93. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State1
Secto 12027. Department pass White House for Dr. Brzezinski. Subject: October 16 Meetings on Namibia.
1. There follows a summary report of today’s meetings on Namibia.
2. The Foreign Ministers met this morning at 8:30 with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and Brand Fourie for about two hours. The Prime Minister opened the meeting by reading a paper containing his analysis of the strategic situation in Africa with particular emphasis on Southern Africa.2 I responded on behalf of the Five, giving our own analysis, stressing recent developments in the North Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East, as well as the situation in Africa. I ended with a review of the Namibian and Rhodesian problems and gave our views on the consequences of the failure to consummate internationally recognized settlements of both of these situations. Each of the other Foreign Ministers then spoke briefly stressing various matters, but each made the point that if we fail to achieve an internationally recognized settlement in the case of Namibia, the ones who will benefit most will be the Soviets and the Cubans.
2. The Prime Minister excused himself and we then entered into a detailed discussion of the specific problems that have to be dealt with in resolving our differences on Namibia. This second meeting lasted about two and one-half hours. Pik listed the items as: (a) elections, (b) requirements for consultation, (c) police force, and (d) the number of UN troops and their composition. After he had completed his statement, I suggested that we put aside for the moment the elections problem, which we all agreed was clearly the most difficult, in order [Page 249] to see whether we could resolve our differences on the other matters we faced. Pik agreed at the outset that we could put the police matter aside as we were in basic agreement on that. I gave further clarifications based upon the Secretary General’s introductory statement to the UN on the question of troop numbers and composition. After considerable discussion, Pik agreed that insofar as composition was concerned, he thought this matter could be worked out satisfactorily, although he said he wanted flag his lingering doubt about the good faith of the United Nations. After a good deal of discussion back and forth, we reached a general understanding as to the dimensions of the problem relating to the number of UN troops. We further agreed that we believed these issues could be worked out if UN Special Representative Ahtisaari could sit down with Judge Steyn, General Philipp, and South African General Geldenhuys.
3. We then agreed, after considerable discussion, that we believed the requirement for consultation could be worked out satisfactorily if the Secretary General would be willing to send Ahtisaari, back to Namibia.
4. This then brought us face-to-face with the question of the election date. We first stated that there could be no elections in December, as currently scheduled, but that we believed it would be possible to work out a fixed date in May or June.3 Again it was agreed that this would require further consultations between Judge Steyn and his colleagues on the one hand and the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the other hand. We had a brief further discussion of the impossibility of accepting any elections in December. Pik maintained that it would be impossible to put off those elections,4 saying that Judge Steyn had already indicated that he would resign if the elections were not held, and that politically there was no way they could move off this plan. We reiterated that if this were done there could be no internationally recognized settlement and that we have been unable to find a way around this problem.
[Page 250]5. We then adjourned for lunch, agreeing to discuss the matter in the afternoon5 if we had time and, if not, at the working dinner to be held with the Prime Minister this evening.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 10–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Vance was in Pretoria to discuss Namibia with South African officials.↩
- Not found.↩
- Carter underlined “May or June” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Why not April as we agreed?”↩
- Carter underlined “It would be impossible to put off those elections.” In his press statement on September 20, Vorster maintained that the Western Five proposal provided for elections and independence by December 31 and for a run-up period of seven months before elections. He argued that this was possible when South Africa agreed to the proposal on April 25. (See footnote 2, Document 92.)↩
- In telegram Secto 12044 from Pretoria, October 17, Vance reported on his October 16 afternoon meeting with Botha, Fourie, and General Malan: “It is clear that we are coming down to the crunch. The odds remain heavily against our being able to work out an agreement regarding unilateral elections in Namibia in December. However, after discussions late this afternoon, Pik and the others are now re-caucusing with the Prime Minister and Cabinet tonight.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 103, 10/1–19/78)↩