Prussian troops are in possession of Holstein. This was accomplished
without resistance from the Austrian troops. The moment Austria
presented the question of Schleswig and Holstein to the consideration of
the German confederation, (in violation of the treaty of Gastein,)
Prussia claimed the right to hold Holstein jointly with Austria,
admitting at the same time that Austria could also hold Schleswig in
common with Prussia. The Prussian troops, in marching into Holstein, met
the Austrian, yet no bad feeling was manifested. Two days since the
Austrian troops left, leaving Prussia in possession of both Schleswig
and Holstein. On receiving the news of the Prussian troops occupying
Holstein, the Austrian minister demanded his passports, and yesterday
the whole Austrian legation left for Vienna. The Prussian minister at
Vienna, with all the members of the legation, returns from Vienna
to-day.
The question presented by Austria to the German confederation is not, as
to who is to govern and hold Schleswig-Holstein, but it contemplates the
German confederation will authorize the mobilization of the entire
federal army, place this army on a war footing with a view of
reinstating Austria in Holstein and expelling the Prussian. Austria also
expects the confederation will give some opinion on the subject of
disarming of troops. A decision is expected today on these and other
questions. The result and time of the decision are alike doubtful. Count
Bismarck’s despatch of the 8th instant to the Prussian representatives
abroad, (herewith enclosed,) exhibits so much bitterness, that within
the past week Prussia has lost ground with many of the smaller states.
In addition to this, Count Bismarck’s circular of the 11th instant
recommends a new programme for the German confederation, namely, to
leave Austria out of the new confederation. He also recommends that the
federal army raised by the new confederation shall hereafter be under
the command of Prussia in the north, and Bavaria in the south. This is
also calculated to prejudice Prussia with the smaller states. It is not
possible for things to remain many days in their present condition. The
Prussian army is now estimated at six hundred and forty-seven thousand,
including fifteen thousand officers. Her cannon numbers one thousand and
eight, one-half of them rifled. One hundred and thirty-two thousand
horses. The government is establishing hospitals in every part of the
country; placards for organizations to provide for the support of wives
and children of the soldiers are placed on walls all over the city, and
money is being raised to take care of the sick, wounded, and dying, yet
not a blow has been struck, many believing with the undersigned that war
between Prussia and Austria will yet be avoided.
Hon. William H. Seward,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
[Untitled]
The following despatch has been sent by Count Bismarck to the
Prussian representatives abroad:
“Berlin,
June 4.
“I have already communicated to your excellency, at a former period,
the despatch I addressed upon the 7th of last month to the King’s
ambassador at Vienna, in reference to Count Mensdorff’s note of
April 26, upon the question of the Elbe duchies. I purposely
selected for that communication the form of a confidential
statement, not intended to be conveyed in
[Page 29]
copy, because experience had taught me that a
real understanding is not promoted by the exchange of documents,
which are wont immediately to obtain publicity, and because it was
the first wish of the King’s government still to offer or leave open
to the Vienna cabinet the possibility of an approach. We had, also,
at first, cause to assume that this step of ours would be
appreciated at Vienna, and, judging from his remarks to Baron von
Werther, Count Mensdorff seemed to have perceived in it such a
possibility. Indeed, the tenor of our communication, wherever it
transpired, was looked upon as a symptom of cordial feeling,
increasing hopes in the preservation of peace.
“We have waited in vain for a reply, or even for a mere expression of
the Emperor’s ambassador upon the subject.
“We are forced, on the contrary, to consider the declaration
delivered by the Austrian government at the federal Diet at Frank
fort-on-the-Main, on June 1, as the answer to our conciliatory
overtures. In that declaration, after a retrospective statement at
variance with facts and offensive to Prussia, Austria hands over to
the Diet the decision upon the Schleswig-Holstein question, and at
the same time gives notice of an act of sovereignty in Holstein,
viz., the convocation of the estates, which she is not entitled to
undertake single-handed from the moment when she released herself
from the Gastein treaty by reference to the Diet, and thereby
substituted the old relation of the co-possession for the recent
geographical division.
