Mr. Hay to Mr.
Seward
No. 371.]
Legation of the United States,
Paris,
September 21, 1866.
Sir: The Moniteur of yesterday contained the
following announcement: “The president of the commission of finances of
Mexico, at Paris, informs the holders of Mexican securities and bonds
that no funds having been received from the Mexican government for the
payment of the interest and coupons falling due on the 1st October next,
that payment will be adjourned.
“The president of the commission at the same time reminds the holders of
Mexican bonds that in conformity with the original conditions of the
contract, a capital of thirty-four millions of francs, deposited in the
Caisse des Depots et Consignations and
invested in three per cent. securities, is to be applied by means of the
quarterly capitalization of the interest to the reconstitution of their
capital.”
This announcement is dated two days before its publication, September 18,
1866. Although not wholly unexpected, it produced a decidedly depressing
effect upon the Bourse. Mexican bonds fell thirty francs, and other
stocks experienced a serious check in the upward movement which has been
in progress for some time past.
I annex an extract from an article of Mr. Forcade, in Revue des Deux
Mondes, in reference to the immediate prospects of the Mexican empire
and the mission of General Castelnau, which is noticeable for its
freedom of statement. A leading article in much the same sense appeared
a few days since in La Liberte, the journal conducted by M. de Girardin,
which urged the immediate recognition by France of President Juarez, and
the arrangement of a treaty with him, as the sole practicable means of
securing protection to French citizens in Mexico.
I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,
JOHN HAY, Chargé d’Affaires ad
interim.
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
[Mr. Forcade, in the Revue des Deux Mondes.—Translation.]
When it was decided to recall the French troops from Mexico, it was
believed and announced that the return could take place in three
successive divisions; the first being fixed for the month of
November next. Many people were alarmed at this project of partial
and
[Page 357]
gradual evacuation. It
seemed to them perilous to weaken our army at the moment when the
relative force and audacity of our adversaries would be augmented by
our withdrawal, and thus, perhaps, draw on our last battalions all
the efforts of the enemy. The question of departure was also
governed by the political state in which we should leave Mexico.
Would the emperor Maximilian persist alone in the enterprise in
which he followed us, and where he has shown that he cannot render
us any service; or would he renounce the adventure and return to
Europe with us? In the case of the abdication of Maximilian, could
we leave Mexico without giving that unhappy country time to organize
a government to its taste, with which we might negotiate and
establish the future relations of France. A little reflection will
show that, to solve these different questions in the least
troublesome manner, they must be settled simultaneously. It is
necessary to know whether Maximilian stays or leaves; and in order
that the security and dignity of our army may not be endangered, it
is necessary that the return of our troops should not be
accomplished successively, but all at once. It is evidently the
strict examination and the categorical solution of these questions
which the Emperor has confided to General Castelnau in sending him
to Mexico, charged with a mission doubtless painful, but the results
of which might be highly important for the interests of France. The
great thing in this difficult operation of putting an end to our
expedition is to cut short the evil and not allow it to drag on. For
us, who have no confidence in the establishment of an imperial
dynasty in Mexico, we should wish that the emperor Maximilian should
decide on a retreat. In any case it is to be desired that the French
army, in order to withdraw in the plenitude of its strength, should
be concentrated in the capital, and march en
masse to the coast. Our military honor and the interest we
have in occupying the second port of Mexico, will doubtless oblige
us to retake Tampico. (Since reported to have been retaken.) Masters
of Vera Cruz and Tampico, we shall be able to organize the
simultaneous embarcation of our soldiers, and, besides, to retain
the two most important maritime cities of the country, until we have
made the necessary arrangements with the new government. If no time
is lost, as we have the favorable season before us, the march of our
troops to the coast and their embarcation could be completed in six
months.
