Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part III
Mr. Pruyn to Mr. Seward
Sir: I have the honor to enclose for your information, No. 1, copy of a letter addressed to me by Sir Rutherford Alcock, and, No. 2, copy of my reply, which will fully explain our opinion in reference to the present condition of Japan.
These letters were exchanged after several conferences, which were rendered advisable by the accumulation of documentary and verbal proof of the growing ascendency of the hostile party.
The minister of France did not favor us with his views in writing, as his successor arrived a few days after the receipt by him of the letter of the British minister, but I am able to say that both the late and present minister of France concur in opinion that there is great reason to fear that the government may be unable, if really disposed, to resist the pressure upon it.
How long the struggle may be postponed is extremely doubtful; whether it will be possible to avert it altogether is exceedingly improbable, unless, indeed, the treaty powers will consent to give up their right of trade and residence.
The two centuries in which Japan remained isolated and unchanged were centuries of unparalleled progress in Europe and America; and now that its ports are opened, the past and the present stand face to face. These two forces will only harmonize as do light and darkness. One or the other must disappear. They cannot quietly coexist when brought into contact.
I have the honor to enclose Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6, copies of four Japanese documents received from the British minister, which constitute a part of the evidence in our possession to prove that hostilities are contemplated by the [Page 495] government as well as the Daimios, and that preparations for the same continue to be made.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.
Mr. Alcock to Mr. Pruyn
Sir: Several documents, bearing certain internal evidence of authenticity, have recently come into my possession from two independent sources. Assuming them to be genuine, they are calculated to throw some light on what has recently been taking place at Kioto during the great gathering of Daimios and the sojourn of the Tycoon at the capital of the Mikado. And as much of the information to be extracted from them shows very clearly the policy they have pledged themselves to carry out in respect to foreigners and the treaty powers generally, without distinction, I have had careful translations made, in the belief that if these documents have not already reached you from other quarters you will be glad to have them. I beg to enclose copies for your information.
My own impression of the importance of the facts disclosed as to the course of action determined upon by the Mikado, Tycoon, and Daimios conjointly, and the insecurity of the position they have made for us, leads me to the conclusion that it would be well if the example set by our avowed enemies, of an interchange of opinions and combinations of plans, were adopted by the representatives of foreign powers here. With a view to prepare the way for such collective action, and inviting at the same time the expression of your own individual opinion, I venture to submit the following observations as touching the principal matters for consideration.
I infer that these documents, whether faithful transcripts of originals, or garbled versions and extracts only, do certainly and substantially state the truth, both as to the existence of such originals and their purport. We are, no doubt, exposed to every kind of complicity and imposition on the part of those who know our anxiety for information, and supply it either to serve their own ends or the ends of the Tycoon government. But in the latter case it does not always follow that the information must be false. It may occasionally happen that the truth may be more serviceable to the Tycoon and his party than any falsehood, however ingeniously devised. That may be the case in this instance if it should turn out that the Tycoon does not covet the task, apparently assigned him, of driving out the foreigners, and dreads the issue. Under such circumstances it is easy to conceive that he would not be averse to our being advised of the whole scheme in time to enable us to save him from the disagreeable necessity of putting himself forward. Whether this were effected by our taking alarm and leaving the country, or by intimidating those who would urge on an attack to expel us, might be comparatively matter of indifference. And if the knowledge of the doing at Kioto, conveyed in these papers, be little likely to effect the first of these ends, it is impossible to deny that there is much to suggest the necessity of securing the other. This appears to me to form the main subject for consideration.
