Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session Thirty-eighth Congress, Part III
Mr. Pruyn to Mr. Seward
Sir: I have the honor to enclose, No. 1, a copy of the translation of the letter of the Gorogio in answer to the note identique addressed to them on the 30th of May last, of which I enclosed you a copy in my despatch, No. 39, of that date.
Immediately on its receipt the representatives of the treaty powers met, and after considering the reply, agreed with entire unanimity upon the memorandum of which I now enclose copy, enclosure No. 2.
Further action has been suspended in consequence of the arrival at this port of two young men, retainers of the Prince of Choshu, who were in England, pursuing their studies, and who thought their representations and remonstrances might cause that prince to refrain from further hostilities.
On my visit to this place, for the purpose of meeting my colleagues, I found they had prepared memoranda for presentation by these young men to that prince, and in the brief time allowed me I prepared a short memorandum for like presentation, a copy of which I now enclose, (enclosure No. 3.) I also send a Japanese version, kindly provided for me by order of Sir Rutherford Alcock.
The British frigates Borussa and Cormorant, despatched to the inland sea, returned this day. On their arrival near the territory of the Prince of Choshu they landed his retainers, who returned, after an absence of eleven days, with a verbal answer, that he was acting under the orders of the Mikado; but if time was given, the Mikado might be induced to revoke his orders, and he, Choshu, would so advise him.
An impression, however, was left on the minds of the British officers and interpreters that the answer was much softened down by these young men.
During their absence the ships were engaged in surveying, with a view of testing the accuracy of the charts, which were found quite reliable. While engaged in these labors one of the ships approached, on two different occasions, the entrance of the straits, and shots were both times fired across her bows. The captain of the Borussa informs me that the guns were fixed, and he was not within their range. The steamer, agreeably to instructions, did not fire on the batteries.
[Page 528]The note identique, which my colleagues and myself have prepared, will be sent in after the naval and military commanders have met for consultation.
I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington.
[Enclosure No. 1.]
We have received your letter, No. 58, of the 30th May, and fully understood all that you, according to the views of your government, stated therein relating to the firing, last year, upon foreign ships in Nagato, and to the closing of the port of Kanagawa.
We have not neglected this Nagato matter, as the members of the 2d council, Suwa Inaba-no-kami and Matrudaira Nui-no-kami stated to you under our instructions. Should this, however, be too hastily proceeded with, a satisfactory solution of all matters would not be attained, owing to great trouble which may arise from the want of harmony in public feeling, and which, it is feared, may bring about a rupture of the friendly relations between the two countries. It requires time to carry out the arrangement, and the requisite steps must be taken gradually, as we have such profound apprehensions as stated above. We therefore request that this matter, for the present, may be left for us to manage.
Your suspecting us of sympathy with those who are hostile to the treaties, because we asked for the closing of the port of Kanagawa, surprised us greatly. We caused our embassy last year fully to explain the state of affairs, which, in good faith, has ever since been the subject of profound deliberation by our government, but this (self-management by degrees) is the only means of tranquillizing the public feeling, and removing the obstructions injurious to the relations between the two countries; it is, therefore, desirable that your excellency will understand this well, and kindly will take care, in order that the mutual relations of friendship be made lasting.
Which we have to state in reply.
His Excellency Robert H.Pruyn, Minister Resident of the United States of America, &c., &c., &c.
[Enclosure No. 2.]
Memorandum.
When the treaty powers, in 1862, consented, on the representations of the Tycoon’s envoys, to certain important modifications in the treaties, the spirit, the motive, and the extent of these concessions were clearly set forth.
In consenting to the deferred opening of the ports mentioned in the memorandum signed at the time, the treaty powers were careful to establish the fact that this postponement, far from signifying a virtual abandonment of their rights, [Page 529] was, on the contrary, to be taken as indicating their firm resolution to maintain them, by furnishing the Tycoon with the means which he declared to be necessary for securing them in a more effectual manner.
In a word, the Japanese government, by the very tenor of those representations, pledged itself to remove, in exchange for these temporary concessions, all the difficulties of the time, and solemnly promised to remove the obstacles which might oppose the development of our relations.
But what have been the results of these promises and concessions?
The undersigned summed them up when last year, in the month of July, they addressed to the Tycoon an identical note describing the restrictions placed upon commerce, the murderous assaults committed upon foreigners, the closing of the inland sea, and the attacks made upon several foreign vessels by a Daimio.
These complaints remained unanswered; no steps were taken to give redress; and as the situation became worse, because the presence of foreigners at Yokohama was put in question, the undersigned were compelled to renew their remonstrances in a note which they addressed, on the 30th of May last, to the Gorogio.
As the Yedo council has not this time thought it advisable to be silent regarding this step, the undersigned have met together in order to examine the tenor of the reply to the aforesaid note, received by them separately, and to fix upon the line of conduct to be followed upon this occasion.
