Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress

Mr. Washburn to Mr. Seward.

No. 68.]

Buenos Ayres, August 20, 1866.

Sir: I am informed by the Hon. Charles Lefebore de Becour, the French minister here, that he has received orders from his government to send the small French gunboat Decidee to Asuncion; that the vessel will start from here to-morrow, and the commander will take a letter from him to the Brazilian admiral, in which he will state that it is the particular desire of the French government that no objection may be made to its passage through the blockading squadron, and that if a free passage is not permitted to it the French government will be greatly displeased. The minister, however, says he does not anticipate that the request will be complied with, in which event the commander will have orders to remain in Corrientes until the arrival of an American war vessel, and if that is allowed to pass through, then to insist that he has the same right, and follow on if not stopped. The particular object in sending up the Decidee, I suppose, is to give some relief to the French consul at Asuncion, who has been unable to communicate with the outer world for the last eight or ten months, who it is feared must have suffered much in the meanwhile from the want of the comforts and luxuries, if not the necessaries, required by a family like his.

As yet I can form little idea as to the time when I shall get away. Captain Crosby of the Shamokin tells me that he has received orders from Admiral Godon to get ready to go up the river, but to what point or for what purpose he is not advised. He has obeyed his orders and is ready to start. So am I, and have been for eight months.

From the admiral I learn by a letter from Mr. Kirk, written at Rio de Janeiro, on his way home, that after getting his instructions to send a vessel from his squadron to Paraguay if so requested by me, he went northward to Bahia, where it is probable my letter will reach him if he has not gone still further north. Mr. Kirk writes me that the admiral told him if I would send an official note he would send a vessel to take me up the river. From this I infer he will try and justify himself for not having done it before by pretending that I have not duly and officially notified him of my desire for his assistance. I will spike that gun for him here and now by sending you a copy of a letter I addressed to him in December last.

Enclosed I send you a printed copy of a protest made by the Peruvian government for itself and in behalf of its allies, Chili and Bolivia, against the “triple alliance” and its proposed overthrow of the government of Paraguay and the substitution of another to be imposed by its conquerors.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

[Extract.]

Mr. Washburn to Admiral Godon.

Buenos Ayres, December 14, 1865.

My Dear Sir: You see by the date of this that I have only got thus far on my way to Paraguay. I reached here on the 4th of November, and have been patiently waiting here ever since for some conveyance to take me to my post of service. But, as I anticipated while at Rio, all communication between this place and Paraguay has been suspended, and only the war vessels of neutral nations have ventured to pass the lines of the belligerents. A French and an Italian gunboat had been sent up from here a short time before my arrival, neither of which has yet returned to this port. The English gunboat Spider left at a later date, and is supposed to be lying at Corrientes, the Brazilian admiral objecting to her going above the “Tres Bocas.” The Brazilians assume that they have the right to forbid any man-of-war of a neutral power going up the river, and have declared that it was only under favor that the above-mentioned gunboats have been allowed to pass. But both the French and English ministers have protested against this assumed right of the allies, though the latter have not yielded the point, but on the contrary have requested the different ministers to recall all vessels bearing their respective flags to some point below the Brazilian squadron.

Under these circumstances, I do not know what objections may be made if an American war vessel were to go up the river. I infer, however, that no real objection would be made. The Brazilian special envoy here, Senor Octaviana, has assured me repeatedly that he would do everything in his power to facilitate my massage, and has even offered me a steamer to take me all the way to Paraguay. But for reasons you will readily understand, I have declined to accept any such favor. But I think I ought not to delay here any longer than is absolutely necessary, and hope that you may find it convenient to despatch the Wasp or some other light-draught steamer to take me to my destination. Please inform me with as little delay as possible if you can do so and how soon. I think matters are coming to a crisis at the seat of war, and I am very anxious to be near the scene of action when the day for negotiation arrives.

I write this letter to you in anticipation of any notice of your arrival in Montevideo, but as I received a letter from our friend, Major Ellison, saying that you had left Rio on the 5th instant, I think it possible you will be there by the time this note is. I shall be greatly obliged for early information as to what I may expect, as I can make no calculations or arrangements in regard to my own movements till I know how and when I am to go to Paraguay.