We have to take into our view, in connexion with these documents, and as corroborative evidence of their genuine character, a number of overt acts on the [Page 496] part of the chief personages, about which there is no question whatever: The Mikado’s decree for the expulsion of foreigners, officially communicated by the Tycoon, after a time withdrawn, and a modification in the programme substituted, calling upon us only to vacate Yokohama; the erection of numerous batteries at all the ports and in front of Yedo, designed to make those places more difficult of approach, at the same time that they menace the security of the foreign residents; the activity shown in the manufacture of arms; the large sums expended in the purchase of munitions of war and steamships; the enrolment and drilling of men everywhere going on even under our eyes; the resumption, with great earnestness, of an undertaking often before contemplated, but abandoned, owing to the enormous difficulty and cost of the enterprise, I allude to a great road the Tycoon is engaged in cutting through a range of hills which lie between Yedo and the rice-growing districts of Yetrigo, on the western coast, from whence the capital draws its chief supplies. The object obviously is to render it independent of any supplies brought by sea, upon which, at present, they are almost exclusively compelled to rely. Finally, the despatch of the last mission with the declared object of inducing the treaty powers to withdraw from Yokohami.
If all these proceedings be taken as a whole and in connexion with each other, there cannot well be any doubt whether a policy originating such measures is tending, or to what end it is directed. The documents now presented are in perfect accord, and may the more readily, therefore, be accepted as reliable sources of information in reference to existing political combinations and their object.
That these nearly concern us, and should be regarded as of deep interest, needs no demonstration. There is little difficulty in eliminating from all the verbiage and involution of Oriental phraseology one dominant idea, and that is, the final expulsion of the foreigner. This, however, is no less clearly shown to be held in check by a fear of consequences, and a consciousness of immediate danger in any attempt to pass at once to action. Hence the result of this grand convocation of notabilities of the highest powers in the state, and of all the deliberations that have taken place, is not a decree for our immediate expulsion, but for the postponement of any effort to give time for more adequate preparation, while the signal is given for the greatest activity in this work which is sooner or later to serve the end.
One question only seems to arise at this point, but it is all important. Do the several parties at work and the chief interlocutors in these documents, Mikado, Tycoon, and Daimios, not only wish our expulsion, of which there can be very little doubt, but mean, in earnest, to compass that end at whatever cost or sacrifice, believing in its practicability? or do they merely employ such language as supplying the fitting and proper terms to use under the circumstances in order to meet a hostile clamor and gain time with the view of tiding over present difficulties? Because, if the latter could be safely assumed, it may be well to wait and watch the course of events. We could, in that case, perhaps, be patient under a continual menace of hostilities and an occasional assassination, however unenviable and undesirable such a position may be; but if, on the contrary, they earnestly mean what they say, it might undoubtedly be a wiser policy to anticipate attack, and strike a blow calculated to put an end to this continuous agitation—this state of active preparation for our forcible expulsion or extermination as might chance—an agitation which, be it remarked, en passant, is itself a source of considerable danger, injurious to the prestige of foreign powers, and affecting not only the stability of our position, but the security of life and property.
I have referred to this as the one all-important question, because there seems a present necessity for taking the one view or the other to represent the truth, as the basis of any consistent policy on the part of those treaty powers who [Page 497] have vested interests at stake and contemplate upon insisting upon the maintenance of permanent relations of amity and commerce with Japan.
I cannot but conclude, upon a careful review of all the facts known to us, that there is a settled purpose to get rid of foreigners, and either to expel them from the Japanese territories altogether, or, failing this, to lock them up within the fortified barriers of Nagasaki, where entrance and escape are alike difficult, if not impossible, without the consent of those who hold the keys. To those who adopt this conclusion little remains but to consider what is likely to be the Japanese plan of operation, in order to form an opinion as to the relative expediency of a passive and expectant policy on the one hand, or a bolder and more decisive course of action, with a view to bring a quarrel (which is only adjourned by the Japanese in order to give them time to strike with more effect) to a more speedy issue when the choice of time and place will be ours, not theirs, and the advantage of preparation will not be, as is now intended, on the enemy’s side.
Before considering the latter alternative it may be well to take note of some very cogent reasons which seem to exist against an entirely passive and expectant policy.
If an avowed enemy is actively preparing to undermine and attack our position, it can hardly be wise to allow him to complete the sap, with a match in his hand, which we cannot see or prevent his applying to the train at his own time. We cannot always be in a state of preparation either for sudden retreat or defence. Great Britain has, at this moment, a considerable squadron in these seas, and troops within reach. But this cannot be counted upon as a permanent state of affairs.