The undersigned satisfied themselves that the reply from the Gorogio was identical, and virtually a negation of all their reclamations.
In effect, while deploring the violent acts of the Daimio, who, after having closed the inland sea, still obstructs and interrupts the commerce of Nagasaki, the Japanese ministers leave the undersigned no hope of this state of things being modified, and warn them, moreover, of the dangers which the treaty powers may incur in attempting to arrive at that end by direct and common action.
As for the port of Yokohama, the Gorogio continues in the same course, and persists in demanding the abandonment of that settlement as a necessity urged upon it by circumstances, and as the only means of securing the lives of foreigners and the peace of the country.
In face of this categoric declaration, the undersigned are compelled to seek elsewhere for the means of obtaining redress for existing grievances, and of protecting, as effectually as possible, the interests intrusted to them.
And first, they inquire, what is the political situation of Japan?
Authentic documents, derived from various sources, disperse the darkness with which the local government endeavors to obscure it.
The Tycoon, by treating with foreigners on a footing of equality, has hurt the national pride of the Daimios, while he has damaged their interests by reserving to himself the monopoly of our new commercial relations.
To these first causes of the discontent of the Daimios have soon been added the increase of taxes and other exactions, imposed on them under the pretext of providing for the defence of the country.
This hostile attitude has been the more clearly defined from the tycoonship having just passed into weak hands, and the best guarantee of its power was given up when the Daimios, whom it was the custom to keep in Yedo as hostages, were allowed to retire to their territories. These elements of opposition have naturally been concentrated round the Mikado, who can at his pleasure resume the exercise of power which his ancestors and himself had simply delegated.
The members of the high aristocracy could not allow this occasion to pass without taking revenge for the long domination of a dynasty, the founder of [Page 530] which had not even been their equal in rank; and they have put aside their respective rivalries in order to combine and more effectually to attack the reigning Tycoon, on the foreign question, as his weak point.
Hence the resolution recently taken at Kioto to annul the treaties, and which commands the Tycoon to expel the foreigners by negotiations or by force.
The Tycoon comprehends his inability to fulfil such a mission; and conscious of the danger to his country of such an attempt, he feels inclined to temporize. But his weakness and inability take away from him all influence over the councils of the Mikado.
Fortunately for us, he is not the only one who desires the adoption of a more prudent policy towards the treaty powers.
A certain number of Daimios, among whom may be counted of old date the Princes of Etsizen, Higo, Idzu, Yossu, and more recently Satsuma, (whose views have apparently been modified by the attack on Kagosima,) have given evidence, about the truth of which the undersigned think there is not the slightest doubt, of their desire to promote commercial relations by establishing on a new or modified basis the intercourse of Japan with foreign powers.
This party has not been afraid to state its opinions in the midst of the council at Kioto, but it has been obliged to give up, for the present, the struggle against an overwhelming majority.
The political situations of Japan might therefore be resumed as follows:
Weakness of the Tycoon, and increasing powerlessness of that prince to resist the violent pressure of a hostile majority;
Existence of a party favorable to continued relations with foreigners, but at this moment, incapable of giving effect to its opinions;
Finally, armaments of every kind prepared, with the loudly avowed intention of expelling all foreigners from the country.
The position made for the representatives of foreign powers is the natural consequence of the situation and the tendencies which they have just pointed out.
The residence in the capital is virtually interdicted.
The passage through the inland sea is forbidden to their vessels by means of batteries erected with that object.
Commanders of Japanese junks, who intended to bring merchandise to the foreign residents at Nagasaki, have been killed by order of the Daimio who has erected said batteries.
The people have been excited against the negotiators of the treaties by speaking of imaginary calamities as attached to their execution.
Orders from the local governments arbitrarily restrict the quantity of produce for exportation at the three open ports. Every day brings with it new obstacles to the development of the trade which sometimes (Chosu has given an example) is suddenly stopped by violent measures. The most elementary rules of the law of nations are disregarded.
Finally, the Gorogio insists upon the abandonment of Yokohama by the foreigners, and it claims that concession on the ground of its being necessary for the peace of the country, and, above all, for the security of the lives and property of these foreigners, whom, it says, it will soon be impossible to protect against the hatred which they have inspired.
And yet, what is the mission intrusted to the undersigned by their respective governments?
The recent decisions of the governments to which the demands on the part of the Japanese mission now in Europe have given rise, enable the undersigned clearly to define their obligations.
The foreign powers not only reject, in categorical terms, the propositions regarding the abandonment of Yokohama, but also refuse, by anticipation, to [Page 531] listen to any overture for the modification of existing treaties for the curtailment of the rights they confer.
