Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVI, Southern Africa

49. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State¹

Cape Town, April 7, 1977, 1807Z

521. Subj: Meeting With PM Vorster on Namibia. Ref: Cape Town 0519;² State 076299³ and previous.

1. This message covers the highlights of an hour-long meeting with PM Vorster at which I handed him aide memoire and made oral points on behalf of the five governments. He was accompanied by FonMin Botha and DFA Secy Brand Fourie. In a separate message there will follow my assessment of the meeting.⁴

2. After reading the aide memoire carefully and listening to the oral points,⁵ PM reacted by saying that “to put it mildly, he found this approach very strange indeed.” Showing considerable irritation, which continued throughout the meeting, he made these points about the document:

A) You talk about self-determination through a fully democratic process. After watching the Turnhalle process for two years, now you tell us that it is not good enough.

B) You speak of supervision of the United Nations. There is the whole history of Dr. Escher sent out by the UNSYG as his representative to work with us on SWA.⁶ After reaching certain understandings with him, he returned to New York but we heard nothing further from the SYG.

C) You call for an end to SAG administration in SWA. Our attitude on this is very clear and has been repeated many times. We have said that we want to end our administration of the territory.

D) Regarding political prisoners, he was not aware of any political prisoners being held in SWA. If you refer to people convicted by the courts as common criminals, these fall outside the terms of your note.

E) With respect to people returning to SWA, he found this very strange since there is no hindrance to people coming back, including SWAPO people. Why do your governments bring this up? They know this, or don’t they want to know?

3. Botha then entered the discussion focusing first on lack of Western recognition for what the SAG had done and then expressing dismay over the fifth paragraph of the aide memoire which he described as a “veiled threat.” He referred to the Kissinger-Vorster talks on Namibia in which our position was described as “extremely reasonable.”⁷ Botha said SAG willing to be reasonable but will not be hammered. Much of subsequent conversation centered around this paragraph with PM and Botha referring to it as “obnoxious” and “unnecessary” given the SAG stated position that it was prepared to talk about these matters as reflected in the response to the EC–9 demarche and in Botha’s recent conversation with President Carter.⁸ At one point Botha suggested that the paragraph be revised but the PM did not support him on this.

4. In the face of the PM’s and Botha’s criticisms of the aide memoire, their efforts to draw us into a discussion of substantive points, and questioning of the motive in making a demarche with the “veiled threat,” I made the following points at various stages in the conversation, supported by my colleagues:

A) The aide memoire represents a sincere effort to open a new stage of discussions looking toward a solution consistent with Resolution 385. Without entering into polemics, the unacceptability of Turnhalle has been known to the SAG for some time.

B) The proposal for discussions should be looked at as part of the effort to avoid confrontation in the UN with adverse effects for South Africa.

C) We were not in a position to discuss substantive points in a possible settlement, this being a matter better left to the proposed discussions.

D) We could not tell him how the proposed discussions would be conducted, this being a point on which we expected further guidance from our capitals in the near future. In the meantime, we hoped for a prompt response to the aide memoire.

E) No one was proposing that SWA be turned over to SWAPO which my government does not recognize as the sole representative authority of Namibia, but that all political groups should be allowed to participate peacefully in determining Namibia’s future, including SWAPO.

6. In the end the PM said he was prepared to give his response to the aide memoire right away. He put it in these terms: “We are prepared and have always been prepared to have realistic discussions—as with the UNSYG and naturally with your governments—but as far as SWA is concerned, we are not rpt not taking any decisions on their behalf. We have not interfered with the Turnhalle Conference and cannot stop its momentum. We cannot and will not prescribe for the people of SWA. It is their country and their future. Within this framework I am prepared to enter into discussions with whoever wants to discuss SWA in a constructive spirit. It was not necessary to threaten us to come to this point. I shall expect to hear from your governments where and when the discussions will take place.”

Bowdler

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770121–1115. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, and Pretoria. Sent for information Immediate to USUN.
2. In telegram 519 from Cape Town, April 7, the Embassy notified the Department that the aide-mémoire was delivered to Vorster at 4 p.m. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770121–0907) The aide-mémoire is printed as Tab A, Document 50.
3. In telegram 76299 to Cape Town, April 6, the Department approved the language for questions and press guidance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770119–0034)
4. In telegram 526 from Cape Town, April 8, Bowdler gave his assessment of the meeting. He noted that Vorster faced two limitations to “call the tune,” in Namibia: the need for the white population to accept what the Turnhalle does and the awareness that he must retain the cooperation of the non-white delegation. Bowdler suggested that it might be better to seek fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolution 385 (see footnote 3, Document 50) after the interim government was set up. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770123–0455)

5. In telegram 1000 from USUN, April 2, the Mission provided instructions for the Namibian démarche. The spokesman for the Five was instructed to make the following points orally to Vorster: “The Five Governments are convinced that an internationally acceptable settlement to the Namibian problem must be found urgently.

   “The Five are prepared to work with South Africa in finding such a solution. The views of the Five Governments on the nature of a settlement are contained in the aide memoire.

   “The Five Governments urge a prompt response and are prepared as a group to enter into discussions with the South African Government to consider its response and to work with South Africa towards a solution consistent with Security Council Resolution 385.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770114–0052)

6. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 73.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, footnote 4, Document 206.
8. See Document 269.