The Japanese know that any outbreak of war among the treaty powers might change these dispositions, and leave all the foreign residents helpless. We have the misfortune to be surrounded by possible enemies, whose unfriendliness would at once assume the form of open hostility, if there appeared but a prospect of success. Remembering, also, that in the east at least there is no effective diplomacy, without force for its background, it behooves the treaty powers to decide while it is yet time between the only two courses open. The passive policy, however watchful, cannot be called defensive, where no defence is possible, as is the case even at this moment. If any doubts prevail on this subject, the several reports of military authorities, now in my hands, will effectually dispel such illusion. The defencelessness of this community, indeed, notwithstanding the pretence of a large squadron, is one of the strongest arguments against an indefinitely prolonged state of suspense and inaction. All the competent military authorities which have been consulted are perfectly unanimous as to the utter absence of any effective means of defence, even from the attack of small desultory bands of armed men. There is nothing to prevent their penetrating the settlement, setting it on fire, and murdering the greater part of the inhabitants before they could either escape or destroy their assailants. To make any defence would require the erection of barriers, guard-houses, barracks, a free command of labor, a large expenditure of money, and, at least, three months of time. Then, only with one thousand men at command, it is considered the place might be made tolerably secure against desultory attacks. No one of these conditions exists or can be realized; for, if there is peril in waiting until danger is at the door, there are insuperable obstacles to any adequate preparation in advance. The Japanese would not supply the land for guard houses and barracks, or the labor; and any political agents insisting upon making the attempt might possibly precipitate a collision, and would certainly lay themselves open, both in this community and at home, to the onerous charge of unnecessarily provoking the danger they sought to avert. Nagasaki is indefensible under [Page 498] any circumstances, and Hakodadi could just as little be suddenly covered, or the people taken away. In this dilemma, if it be really believed that the Japanese ruling powers are in earnest in their plans for our expulsion, or even that some are, and the Tycoon’s government, through lukewarmness in their cause, is not to be trusted by foreigners, what course may be open to the treaty powers equally anxious to prevent such a consummation, and avert a national war on a large scale.
The indiscriminate attack on foreign flags, the stoppage of native junks, even when carrying produce for foreign markets, and the closure of the Inland sea by the Prince of Chosen, are such undoubted acts of hostility directed against foreign powers as amply to justify any hostile action on their part, which may be directed against him or his batteries. The Tycoon’s government might not be unwilling to co-operate or to sanction a decisive blow at this puissant Daimio, who seems to set all native authority, as well as foreign powers, at defiance. If such a measure could be successfully carried out by even three or four of the chief treaty powers, cordially joining with whatever force each might have available, it seems probable the result would go far not only to paralyze the individual Daimio attacked, but all the hostile party, by showing the utter worth-lessness of costly preparation, and their incapability of making effective resistance. The Tycoon’s concurrence, either in active operations or merely by consent, could hardly fail to isolate him from the anti-foreign faction, and probably would compel him to adopt with more sincerity a friendly policy. In the event of his refusing to participate in a measure of this nature, it would have to be determined whether such refusal should or should not deprive the treaty powers of all action calculated to extricate them from a false position—one of prolonged doubt, under open menace of expulsion, contrary to the stipulations of treaties. If such a course of action should be adopted by common consent, whether with or without the Tycoon’s consent, the result might reasonably be expected to be beneficial, either in preventing an attack upon the foreign communities, and thus averting a catastrophe first, and a war afterwards; or in compelling those who contemplated this end to act decisively at a disadvantage, and before they had all the time they desired for preparation. In the present state of unpreparedness, in which Japan confessedly is for war with a western power, any diplomacy on their part which gains time is obviously an advantage to them; but it would be far better for the treaty powers, and, I believe, also better for the true interests of the Japanese, as a nation, to bring it to an issue at once. The struggle will be less protracted, the area of the conflict more restricted, and the war itself, if war there should be, on a less costly scale, Whereas if nothing be done to place foreign relations on a more stable footing, and with better prospect of security to the interests at stake than is consistent with the present policy of the Japanese government, there does not seem a hope that either time, the efforts of diplomacy, or the spontaneous action of the ruling powers in Japan will bring about any improvement. It seems still more impossible that the status quo, were it less satisfactory, can be maintained. Rapid and serious deterioration, which sooner or later must end in hostilities, can alone be anticipated, and the longer they are deferred the more extended is likely to be the field of operations.
