Mr. Pruyn to Mr. Seward

No. 54.]

Sir: At a meeting of the military and naval commanders held yesterday, at which were present, among others, Major General Brown, commanding the British forces in China, the British and French admirals, Captain Price and Captain Le Marr, the commanding officer of the Dutch squadron, it was resolved to proceed at once to open the straits of Simonoseki.

About 800 troops are to be left for the defence of this place; also, the Jamestown and a British steam corvette, one despatch steamer, and two gunboats. General Brown has also ordered from Shanghai 600 more troops, including another half battery of artillery.

Not having yet received a copy of the memorandum of the naval and military commanders, I am unable to send you one by this mail. It throws upon the ministers of the treaty powers the responsibility of the defence of this place, which we are ready to assume.

Should the large force now here withdraw without striking a blow, we feel assured our position would be untenable. The best place to defend the open ports is at the straits of Simonoseki. And if Choshu’s pride and power are humbled, we may quite safely calculate upon an improved condition of affairs. We have, besides, the knowledge that this expedition will not displease the government, and that, during the absence of the fleet and forces which will compose it, we may expect more vigilance on the part of the Japanese guards, and an increased number of them, if considered needful.

I have the pleasure to be able to say that I had an interview this day with Takemoto Kai-no-kami and another confidential governor for foreign affairs, and one Omestki, who have been here some days, treating for the conclusion of this business, in which I expressed my concern for the safety of this place during the absence of the forces, not only because of the property and lives involved, but because any injury done here must, of course, be regarded as done or permitted by the Tycoon, situated as we were in his territories and so near his capital, and our good relations with the government might therefore be thus seriously impaired. I wished also to assure the government of the Tycoon that this expedition was not an act of hostility to his government, but for its maintenance, and in the interests of peace, which I and my colleagues were satisfied could thus be more effectually secured.

The governor replied, that every precaution would be taken for the defence of the place; but that it was desirable that, meanwhile, as few should ride out on the Tokaido as possible, and great precautions should be taken, as attacks might be made on individuals who exposed themselves. He also said I had always shown a friendly disposition towards the government of his Majesty the Tycoon, and that this expedition was an additional proof of friendship, for which he thanked me. He further said, that after the note identique, which he had been informed was to be addressed to the ministers, had been received, a vice-governor would come down, and request the expedition should not be sent; but he desired my colleagues and myself to say that it was impossible to refrain from sending it. He also said that the Daimio of Boodzen, whose fortress, Kokura, was on the southern side of the straits, was a great friend of the Tycoon, but being opposite to and afraid of Choshu, he might be compelled to fire on the expedition. The governor said he wished that Boodzen might be treated as kindly as possible.

I informed him that before that place was reached the batteries of Choshu would all be silenced, so that no occasion would be given him to fire from Kokura, and that I would ask that a flag be sent to assure him of the peaceful purposes of the treaty powers towards him.

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The interview closed with the information that he was directed by the Tycoon to express his entire disapprobation of the act of firing on the Monitor, and that he had no language sufficient to express his indignation.

The mail has been detained, and I have only a few minutes in which hurriedly to communicate this important information.

Interviews were held this day with my colleagues of Great Britain and France, at which the same language was held.

You will see from the above that what I have heretofore written, that an expedition could be sent to punish Choshu without involving the treaty powers in a war with Japan, is quite certain to prove true.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

[Untitled]

The following telegram received at Washington, August 28, 1864, 11 a. m.— from Kanagawa, via San Francisco, August 26, 1864:

At a joint meeting of the ministers of the treaty powers, held yesterday, it was determined, on the failure of the government within twenty days to do so, to open the inland sea, now closed, even to Japanese commerce with Nagasaki, by Nago. The British will have fifteen ships-of-war, the Dutch four, the French three, and the United States one only, the Jamestown. I would respectfully ask for steamers, which, though they will not arrive in time for this movement, may and probably will be necessary for the protection of American interests.

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.

[Untitled]

The following telegram received at Washington, October 15, 1864, 10.15 p. m.—from San Francisco, October 14, 1864:

United States Legation, Yedo, August 2, 1864.

Sir: Legation indemnity paid; written agreement given for payment of Pembroke indemnity, principal and interest, within thirty days, and for submission of all other claims to arbitration to Emperor of Russia, if not in meantime arranged.

Yours, &c.,

ROBERT H. PRUYN, Minister Resident in Japan.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, &c., &c., &c.