Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town¹

Washington, February 26, 1977, 1953Z

43645. Exdis for the Ambassador. Subject: The South African Reply on Namibia.

1. The South African Ambassador called on Assistant Secretary Schaufele on February 26 and delivered a memorandum of record summarizing our exchanges with the South African Government on Namibia.² The South Africans are not prepared to reconfirm the 7 Point Proposal for a Namibian settlement³ but are willing to discuss quote some basic points unquote.

2. The South African memorandum points out that the South African Government will have great difficulty in slowing the pace of the Turnhalle Conference and reminds us that we have been adequately warned that this would be the case. In light of the advanced stage of Turnhalle deliberations quote some of the Seven Points have for practical purposes been overtaken unquote. The memorandum closes by saying that the SAG is prepared to discuss quote some basic points unquote with US.

3. In presenting his memorandum Botha stressed his government’s interest in seeing moderate government set up in Namibia and Rhodesia. South Africa, he pointed out, has no interest in replacing a minority white regime in Rhodesia with a minority black regime whose only political support is military muscle. This, he said, appears to be Britain’s intention. Similarly in Namibia moderate Africans, including many of SWAPO’s original founders, are seeking to create an independent Namibian Government and South Africa agrees they have a better claim than does SWAPO’s present leadership.

4. In reply Schaufele told Botha that he does not agree with Botha’s description of British intentions in Rhodesia. The British do not intend to hand over power to Robert Mugabe and his freedom fighters. They have argued, with our support, against the Front Line States’ intention to give the Patriotic Front exclusive recognition and the Front Line Presidents appear to be having second thoughts. The British have held to their view that free and fair elections must preceed independence.

5. With respect to Namibia, Schaufele told Botha that the situation was not as stark as he painted it. We have indications some African nations are uneasy with SWAPO’s continued intransigence and might be willing to play a more forceful role.⁴ Schaufele also reminded Botha that we face a Security Council debate on Namibia which will have unfortunate consequences for his government if it cannot be proved that an internationally acceptable settlement is being sought.⁵ Botha said the points Schaufele made were most helpful, and he would communicate them to Cape Town. He and the Assistant Secretary agreed to examine in greater detail next week what the SAG and we have in mind.

6. Would appreciate your comment and suggestions.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770067–1231. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wisner; cleared by Bridges (S/S); approved by Schaufele. For an explanation of the status of the Embassy in Cape Town, see footnote 1, Document 153.
2. Not found.
3. See Tab 2, Document 264.
4. In telegram 1744 from Lagos, February 14, the Embassy summarized a conversation between Young and Obasanjo, in which the role of Nigeria in dealing with SWAPO was discussed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770052–0561)
5. The UN General Assembly’s Special Committee held meetings on the question of Namibia from February 25 to March 14. The Special Committee asked the Security Council to consider measures against South Africa, including an arms embargo, as provided for under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, p. 898)