I have thus unreservedly given my own views on the present aspect of affairs, and the attitude taken by the Japanese ruling powers. I speak of them collectively, for, at the present moment, the action of Mikado, Tycoon, and influential Daimios is so confusedly blended, that it is impossible to assign to each their part. My object is to elicit an equally frank expression of opinion from my colleagues as the best mode of arriving at some common base of operations, and [Page 499] to make head against those who seem resolved on making no distinction whether as regards nations or persons.
I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient, humble servant,
His Excellency General Pruyn, United States Minister Resident in Japan.
Mr. Pruyn to Mr. Alcock.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22d ultimo, and to present my thanks for your very full and frank expression of opinion as to the true condition of affairs in this country.
Recognizing fully the importance of a free interchange of views by the representatives of the treaty powers, I proceed to notice the topics you have presented, which I am relieved from doing at length, in consequence of your interesting and elaborate discussion of them. Under any circumstances it would be difficult to form an entirely satisfactory judgment of the actual state of affairs in this empire in consequence of the absence of the ordinary channels of information in every country open to the foreign ministers resident therein, and in consequence, also, of the limited means of intercommunication. The difficulties arising from our extreme isolation are greatly increased by the remarkable and habitual reserve of the high officers of government, and their systematic efforts to prevent information reaching us through unofficial channels. The magnitude of this embarrassment can only be appreciated by those resident in this country. Any important information obtained through official sources can never be received without distrust. The experience of all the ministers of the treaty powers, I think, is, that this information is rarely given except for the obvious purpose of qualifying or explaining away that which is known or suspected to have been already acquired. I have frequently, but without any apparent success, urged upon the government of his Majesty the Tycoon the duty and policy of manifesting more confidence, and displaying more frankness, in its dealings with those representatives. Much of the information we now have is conflicting, and a portion of it unworthy of credit. There is on one point, however, a remarkably uniform concurrence, both in the verbal reports and the documents we have severally had the good fortune to secure. All unite in disclosing that the Daimios are engaged in extensive and costly warlike preparations, and that while a formidable minority believe in their ability to expel foreigners now, very few distrust their eventual power to accomplish that result. The great change recently made in the government, relieving the Daimios from their compulsory and burdensome residence at Yedo, was confessedly yielded for the purpose of enabling them to expend larger sums in these preparations. There is probably as yet no fixed purpose of action. But it cannot be doubted that great preparations are in progress to effect our expulsion should it be finally decided to make the attempt; nor can it be doubted that the large majority of Daimios are bitterly opposed to the maintenance of the treaties. The government of the Tycoon has succeeded in resisting this strong current of opposition so as to prevent its assuming the form of united action; and yet, within the past year, it was compelled to yield to it, and give formal notice of its purpose to close the [Page 500] ports. After the Tycoon had succeeded in escaping from the pressure, and felt himself secure at Yedo, he was able to recall that order. But the combined forces before which he had been obliged to succumb at Kioto were sufficiently potent, even in his own capital, to compel him to seek to obtain by negotiation what he feared, or was unwilling to attempt by force. Hence the request made to surrender this port, and the mission to the treaty powers with the avowed object of asking that foreign trade be restricted to a port at the north, distant from the chief products of the country, and to the port of Nagasaki, entirely incapable of defence, and easily sealed to commerce, unless protected by a powerful land force. It is to be hoped that the government of the Tycoon is more enlightened as to its inability to contend successfully with the treaty powers. But it is impossible to believe it to be free from the prejudice and hostility which so thoroughly pervade the privileged classes. All that can be expected is, that fearing the result of a conflict, and satisfied that it can only be averted by observing the treaties, it will in good faith bend every power to their maintenance. I cannot see that any injustice is committed towards the government by entertaining these opinions. It must be sensible of the danger to which the institutions of the country are exposed by the continuance of foreign trade and intercourse, and it can scarcely be expected to welcome cheerfully the presence of silent yet powerful forces, which must eventually endanger its own existence. There can be no doubt that the entire framework of society and government must be remodelled in their presence, or it will crumble and disappear before them. The ancient feudalism of Europe has its counterpart here, tainted by a deeper corruption of morals, and unsoftened as that was by a high sentiment of honor, a chivalric devotion to the sex, and the precepts of the Christian religion. As that system fell before the rise of the free cities, the spread of commerce, and more enlightened views of liberty and government, so must the system which fetters, paralyzes, and degrades Japan disappear in the presence of the representatives of constitutional government, of a wider commerce, and a purer Christianity.
