Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress
Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward.
Sir: In connection with my despatch No. 1164, of the 2d instant, I now have the honor to transmit copies of two more notes which have passed between Lord Clarendon and myself, on the extraordinary position taken by the attorney general in his speech of the 23d of February, in the House of Commons.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C
Lord Clarendon to Mr. Adams.
Sir: I lost no time in communicating to her Majesty’s attorney general the note which you did me the honor to address to me on the 24th ultimo, with reference to statements on the subject of proposed amendments in the foreign enlistment acts of this country and the United States, reported to have been made by the attorney general in the House of Commons, on the previous evening; and I have now the honor to enclose, with the hope that it may be satisfactory to you, a copy of a statement which has been made to me by the attorney general in reply.
I have the honor, &c., &c.
Charles Francis Adams, Esq., &c., &c., &c.
Mr. Palmer to Lord Clarendon.
After a careful reconsideration of the expressions used by me on the occasion to which Mr. Adams refers, and of the document cited in his letter to your lordship, I am unable to perceive that there was in the substance of my observations anything which, when rightly understood, can be open to the charge either of misstating material facts, or of placing a wrong construction upon the conduct of the government of the United States. It must be borne in mind that my object was not at all to criticise or reflect upon the conduct of that government, for which I have always entertained a most high and sincere respect, but solely to explain under what circumstances her Majesty’s government had determined, during the late war, to put to proof the efficiency or inefficiency of our own foreign enlistment act, without attempting to propose any alteration of it to Parliament.
1. With respect to the exact date at which the overture to which I referred was made by her Majesty’s government, my memory (for I spoke from memory) was certainly not quite accurate, and on that point I willingly accept Mr. Adams’s correction—but I must be permitted to add, that the circumstance of that overture having been made after and not before the commencement of the discussions with respect to the Alabama, would (if it had been present to my mind) have enabled me to give additional point to some of my observations as to the manner in which that overture was met by the government of the United States.
2. Mr. Adams appears to think that the facts did not warrant me in representing this overture as having been made by her Majesty’s government “spontaneously, of its own volition.” The letter of Earl Russell, dated the 19th December, 1862, in which it was contained, having been written in answer to one from Mr. Adams himself, in which (after seeking redress for the captures made by the Alabama) he solicited from her Majesty’s government “a more effective prevention of any repetition of such lawless and injurious proceedings in her Majesty’s ports.” No doubt it was with a view to this latter object, mutually desired by both governments, that Earl Russell in reply, suggested the consideration of the question whether amendments might not advantageously be made in the foreign enlistment acts of both countries. That suggestion, however, though made upon such an occasion, did not the less originate with her Majesty’s government, and was not the less entirely spontaneous on their part, Mr. Adams had on one or two former occasions intimated that new legislation by Great Britain against blockade running, and against the exportation of munitions of war from this country to the Confederate States, might have been acceptable to the government of the United States; but I am not aware that he had ever down to that time suggested any alteration of our foreign enlistment act as necessary for the more efficient prevention of naval equipments for warlike purposes; and the sequel of the correspondence itself clearly proves that the goverment of the United States did not look upon their own act of Congress of 1818 as requiring any such alteration.
I see no reason, therefore, to recede at all from the substance of that part of my statement in which Mr. Adams understands me to have affimed, “that the British government spontaneously, of its own volition, initiated a proposition to the government of the United States to revise the foreign enlistment acts of both countries, and make such additions as might be thought necessary to them.”
3. But with respect to the remaining and more important point, I cannot altogether admit the correctness of Mr. Adams’s interpretation of my language. He understands it to have been substantially affirmed by me, “that the answer of the United States to this offer was like throwing cold water on it altogether. They said they had no objection to enter into the consideration of such a question, but they were satisfied with their own law as it stood.” So far, Mr. Adams quite fairly represents the effect of my statement, and the documents cited by himself (as well as Earl Russell’s despatch to Lord Lyons on the same subject, to which [Page 81] he does not refer) prove the fact to have been as I stated it, whether I rightly described such an answer as cold and discouraging or not. Mr. Adams, indeed, quotes a letter from Mr. Seward to himself, dated the 19th of January, 1863, and says, that he “abstains from entering into any discussion of whether the language of that letter is or is not fairly to be considered as ‘throwing cold water altogether’ on Earl Russell’s proposition.” But he does not state that the terms of that letter of Mr. Seward were ever communicated to her Majesty’s government, nor can I find the least trace of such a communication having been made in any of the sources of information open to me. I do not, therefore, perceive how the language of Mr. Seward in a letter to Mr. Adams can legitimately be called in aid to alter or modify the impression which Mr. Adams’s own conversation with Earl Russell may have been in itself calculated to produce.