The instructions transmitted to the undersigned are identical. All are directed to maintain treaty rights intact, and to insist on their complete observance. But the facts already cited, do they not prove that these treaties of which the execution is required are at present a mere dead letter?
The political situation and the instructions the undersigned have received from their governments are in irreconcilable contradiction, and they are bound, at the risk of failing in their duty, to seek without delay for the proper means of effectually modifying such a condition.
The representatives of foreign powers, having experienced the uselessness of their representations and efforts with the government of the Tycoon to obtain redress for their grievances, can only trust to means at their own disposal, in order to arrive at the best solution of the question that may be possible.
Looking in that direction, they recognize more than ever the necessity of strengthening and consolidating their position by a cordial understanding founded upon identity of interests and entire unity of views as well as of action.
Suffering from the same political situation, and provided with the same instructions, the question suggests itself whether it be in a prolonged temporization or in energetic and prompt action that they must find the remedy for the state of affairs they have pointed out.
Forbearance and conciliation, and a policy characterized by these, have already been pushed to the utmost limits, and failed. It is by following this system that the treaty powers have been led from concession to concession to the point where they have now arrived. It was from prudence, and the fear of bringing about complications, that they left Yedo, that they subsequently allowed themselves to be almost confined in Yokohama, and that they have waited a whole year for the reparation which they demanded from the local government relative to the hostile expressions of the Prince of Nagato.
This long and patient forbearance was natural, so long as the treaty powers could believe in the promises and assurances of the Tycoon’s government; but it would now be a mistake, when undeniable facts prove that it has only encouraged the retrograde aspirations of a party which believes itself so certain of victory that it thinks it no longer necessary to conceal its hopes and designs.
The undersigned, guided, therefore, by the experience of the past, believe they ought not to hesitate in coming to the conclusion that further inaction would be fatal to the interests at stake, and unavoidably productive, under greater disadvantages and certainly with larger proportions, of the conduct which they would by such means seek to avert.
Whereas, a more energetic attitude would, on the contrary, have undoubtedly for immediate result the dissipation of the idea now entertained by the Daimios, that patience has only been dictated by weakness or fear. A vigorous demonstration will disarrange schemes scarcely yet formed, and is calculated to give support to the party favorable to the maintenance of treaties before its opponents will have time to crush it. It will, moreover, give a salutary lesson to those semi-independent feudal chiefs who scoff at the obligations of treaties, the validity of which they deny, and who, for the justification of these continuous acts of violence, appeal to a decree (still in existence) which makes foreigners outlaws. In a word, this decided attitude may furnish to the Tycoon an occasion to regain an influence which is slipping away from his weak hands, although he is far from being willing to abdicate or renounce his governing powers.
At all events, it may compel this prince to abandon the system of duplicity and half-measures which he now follows, and openly declare whether he wishes to respect the treaties, or sides with those who wish to tear them up.
Thus the undersigned are unanimously agreed as to the necessity of a vigorous effort; and by the final abandonment of an expectant position they are convinced
[Page 532]that by prolonging the passive and expectant policy they would unavoidably bring about a denouement which, if there be nothing formidable in it now, owing to the imposing forces that the foreign powers have at their disposal in Japan, might come later, at a moment when (these forces being called elsewhere) they would have to resist, without adequate means, an enemy fully prepared, and who would choose the hour he might judge most favorable.
How and where the first blow must be struck is easily determined by an examination of the present state of things.
While the majority of the party hostile to the treaties has limited itself to menace, the Prince of Choshu has resolutely taken the initiative of attack by prohibiting to foreign vessels all access to the inland sea, and by stopping the supplies of produce for the Nagasaki market, carried on by native junks, as has been shown by the successive reports received from the consular agent at that port. Such continued violation of the law of nations, and formal negation of treaty rights, has been encouraged by the impunity which those perpetrating the acts have been allowed to enjoy. The futility of the representations made by the treaty powers on this head is, for the hostile Daimios, an argument upon which they build their hopes for the final success of their policy, and one which they freely use to keep up the excitement and courage of their followers and party.
Foreign powers, therefore, in chastising the Prince of Choshu, will meet the exigencies of their position, and best contribute to the security and well being of their subjects, who have been injured by this belligerent Daimio.
The removal of the obstructions to the free navigation in inland sea, by the destruction of the batteries whence the attack has come, will ruin the prestige of the aggressor, open the eyes of the hostile Daimios deceived by our inaction, and show the inanity of their means, and their incapability of standing before the science and military resources of the treaty powers.
The undersigned, being of one and the same opinion as to the necessity of acting and the direction to be given to their movements, have agreed to establish certain principles to serve as the bases of future co-operation, and which may also strengthen the common understanding by removing suspicions which might be conceived as to the future projects of each of the representatives.
They have, therefore, accepted the following articles:
Art. 1. The undersigned lay down as the basis of their policy the neutralization of Japan, and while awaiting the adhesion of their respective governments thereto, they engage that this principle shall prevail in the open ports.