That this danger is felt and appreciated is apparent from the persistent but vain attempts which have been made to induce the ministers of the treaty powers to recognize or establish among their citizens and subjects resident here, distinctions analogous to those existing in Japan, and to impose similar restrictions and disabilities to those enforced by the Japanese laws.
As almost the entire profit of the foreign trade is absorbed by the government of the Tycoon, or by the chief Daimios, who monopolize the surplus products of the soil, the formation of a powerful and wealthy middle class will be retarded, and to this extent the danger to the privileged classes arrested.
At present, the only voice heard or power felt in Japan is that of these privileged classes; and either to the extent of this influence, or to the greater power of ignorance and prejudice, is to be attributed the well known fact that the lower classes in this town, notwithstanding their presumed friendship for foreigners, and their obtaining from foreign trade a better support, were, less than a year ago, prepared to commit any violence, and needed only a sign to prompt them to an indiscriminate and bloody attack on the foreign settlement.
In view of these facts, what is the duty of the treaty powers? Manifestly to insist on the observance of the treaties, and neither to surrender nor postpone any rights now acquired. At the same time, they should, in my opinion, exercise great moderation and forbearance in their treatment of the government, and give it credit for sincerity, as far and as long as possible; sympathize with and aid it in its difficulties, and strengthen it as far as may be safe, to enable it to resist any probable combination of the Daimios, of whom the Tycoon is not the sovereign, and who are in a great measure independent.
Experience has demonstrated that if the hostilities of any of the Daimios should manifest itself in acts, it is possible, to repress and punish the offender [Page 501] without bringing on a conflict with the government, and the most efficient aid can probably thus be given to the government.
Entertaining these opinions, I felt it to be my duty to punish the prince of Nagato for the outrage committed by him in firing on the merchant steamer Pembroke, with such small force as I then had at my disposal, and for the same reason I united with the representatives of France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, in a resolution declaring that it was indispensable for the maintenance of treaty rights immediately to reopen the inland sea by a combined operation of the naval and military forces; at the same time giving the Tycoon’s government an opportunity by its own means to render such action unnecessary.
I regarded such action as alike demanded by the dignity of our governments, and the safety of their citizens and subjects resident in Japan, and as essential to the maintenance of peace.
The President of the United States has been pleased to approve of my action.
No response has been made to the joint note by the government of his Majesty the Tycoon, nor has anything been done to restrain the Prince of Nagato from the commission of further violence or to punish him for past offences.
Very soon a year will have passed away, and no attempt has been made to carry into effect the deliberate decision of the representatives of the treaty powers. It is much to be regretted that the memorandum in question, now, perhaps, regarded as an idle menace, was transmitted to the government. Nor should I have signed it had I supposed that the failure of the Japanese government to act with vigor and promptitude would not have been followed by appropriate action by the treaty powers interested.
The original offence of the Prince of Nagato consisted in firing on a merchant steamer of the United States, a despatch steamer of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French, and the Netherlands steam corvette Medusa. I cannot see how, by doing so, he violated any law of Japan. On the contrary, he respected that still existing law which prohibits the presence of foreigners, and justifies any violence even to death. I understand this to be his defence, and that he acted under the direct orders of the Mikado.
I am, therefore, inclined to credit the reports of the reluctance and refusal of Daimios to march their forces against him, and to believe that if any punishment is inflicted, it will be for some independent offence against the Tycoon, or for some breach of etiquette, such as obeying the order of the Mikado transmitted direct and not through the Tycoon.