Mr. Adams proceeds to say that it was “clearly implied in the sequel,” (of my observations,) “though not affirmed in words, that as a consequence of this answer the British government were reluctantly compelled to desist from appealing to Parliament at all,” and then, after citing passages from the documents which passed between himself and the government at Washington, ending with his own despatch which contains a record of the conversation between himself and Earl Russell, he assumes it to have been shown “that his lordship’s answer declining to proceed any further was made forthwith, and was the result of cabinet deliberations previously held, and of the opinion of the lord chancellor theretofore given.” “It was,” he adds, “in no way the effect of the communication made by myself at the moment, but had been prepared in advance to meet it whenever it came, or whatever it might be. It fell in with an opinion expressed by Mr. Seward, but was in no manner dependent upon it. If this be the correct chronology it follows that no such hypothetical difficulty in an appeal to Parliament, after such an answer as is described by her Majesty’s attorney general, could ever have been possible. Her Majesty’s government had decided before the answer ever appeared not to make any such appeal, but rather to abide by the lord chancellor’s confidence in the existing statute.”
I cannot think it was a just inference from anything which I said that her Majesty’s government were “reluctantly compelled” to desist from making any application to Parliament as a consequence of Mr. Adams’s answer to Earl Russell’s suggestion. I neither said nor implied that her Majesty’s government were desirous of making any such application to Parliament, much less that the answer returned by the United States government to Earl Russell’s overture was their only or their principal reason for not making it. On the contrary the manifest difficulty of carrying such a measure through Parliament at such a time, and the great inconvenience of any unsuccessful attempt to do so (to which I did not omit to refet) would necessarily make the conclusion that such an attempt was unnecessary, (if it could be arrived at on good grounds,) acceptable to her Majesty’s government, and the opinion formed in the cabinet under the advice of the lord chancellor, (which I also mentioned in the debate,) that our existing law would probably be found upon trial sufficient for its purpose, must (of course) have contributed in a very important degree to that conclusion. But as I read the reports of this conversation, (both that made by Mr. Adams, and that of Earl Russell to Lord Lyons,) I find nothing in either of them to justify Mr. Adams’s inference that her Majesty’s government had determined beforehand to let the matter drop, at all events, and not to propose any measure to Parliament, whatever the answer of the government of the United States might be. Lord Russell did, indeed, at once come to the conclusion, which he then announced to Mr. Adams, that the matter could not, at that time, -usefully be carried further. But why? Not because the cabinet had already so decided, but because the opinion of the government of the United States, as expressed by Mr. Adams as to their own law, was. found to coincide with the opinion of the lord chancellor expressed in the cabinet as to our law. Under these circumstances there appeared to be an agreement of opinion between the governments of both countries, that reliance might safely be placed upon their existing laws; and if any measure had been afterwards proposed to Parliament, the opinions thus formed and expressed must (when made known) have had an unfavorable influence upon its chance of success. To prosecute the negotiation further, under such circumstances, might not improbably have proved a source of serious embarrassment to her Majesty’s government, unless some amendments to the laws of both countries had actually resulted from it; and the prospect of such a result was too uncertain to justify the risk. The government of the United States had thought it necessary, while expressing their willingness to consider any propositions which might emanate from her Majesty’s government, to guard themselves against being supposed to admit that their own law, (in the language of Mr. Adams,) was not “of very sufficient vigor,” or (in the language of Earl Russell) that it “could be improved.” They were willing to receive suggestions; but, though invited to do so, they themselves made none. What might have been the effect of this if her Majesty’s government had been satisfied that an amendment of our foreign enlistment act was indispensable for the accomplishment of its objects, I cannot pretend to say, but under the actual circumstances of the case, its natural (not to say necessary) effect was the reply immediately given by Earl Russell to Mr. Adams; in which reply the government of the United States, without any appearance of surprise or dissatisfaction acquiesced.
Mr. Adams thinks himself warranted in concluding that if the answer of the government [Page 82] of the United States had been different, the reply of Earl Russell would still have been the same. My conclusion from the facts and the documents was, and is, the reverse. Having voluntarily proposed to enter into communication, with a view to the mutual revision of the statutes of both countries, on a very important and very practical subject, it was fully open to his lordship to withdraw from that proposal, when the government of the United States had expressed their willingness to entertain it in a merely passive sense, without accepting any part of the responsibility of pressing it forward, or even encouraging it so far as to say that they concurred in the views with which it had been originally proposed, or that they anticipated any prospect of advantage from its further prosecution. Under these circumstances the lord chancellor’s opinion that there was no practical necessity for a change in our law became decisive. But my belief is, that the cabinet had in fact come to no conclusion which would have superseded the further consideration of the question, at that time, if the United States government had stated it to be the result of their experience, that their own law required amendments to make it perfectly efficient—much less if they had expressed an anxiety to agree in such amendments as might make the laws of both countries more effective for their common purpose, and had offered or stated themselves to be prepared to offer any practical suggestions with that view. Nor does it appear to me at all probable that if such had been the tenor of the answer given by Mr. Adams to Earl Russell’s proposal, his lordship would nevertheless have broken off a negotiation initiated by himself, merely because the lord chancellor had in the mean time induced the cabinet to take a more favorable view than that which had been entertained by her Majesty’s law officer of our existing law.
