Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward
Sir: I have to acknowledge the reception of despatches from the depart ment, numbered from 1262 to 1269, inclusive; also three printed copies of the new regulations respecting passports.
On Saturday last the cabinet, finding that the health of Lord Lyons was not likely to be soon restored, decided upon making a new appointment without further delay. On Monday I received a private and confidential note from Lord Russell apprising me that Sir Frederick Bruce had been selected to fill his place. The reason assigned is, the probability that the questions of the late convention and of the reciprocity treaty may give rise to negotiations.
The appointment seems to me a good one. The strong testimony borne by Mr. Burlingame to the friendly disposition of this gentleman in China has been sustained, so far as I have had an opportunity to judge by what I have seen of him since his return home. He paid me a friendly visit on his arrival, since which he has been constantly in Scotland.
It is undoubtedly intended in an amicable sense by the government, and is so regarded here. I had the other evening a few minutes conversation with Baron Brunnow, the Russian ambassador, in which I found him very earnest in pressing this view of the subject. He dwelt on the adverse influences brought to bear here, both from without and within, to bring about a misunderstanding. He seemed to speak from personal knowledge and with great confidence on this point; and he appeared to fear that we were not sufficiently impressed with the importance of counteracting it. I told him how strongly I had myself written in this sense for some time past. He intimated that he should himself write to M. de Stoeckl, at Washington, about it.
It is very certain that the alarmist policy continues to be actively pushed. The Times has fallen into it by perverting, as it too often does, that passage of your despatch No. 1258 which alludes to a proposal made in the conference at Fortress Monroe, by the rebel agents, to raise some extrinsic issue, as if you had favorably entertained it. Much use is made of the notice to rescind the treaties, to prove our intentions to pick a quarrel. The commercial classes affect to be deeply apprehensive of our movements; I learn that some of them decline to enter into engagements of a prospective character with Americans on this ground alone. Thus far the political effect of these operations has been trifling. The government give no countenance to them. At the same time it is undeniable that a little uneasiness is felt by it about the exposed situation of Canada, and the possibility that the popular passions may precipitate us into hostilities on their weak side. I have sedulously endeavored to soothe this feeling by treating the matter as lightly as possible. If the Canadians would but secure the peace of their border, I have said that peace on that side would be perfectly secure, and further precautions become unnecessary.
One curious effect of all these movements is to render the prospect of a reconciliation in America more and more unwelcome. It is regarded as likely to prompt the adoption of a peremptory tone on our part in regard to the unsettled controversies engendered by the war, which will force Great Britain either to make mortifying concessions, or else to bring on a rupture. These apprehensions are, doubtless, aggravated by a consciousness of the false position in which the governing classes placed the country so precipitately at the outset, and their unequivocal later manifestations of ill will. They do not now find so many avenues of public expression as they might, on account of the near approach of a general election. Yet I feel it my duty to dwell upon them a little in order [Page 195] that the government may be the more fully possessed of the facts, and, therefore, better enabled to adapt its policy to the emergency.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.