8. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Cubans in Angola
You have received by now Admiral Turner’s memorandum noting our capabilities for exploiting the negative aspects of the Cuban and Soviet activities in Angola.2 As that memorandum notes, there are a number of means both overt and covert which may be employed.
In pursuing such courses of action, however, we would have to take into account countervailing considerations. To the extent that our effort is targeted at the Angola situation, and assuming that our hand will show, we should consider the possible effect of such a campaign upon (a) our interest in normalizing relations with Angola and, (b) whether our actions would appear to represent an effort to undermine Neto’s position. Beyond the foregoing are the more serious questions of where recent internal political events in Angola are leading and where U.S. interests lie among possible alternative political alignments within Angola.
The most effective anti-Cuban propaganda is the behavior of the Cubans in Angola and the economic difficulties which the country and its population are facing. To the extent that the insurgency spreads (as it appears to be doing), and conditions within Angola worsen, “foreigners”, and principally the Cubans, will be blamed and be held accountable in Africa and elsewhere in the world.
If the purpose of an information campaign would be to generate concerns and suspicions about Cuban activities on a broad scale, we should look to our natural allies. A number of moderate African leaders, for example, are already expressing concerns about Soviet and Cuban activities. Their criticisms have obviously struck a sensitive Soviet nerve. African elites read and are influenced by respected European and African publications such as, The Economist, Le Monde and Jeune Afrique when they address Cuban activities in Angola.
The most difficult challenge would be to reach the Marxist-oriented intellectuals in Africa and elsewhere. Here, Neto and the Cubans have [Page 16] a natural advantage: To the extent that our propaganda appears to be “made in the U.S.A.”, it will automatically be discounted.
Nevertheless, there are certain careful actions which we can take. The Voice of America can note hard news—particularly reports originating in Africa—of an uncomplimentary nature about Cuban activities in Angola and accompany this with some understated commentary; we can prepare background briefings for the American and European media; we can work with the BBC which enjoys a large African and Third World audience; and, using the Voice of America and our other radios, we can also beam selected information to the Soviet and Cuban population to play on their resentment of costly foreign involvement. Throughout, however, in designing our message, we must be careful to avoid giving the impression that we seek to upset the Angolan regime or further complicate the country’s fortunes.
Perhaps the most important way in which Cuban and Soviet misadventures can be exploited is through our contacts with respected African leaders. As the evidence of Cuban misadventures mounts, we should be prepared to instruct our ambassadors to approach selected leaders and discuss with them the risks which continued Cuban involvement pose for Angola and Africa at large.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770109–1877. Secret. Drafted by Buchanan and Moose on July 1; cleared by Moose. ↩
- See Document 7.↩
- Denis Lamb signed for Tarnoff.↩