I think, therefore, I did not err in my appreciation of the substance of what took place between the two governments and although I do not attribute and never have attributed the decision of her Majesty’s government solely to the opinion expressed by the government of the United States, as to the sufficiency of their own law, I still continue to believe (what alone I meant to state or imply in my place in Parliament,) that the opinion so expressed by the government of the United States did exercise a material influence upon the course then and subsequently taken by her Majesty’s government, and that it would have been also likely to prove a serious impediment to the success of any measure for the amendment of the foreign enlistment act, if such a measure (even after some continued negotiation with the government of the United States) had been introduced into Parliament.
I have, &c., &c.
The Earl of Clarendon.
P. S.—*I annex, as necessary to give a complete view of what passed, the two following extracts: No. 1, being the passage in Earl Russell’s letter to Mr. Adams, of December 19, 1862, immediately following that quoted by Mr. Adams; and the other, No. 2, being Earl Russell’s report to Lord Lyons, dated February 14, 1863, of his conversation with Mr. Adams:
No. 1.
“I shall accordingly be ready to confer at any time with you, and to listen to any suggestion which you may have to make, by which the British foreign enlistment act and the corresponding statute of the United States may be made more efficient for their purpose.”
No. 2.
“Mr. Adams said that his government was ready to listen to any propositions her Majesty’s government had to make; but they did not see how their own law on this subject could be improved.” I said, “that the cabinet had come to a similar conclusion, so that no further proceedings need be taken at present on this subject.”
R. P.
Mr. Adams to the Earl of Clarendon.
My Lord: I have the honor to acknowledge the reception of your note of the 10th instant, and of a copy of a statement made to your lordship by the attorney general, in reply to the remonstrance which I felt it my duty to address to you on the 24th ultimo, against what appeared to me to be errors affecting the position of my government, in his speech in the House of Commons the previous evening.
I have read that statement with the attention which is due not less to the distinguished position of that eminent individual, than to my own personal respect for his high character. If I have unfortunately failed in entirely mastering the purport of his reasoning, it may, perhaps, be owing to my own inability to understand the necessity for any at all.
The question which it was my intention to propound was not one touching any class of [Page 83] opinions, but simply naked facts. I pray your lordship’s pardon if I briefly recapitulate the conflicting statements.
I understand the attorney general substantially to affirm:
1. That her Majesty’s government had voluntarily initiated a proposition to the government which I have the honor to represent, to amend and improve the provisions of the British enlistment law, for the benefit of the United States.
2. That her Majesty’s government had been deterred from prosecuting this friendly purpose entirely by the cold and repulsive manner in which that proposition had been met by the United States.
The necessary inference from these propositions, if well founded in the facts, is, that the whole responsibility for any failure of her Majesty’s government in securing from Parliament greater safeguards against the abuse of neutrality in this kingdom devolves on the United States.
In behalf of my government, I have only respectfully to repeat my counter statement, to the following effect:
1. That her Majesty’s government, so far as any knowledge of their proceedings was communicated to me, never initiated any proposition to the United States to improve the legislation against abuses of neutrality in this kingdom.
2. That the only thing done was a suggestion of an intention to make such a proposal, and that was elicited by a demand of the United States that something or other should be done. But even this was made conditional upon their consent to reciprocate whatever might be subsequently proposed by the British, and concurred in by the United States government.
3. That that intention was definitely abandoned before any reply from the United States came to the knowledge of her Majesty’s government.
So far as the statement made by her Majesty’s attorney general may be construed to corroborate the preceding averment of facts, I take great pleasure in expressing my satisfaction with it. So far as it may fall short of admitting them, I must submit that the way to prove the truth and to convict me of error is still open, not through reasoning so much as by an appeal to living testimony. I shall be prepared at all times, very cheerfully, to correct any misapprehension I may have myself fallen into of these facts, so far as they may involve the course of other parties, provided it shall be made plain to me from the proper authority.
Meanwhile, I must take the liberty to insist that my government must be considered as wholly free from every shadow of responsibility for the decision of her Majesty’s government to abide by the existing legislation as a sufficient prevention of all abuses of the neutrality of the realm.
I pray your lordship to accept, &c., &c.
Right Honorable the Earl of Clarendon, &c., &c., &c.