Art. 2. The undersigned will come to an understanding as to the measures to be taken to maintain the treaty rights intact, especially the liberty of commerce in the open ports.
Art. 3. Although the experience acquired at the time of the expeditions to Simonoseki and Kagosima has led them to consider an attack on the three open ports improbable, in consequence of any operations in the inland sea, yet the undersigned will, in common, take measures in order to provide for that contingency, particularly as regards the port of Yokohama, which is most exposed to the chances of aggression or attack.
Art. 4. The undersigned agree not to ask for nor accept any concession of territory, nor any exclusive advantages whatever, either in the open ports or elsewhere in Japan.
If, in order better to secure the success of operations in the inland sea as elsewhere, it should appear to be useful or necessary to the commanders of the military and naval forces engaged to take possession of a port, island, or any portion of land, it is distinctly stipulated that such possession shall confer no exclusive right to the nation which shall hold it, and that the same must cease as soon as the end in view shall have been attained.
[Page 533]Art. 5. The undersigned agree, moreover, that they will abstain from all interference in the jurisdiction of the Japanese authorities over their own people, as well as from all intervention between the contending parties in the country. As the basis of an “entente cordiale” and effective co-operation, in view of the common action which it may become necessary in future to undertake, has been established, the undersigned have agreed to bring this memorandum to the knowledge of the military and naval commanders of the treaty powers, and to invite them to concert among themselves the coercive means that may be necessary in order to secure the proposed result. As soon as the said commanders shall have declared that they are in a position to act in conformity with the programme of the policy above set forth, and not before, the undersigned agree to transmit to the Gorogio, each separately, an identical note, which shall be substantially to the following effect:
They are to be informed that their answer has been the subject of a conference; regret to be expressed that the previous letter should have had so little effect; mere expression of regret for injury, to remain unredressed, of no avail; equally so warning of danger, if foreign powers do themselves justice; persistence in demand for closing of Yokohama, on a plea of necessity, overlooks a like necessity in foreign powers not to consent; conference see, in the general tenor of the answers, a formal and absolute negation of rights, and such a situation it is impossible to accept. In consequence, the foreign representatives have adopted resolutions in common accord to be now communicated.
In respect to affair of Choshu, if within twenty days no material change— and satisfactory guarantees for future security—action will be taken through the admirals, the naval and military commanders, without further communication with ministers.
In reference to the withdrawal from Yokohama, renewed protest against reiteration of a demand which foreign representatives are not even allowed to discuss. Suggest one consideration they seemed to have overlooked in making such; persevering in this demand; concessions of 1862, not absolute but conditional; non-fulfilment of conditions put an end to concessions. Treaty powers revert to treaty, by this right to claim execution of all articles; openning of Yedo, Osaka, Hiogo, and Nagato.
This is the only answer to the demand for abandoning Yokohama.
The line of conduct here traced, and the general policy indicated throughout this memorandum, as the best adapted, under all the circumstances, in a political point of view, to lead to a satisfactory result, obviously assumes the availability, on the spot, of material forces, and their employment for the attainment of the more immediate ends in view. It has accordingly been agreed by the undersigned that neither the despatch and “note identique,” nor any other step of a nature to commit them to any definite issue with the Japanese government shall be taken, until the assurance has been received of the naval and military officers in command that they are prepared to give their effective cooperation whenever it may be deemed necessary.
[Untitled]
The minister resident of the United States in Japan, on his arrival at this place from Yedo, learns that two steamers of her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain will leave early to-morrow morning for the province of Nagato, with two subjects of the Prince of Choshu. Their excellencies the ministers of her Britannic Majesty and of his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of the French have embraced this opportunity to send forward memoranda giving their views of the attitude of that prince towards the treaty powers, and the inevitable destruction which awaits him if he pursue his present course of hostility.
The minister of the United States fully concurs in their opinions and warnings. Not having time to prepare a paper of the same character, and covering the entire ground, he cordially adopts as his own the language of their excellencies the ministers of Great Britain and France.
The President of the United States, while desirous of preserving the most peaceful and friendly relations with the government and princes of Japan, has instructed his minister to use the naval force of the United States for the protection of the lives and property of its citizens.
The minister of the United States joins in the hope expressed by his colleagues that the Prince of Choshu and all hostile Daimios will heed the warnings now given. They are not made by way of threat, or with any hostile feeling, but with the sincere desire that hostilities may be avoided.
If hereafter, as heretofore, the lives and property of citizens and subjects of the treaty powers are assailed, and the Prince of Choshu shall find his power shattered, it will be because he neglects these warnings given in the spirit of friendship, but with the resolute purpose of resenting and punishing any aggressive acts he may commit.
Prince Choshu, in his Province of Nagato.