy of your reclama and your original memo on which his decision is
based.3
Attachment
Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the United States
Representative to the United Nations (McHenry) to President Carter4
Washington, December 21, 1979
SUBJECT
We continue to believe that US interests in Angola and southern
Africa would be best served by immediate recognition of the Luanda
government.
In our memorandum of October 23, 1979 we recommended that Ambassador
Wisner (in Lusaka)
travel to Luanda to inform the Government that the United States
will recognize Angola but to state also that
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close relations could not exist without a
significant reduction of the Cuban military presence.
To condition recognition on Angola’s agreement to reduce Cuban
troops, as had been decided, will not advance the current situation
and could be counterproductive. In past contacts, the Angolans have
strongly reacted negatively to any linkage of US recognition to a
drawdown of Cuban troops. President Neto, before his death, held that Cuban support was
necessary to bolster Angolan security in light of South African
attacks from Namibia against Angola; South African support for
UNITA; and tensions between
Zaire and Angola. Without entirely accepting Angolan reasoning (i.e.
UNITA will probably continue
to be a force to be reckoned with but probably on a smaller scale),
we would note that the Zaire situation has been largely resolved but
the Namibia problem remains despite far-reaching Angolan efforts to
reach a solution. In sum, Angola’s security concerns remain despite
their forthcoming posture. In their view, the Cubans will remain so
long as the South Africans remain in Namibia as a direct threat and
with ready access to UNITA.
The dos Santos government
appears to be at least publicly well-disposed toward the United
States, although pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban elements in the leadership
continue to challenge those more favorably disposed to greater
cooperation with the West. President dos Santos warmly confirmed this posture in response
to your letter on the death of Neto. An Angolan government official informed us
November 27 that the new leadership in Angola would respect the
assurances given earlier by Neto’s representative that the Cubans would be
withdrawn upon a Namibia settlement.
The dos Santos government
continues to be helpful on a number of southern African issues. As a
Front Line state, Angola demonstrated its willingness to assist
Britain’s Rhodesia initiative, and the successful reconciliation
with President Mobutu owed
in great measure to the Angolan desire to restore stability on its
northern border. In July, 1979, the Angolans broke the logjam in the
Namibia negotiations by proposing creation of a demilitarized zone,
which the South Africans recently accepted (subject to certain
conditions). Since it is now South African foot dragging which is
slowing progress on Namibia, it would be contradictory to continue
telling the Angolans that we must have movement on Namibia (and from
their side a consequent reduction in the Cuban military presence)
before we could consider diplomatic relations.
We believe this is a propitious moment to inform the Angolans of our
willingness to recognize the Government of Angola albeit with little
hope of warm relations without significant Cuban withdrawal. In
doing so we would demonstrate that the US is prepared to join our
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allies (who have already
recognized Angola) in offering an alternative to Angolan reliance on
the Cubans and Soviets. Most Africans, including Liberia, Nigeria
and the other Front Line states believe firmly that we should take
the step. Continued isolation of the Angolans will leave them
dependent upon the Eastern bloc, while the establishment of
US/Angolan relations could serve as the first step toward bringing
Luanda out of the communist orbit. Diplomatic relations, at the
outset, would facilitate economic/commercial relations and promote a
healthy exchange of views. Although PL–480 and AID bilateral assistance to Angola
must await greater public and congressional acceptance in the United
States, they represent formidable means of convincing the Angolans
of our interest in their peaceful and steady development.
Our present policy gives the Soviets and Cubans the opportunity to
foster instability in southern Africa and within Angola itself. Our
willingness to recognize Angolan cooperation on issues of mutual
concern and engaging rather than attempting to isolate them would
serve to demonstrate our resolve to challenge the Cubans and Soviets
in southern Africa.
It is worth recalling that because we had good relations with
Mozambique we were able to enlist Samora
Machel’s support in the final hours of Lancaster
House to bring Robert Mugabe
to initial the ceasefire. The Angolans are in a position to play the
same role with SWAPO as regards
Namibia.