When in the presence of my colleagues, I asked the vice minister Sakai Hida-no-kami whether the Tycoon approved of the course of the Prince of Nagato. His answer was, that “depended on the fact whether he had acted under the orders of the Mikado; and if so, while he ‘interiorly’ condemned, ‘exteriorly’ he would be obliged to approve.”
The government was probably then aware that the hostile acts in question were the legitimate results of the deliberations at Kioto. It is also probable that the orders were transmitted direct to prevent the Tycoon from delaying or qualifying them, and that Chosen embraced the earliest opportunity to commence hostilities, hoping to involve the government inextricably in war. The result was different, however, from what he anticipated. The prompt and severe punishment inflicted had the effect to intimidate the hostile Daimios, who were easily convinced that it would be unsafe to encounter all the treaty powers, while too weak to resist successfully even one of them.
The government of the Tycoon was enabled, therefore, to obtain their acquiescence in a resort to negotiation, the interval to be devoted to preparation for an effectual and final struggle.
[Page 502]Had the Prince of Nagato abstained from further hostilities, the opportunity for humbling his pride and crippling his resources would now be lost. Unhappily for himself, but fortunately for this government and for the preservation of peace, he has exhibited at least the merit of consistency. He still obstructs commerce with foreigners; to this end he has fired on a steamer of the Tycoon, loaned to the Prince of Satsuma, and on junks of that prince, engaged in carrying cotton to Nagasaki. His batteries have been multiplied, and his cannon line the straits of Simonoseki. The inland sea is closed to commerce; no merchant ship dares to pass through it.
It is the earnest desire of the President of the United States to preserve peaceful relations with the government of Japan, and I have faithfully and zealously labored to that end.
In the hope that peace can thus be most effectually preserved, I am prepared to meet with my colleagues, and after fully considering the existing exceptional and hostile attitude of this prince, and the state of affairs in Japan, concert such measures as may be regarded as essential to the preservation of our treaty rights
I entertain no doubt that a result may be attained which will enable us to do this without any conflict with the government, and which will, in fact, greatly strengthen it, and avert the civil war it has so long feared.
I have the honor to be your most obedient, humble servant,
Sir Rutherford Alcock, N. C. B., Her Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Japan.
Letter of the Mikado to the Tycoon.
We, an humble personage, and feeling our unworthiness to hold the position of Son of Heaven, have from gratitude, since our succession to the throne of our ancestors, always been in anxiety, fearing lest we should be unable to gain by our action the approbation of our forefathers and satisfaction of our subjects.
One of the principal causes of our uneasiness is the often repeated appearance of foreign barbarians, who have violently visited our ports, since the 6th year of Kalie, (1853,) and have greatly endangered the integrity of our country. The prices of many articles of daily use have risen, and our subjects have greatly suffered in consequence.
What shall the Gods of Heaven and earth think of me?
Oh! whose fault, whose mistake is this?
Night and day these thoughts torment me without ceasing.
I have held a council the other day with my military nobility, (Daimios and nobles,) but unfortunately inured to habits of peace, which for more than two hundred years has existed in our country, we are unable to exclude and subdue our foreign enemies by the forcible means of war.
Therefore, if we, without duly considering this, do raise the law of expulsion and extermination, surely miseries and calamities without measure will fall upon our country.
The Tycoon (Bakfoo) has seen into my heart, and has amended the laws which existed for ten generations. He has lessened the servitude of the Daimios, and allowed them to take their families to their respective countries, and ordered that the requisites of war and military exercise should be more extensively [Page 503] carried out. He has reduced unnecessary offices and expenses, and prepared many ships-of-war and cannons. All this pleases not only us, but shall greatly delight our ancestors and subjects.
Also the re-establishment of the old custom, by which the Tycoon came last spring to my court, meets highly with my approbation.
Against my expectation, Tusiwara Saneyosi and others took for good the unruly and impracticable proposals of ill-disposed people, and not taking into consideration the state of progress in the world, nor the danger of our own country, did, under my name, circulate the inconsiderate mandate for the expulsion of barbarians, and he attempted also to create a war in order to destroy the Tycoon.