“We have already protested at Vienna against this unjustifiable and
one-sided act, as against the equally unjustifiable disposal of our
rights by handing them over to the Diet, and reserve to us to take
further steps.
“But, first, I cannot refrain from declaring that in this proceeding
of the Austrian government we are unable to perceive anything but
the intention of a direct provocation and the desire forcibly to
bring about a breach and war. All our information agrees that the
determination to make war upon Prussia is firmly settled at
Vienna.
“I may confidentially acquaint your excellency, by his Majesty’s
desire, that at the time when we addressed the conciliatory
communication above mentioned to Vienna, the King, actuated by the
duty of preserving peace as long as possible, readily listened to a
proposal for direct understanding made from an impartial quarter at
Vienna, and first communicated to his Majesty, without the
participation of the ministry, in order to ascertain whether his
Majesty the Emperor of Austria was still actuated by the wish of
maintaining peace. The proposal was to treat the Schleswig-Holstein
and the federal reform question in common, and by this connection to
facilitate the solution of both. The negotiations, supported by the
most conciliatory desires on the part of the mediators, have, as his
Majesty informs me, only demonstrated that a corresponding feeling
no longer exists at Vienna. They have shown, notwithstanding the
Emperor’s theoretical love of peace, the craving for war which
dominates every other consideration throughout his entire council,
even among those who, to our knowledge, formerly voted against the
war, and even against the preparations and armaments, and that this
craving has now also gained decisive influence over the Emperor
himself. Not only was there manifested an entire absence of all and
every readiness to enter even into confidential negotiations, and to
discuss the possibilities of an agreement, but expressions of
influential Austrian statesmen and councillors of the Emperor have
been reported to the King from an authentic source, which leaves no
doubt that the imperial ministers desire war at any price, partly in
the hope of successes in the field, partly to tide over domestic
difficulties, nay, even with the expressed intention of assisting
the Austrian finances by Prussian contributions, or by an
‘honorable’ bankruptcy.
“The acts of the Austrian government coincide only too accurately
with this intention.
“I have mentioned above that we are compelled to recognize a direct
provocation in the declaration delivered at the Diet. It has only
one meaning, if the Vienna cabinet intends to follow it up
immediately with the expressed breach, for it cannot have expected
that we should tamely submit to this attack upon our rights. In
another question the forced loan ordered in Venetia, which impresses
a sting of additional bitterness upon circumstances, shows that
Austria will only make use of the extremest means towards Italy
also. Corresponding with this are the reserves with which, according
to the information received here, she accompanied her answer to the
invitation to the conference, and which, as we hear, are understood
by all the three powers as equivalent to a refusal.
“After the form of the invitation had, by negotiation between the
inviting powers, been expressly so drawn up that Austria should be
able to accept it without committing herself to anything in advance,
and without being compelled to make reserves, it is precisely the
Vienna cabinet that renders all these labors futile.
“Behind this we can only see the decided intention upon the part of
Austria of forcing on war with Prussia, and of, at most, making Use
of negotiations as to the congress to gain time by procrastination
for her own not entirely completed arrangements, but especially for
those of her allies. The fact of war is a settled determination at
Vienna; the only further point is to choose the favorable moment to
begin.
“This conviction is forced upon us with imperative necessity by the
most recent facts, and we consider that only an intentionally
prejudiced view can come to an opposite conclusion. Facts now speak
too loudly for gossip based solely upon conjectures, combinations,
falsely interpreted statements, and empty rumors as to the warlike
longings of Prussia, not to dwindle into nothingness in comparison.
Perhaps we shall at last be believed when we solemnly
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protest against any notion
of wishing to make good our claims to the duchies by force and with
disregard to the rights of the co-possessor. Now, too, probably it
will not be difficult to understand the real motives of the
armaments by which Austria has given rise to the present crisis, and
whose removal by means of the congress she has further taken care to
render impossible by the attitude she has assumed.
“We may appeal with a calm conscience to the judgment of all
impartial statesmen as to which party has displayed conciliation and
love of peace up to the latest moment.
“I respectfully request your excellency to express yourself in the
sense of this despatch to the minister of foreign affairs at the
court to which you are accredited.
