Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.
Sir: Since writing my despatch of the 25th instant, I have obtained further information in regard to the great battle of the 24th. The account I then gave I believe to have been substantially correct in regard to the battle itself, though I have had reason to change my opinion respecting the duration of the war. There is no doubt but the Paraguayans suffered terribly in killed and wounded. Of the twenty-one thousand that made the onslaught it is said that one-third never left the field. The allies also suffered terribly, but not, as they say, half so much as the Paraguayans. The fact, however, that 2,000 wounded have been brought to this city would indicate that their loss was little less than their enemies. But though the Paraguayans were repulsed, it was not a rout. They fell back to their former position, and the allies are near where they were before the battle. No strategic advantage was gained by either party, and the only effect the battle can have on the result of the war, supposing each side to have lost the same number, is to render the disparity between the stronger and the weaker greater than before.
But an unexpected difficulty has appeared in the way of the allies. As the army of General Mitre was to advance by land against Humayta, the squadron, under the Brazilian Admiral Baron Tamandare, was to advance up the river Paraguay and attack, simultaneously, the fortifications on the bank of the river. But now, after waiting for weary months for the admiral to get his fleet ready to move, it is found that the river has fallen so that the iron-clads and gunboats cannot ascend it. It is not probable that the river will rise again for four months, so that the Brazilian squadron will be as useless for all purposes of the war as was Robinson Crusoe’s boat for navigation. That the river would fall to its present low stage within a month or so was almost certain, and it is not unfrequent for it to fall as low as it is now even earlier in the year than this. Hence the tardiness of the Brazilian admiral has caused great complaints; and now, when it is found that by reason of his unaccountable delays his squadron can be of little or no service, I apprehend they will be greatly increased. Should General Mitre be able to take Humayta without the aid of the fleet, probably some of the transport steamers and gunboats of light draught will work their way up to Asuncion. But to accomplish this will be a work of time, and whether without the aid of the squadron the allies can take Humayta at all is a question yet to be solved. In my former calculations as to the probable duration of the war, I have supposed the fleet would move while there was water in the river to float it, and not consume all the time of the high water in getting ready.
By the last mail from Buenos Ayres I received the first despatch from you that has reached me since I left the United States, in September last. It was despatch No. 42, and dated March 20th. Hence I have had no advice or instructions since I left as to the course I should pursue in the unpleasant and anomalous position in which I have been placed since my return to the river Plate. If the war is to last several months longer, as now seems not improbable, and if the allies persist in denying me the right of going to the capital of Paraguay, I hope to receive some definite instructions as to what I shall do under such circumstances. I cannot but think that the presence of an American gunboat in this vicinity would have a salutary influence, and that, too, independent of any relief it might be able to afford me in reaching my post in Paraguay. But our admiral refuses to send a gunboat into these waters, much to the surprise and chagrin of the Americans doing business on this river, though doubtless he has good and sufficient reasons of his own. The reason he alleges is that he doesn’t choose to do so. So I am informed by Mr. Kirk. I see by the Buenos Ayres papers that he has been on an excursion up the Uruguay river, where he spent some eighteen days in partridge shooting. Mr. Kirk [Page 581] wrote me that he did not go under sail; though what national interest he could serve up there that would justify in consuming the government coal I am not informed. His economy of coal when I was in Buenos Ayres was astonishing, but when the American merchants there proposed to furnish the coal gratuitously necessary to take a gunboat to Paraguay, he still declined and said that would make no difference. I conclude, therefore, the reason why he went up the Uruguay was, he did “choose to do so.”
Very respectfully, your obedient and humble servant,
Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.