In regard to our rebellious and disobedient subject, Nagato Saijo, who deceived his master, fired carelessly upon foreign ships, murdered in secret the Tycoon’s envoy, and, without order from us, took Saneyosi and others to his country; such mad people ought not to be allowed to escape without condign punishment. However, taking into consideration that all this was caused by my own want of ability, I most deeply repent my mistakes, and feel ashamed.
If we compare our Japanese ships-of-war and cannon to those of the barbarians, we feel certain that they are not sufficient to inflict terror upon the foreign barbarians, and are, also, insufficient to make the splendor of Japan show in foreign countries. I should think that we only should make ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the barbarians.
Therefore, my desire is as follows: With the combined strength of Japan to erect fortifications on the principal points of the seaboard, in order to protect the capital and respect the laws of our country and protect our subjects against foreigners, and taking the force of the different Daimios, to let each of them defend their own sea-coast and harbors, (and if the foreigners should attack,) take large numbers of our ships-of-war, and destroy the never-satisfied, ugly barbarians, in order to carry out the laws of our ancestors, which direct the extermination of barbarians.
The Tycoon last year remained a long time in Kioto, and this spring has come again to Kioto; many Daimios have also incurred large expenses by coming to Kioto, and by sending their wives and families to their respective provinces.
In consequence of this, therefore, it is not to be expected that they should now make use of their money to purchase armaments, but we do not desire that they should incur any more of these large expenditures, but reduce them, and devote themselves to making preparations of war, and make them effective. Also teach their warriors all that is necessary to make them strong, in order that no blame can be attached to their names.
Oh! the Tycoon and the large and small Daimios are all my children! Let them do their best, and unite with me for the future to redress mistakes hitherto committed, and not oppress their country people, neither delay getting ready the necessary munitions of war, and commence with zeal for the extermination of the barbarians, and not forget the profession of their forefathers, which was that of arms.
If they do not act as we desire them now, they shall not only offend my heart, but the spirit of our ancestors shall be highly displeased. And what shall the Gods of Heaven and earth then think of them?
Given in the 4th year of Bunkiu, 1st month, (1864.)
Answer of the Tycoon.
The imperial will, expressed in the letter with the sight of which I have been favored on the 27th of last month, was to the effect that the Mikado desires to take upon his own responsibility all the adversities which have happened in our illustrious country ever since the accession to the throne of his ancestors; that decree has really inspired me with veneration, and moved my heart even to tears.
When I contemplate the errors committed by me up to this time, and reflect upon my own conduct, I feel abashed at the amount of transgressions I committed. Your servant Iyemochi, endowed neither with skill nor genius, has, with many short-comings, served in his important position, and having been unable to hold the reins of government with becoming wisdom, internal and external difficulties have arisen and are still continually thickening upon us. All this caused much anxiety and disquietude of mind to the Mikado; because, although I accepted the decree for the expulsion of the barbarians last year in Kioto, I have been unable to carry it into effect up to this time; neither the closing of the port of Yokohama, nor the negotiations regarding it, have yet been accomplished, and it is difficult to say when these matters shall come to a successful end.
Notwithstanding that none of the orders were carried into execution, I obeyed your invitation, and have appeared for a second time at your court, at Kioto, expecting to find the Mikado in great anger with me, and to be heaped with reproaches; but, on the contrary, I am highly praised, and by a most condescending decree of the Mikado your servant lyemochi’s gratitude is high as the mountains, and profound as the ocean, and anything your servant can do will fall immeasurably short of returning an equivalent amount of thanks for such benevolent treatment as he has received at your hands.
In future we shall change the old and outgrown customs, treat the Daimios like brothers, unite their hearts and arms with his, in order to serve the Mikado, as a faithful servant; with the obedience of a child he shall reduce in time of peace the unnecessary expenditures, and carry out with zeal and ardor the military arts and requisites of war. He shall put up the decaying government and inspire energy into the minds of that effeminated people, and take care of the coast defences near the capital, and the provinces, that the foreign barbarians can no longer contemptuously play with us. He shall build many ships, and cast large cannons, so that again we can undertake for a second time our great object, the punishment and expulsion of the barbarians from our soil, to make the glory of our empire appear more and more abroad, and set the Mikado’s mind for ever at rest.
He shall with great promptitude, however, obey the desire of the Mikado, that the expulsion shall not be undertaken without due deliberation, and I have a stratagem in view by which I shall accomplish my object and be certain to gain the victory over the barbarian.
In regard to the closing of the port of Yokohama, I have already sent envoys to foreign countries; and although I intend to do my utmost and use every endeavor, still I am ignorant of the intentions of the barbarians in this matter, and, therefore, make the greatest exertions to defend our sea-coast and to be at all times prepared.
I have made it my duty to apply myself diligently to the military tactics and the regulation of the important changes which are about to take place in future, and carry them out according to the wish of the Mikado, in order to encourage progress in our country, which of late has fallen into disuse—to [Page 505] surprise the barbarians, (lit., drink their lives,) and not oppress our subjects, and put the Mikado’s mind at ease.
I honor the spirits of the ancestors of the Mikado, and act according to the traditions handed down from my forefathers. This is the sincere wish of your servant, Iyemochi, and is, therefore, presented in answer to the Mikado’s letter.
Your most respectful, humble and obedient servant,
Circular addressed to all Japanese merchants trading with foreigners, by Arima Totomi-no-kami, member of the Gorogio.
Whereas, since the opening of the port of Kanagawa, our merchants have carried on trade with foreigners, regardless of the future of Japan, and have consequently caused a scarcity of the various articles of daily consumption, we hereby, in order to remedy this evil, call into force the order of 1860,* wherein it was determined that silk, or any other of the five articles of daily consumption, shall not be brought directly from the different provinces or towns of Japan to Yokohama and sold there to foreigners.
It has also come to our notice that, notwithstanding the silk produce of this season has not been plentiful, many persons having only their private gain in view, and indifferent to the calamities which such a course of action must bring upon the whole of Japan, have sent large quantities of merchandise to Yedo to he sold to foreigners.
As a necessary result of such a course, articles of daily use must become more and more scarce, and the prices continue to rise. It will bring hard suffering upon the whole of Japan, and throw it into extreme misery. All merchants, not only those of Yedo, but of the whole empire, are, therefore, warned to contemplate the state of things above described, and act accordingly, for the benefit of the country at large.
The above shall be circulated on the estates of the Tycoon, Daimios, Hatta-motos and temples.
[Enclosure No. 6.]
From a correspondent in Yedo. His letter is dated 8th of May, 1864.
On the 27th Sangwats (2d May) the steamer Shokakumaro arrived here from Kioto, having on board Arima-Totomi-no-kami, a member of the Gorogio, and the chief Ometske, Okubo-Bungo-no-kami; also the Metske-Matsudaira-Kesaburo. The object of their visit to Yedo is stated to be with the intention of entering, without delay, on the negotiation with foreigners upon the subject of closing the ports, which has again been determined and agreed upon at Kioto, although once in Kioto the proposals of Satsuma. and Higo, for the general opening of Japan, were about to be accepted. Again, this time, the aspect of affairs has entirely undergone a change, and the designs and intrigues of Stotsbasi appear to have gained the day.
Matsudaira-Osumi-on-kami, (Soboora,) and the prince of Etsizen, amongst [Page 506] the number of Daimios who have until now stood firm in favor of a more liberal policy, have retired to their own palaces under pretext of being sick, (always a sign of distress.) The Daimio Matsdaira Josa has gone back to his province.
The state of affairs in Kioto has caused here great excitement and agitation among the Daimios, retainers, and Lonins; and the mercantile part of the town is greatly disturbed, very much like the consternation prevailing last year, in the winter and spring, at the time the demand of the British government was put forward.
The return of the Tycoon is indefinitely delayed.
- The order of 1860 is to the effect that the merchandise must first be brought to Yedo, to be there examined and approved for sale before it can enter Yokohama.↩