* * * * * * *

I have the honor to be, very truly, your obedient servant,

CHARLES A. WASHBURN.

Admiral S. W. Godon, United States Steam Frigate Susquehanna.

[Translation.]

Protest of Peru and her allies against the triple alliance treaty.

To the Chargé of the Republic near the governments of Buenos Ayres, Montevideo, and Rio Janeiro:

Since the establishment of our present provisional government, notwithstanding difficulties we have had to contend with at home, we have watched the course of events among the nations on the Plata with no little interest, and have never failed to express the most fervent wishes for the termination of a contest that must harm, not only the nations engaged in it, but all portions of South America.

Without investigating the original causes of the contest, the justice and necessity of which can be determined only by the belligerent parties, our chief magistrate protests against its disastrous results, particularly at a time when the western coast of the continent is suffering from an unjust European invasion, which, if successful, might be repeated on the eastern coast.

It was enough for our supreme chief to know that the war was between American nations to desire its end, and this desire was the more ardent because it was necessary for all the South American nations to unite against a common enemy, in sustaining the liberty and independence they conquered forty years ago. The Peruvian government is grieved to see an alliance between nations on the eastern coast of America against another American nation bound to us in ties of friendship, and which was once a part of the territory of those nations it is resisting, at the same time that there is an offensive and defensive alliance among the pacific republics, to repel the violent attacks and arrogant pretensions of Spain.

This is the more painful to us at the present time, because of the European aggressions on America since 1861. These and other considerations easy to be seen induced the Peruvian government to try to bring about a termination of the contest between the allies and Paraguay, by sending you instructions on the 20th of December, 1885, offering the good offices, and even the mediation of Peru. Subsequently, and after the alliance of Bolivia, Chili, Ecuador, and Peru, an agreement was entered into, between the Chilian minister of foreign relations and the representatives of Boliver and Peru in Santiago, confirmed by the government of Quito, offering the joint mediation of the four nations, which was approved by all the other governments. But before the government at Lima had heard of the result of the mission to La Plata, the text of the treaty of the first of May, which had been kept secret up to that time, became known.

It is not my intention to examine the motives of enmity of the allies against Paraguay, and why they kept their alliance secret. The reasons must have been good, since the publication of the fact has given cause for events that demonstrate the inconvenience to the allies of making known the stipulations they had formed.

If it is an unquestionable right of every nation to declare war and form alliances with other nations, we cannot understand why the allies, after declaring war against Paraguay, and even carrying it into the territory, should want to conceal the fact for doing it, which could not be long kept secret. It is the custom to keep treaties of alliance secret till the time for action; but when the results of the alliance begin to be seen, then the fact is made public. In article 18 of the treaty of May, 1865, it is expressly stipulated that it shall be kept secret till the principal object of the alliance is accomplished; and we learn from the preamble and various clauses of the treaty that the principal object of the alliance was to destroy the government of Paraguay, and of course the treaty was to be kept secret till the end of the war, that is, till Paraguay was conquered and at the mercy of the victorious allies, for that was the only way to destroy the government of Paraguay.

So, virtually, the treaty of alliance was to be kept secret during the war, so that the other American nations were not to know the fate of Paraguay till it was conquered. But it seems the government of Great Britain had some fears of this and made them known by her representatives in Montevideo, and to allay them, the minister of foreign relations of Uruguay delivered a copy of the treaty to the English minister. It might have been known that other governments, particularly those of America, would entertain the same suspicions, and it was the duty of the allies to explain the causes of the war and their objects in order to remove all doubt about the independence and sovereignty of the American nations.

The declaration of the allies in the first part of article 8, that they would respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the republic of Paraguay, is certainly deserving of praise, but that obligation is annulled by other more explicit stipulations, as a brief analysis will demonstrate.

In article 7 the allies assert that the war is not against the people of Paraguay but against its government. However plausible the theory may be that war may be made on the government of a nation and not on the nation itself, in practice, it is hard to separate a government from the nation it forms when treating of a foreign war. The law of nations admits no such distinction; on the contrary, it considers the nation and its government as one and inseparable, and injuries to subjects or citizens as injuries to the government.

Admitting the principle laid down in article 7 of the treaty, war would be difficult in some cases and impossible in others; for instance, there might be a government against which reprisals could not be enforced by an enemy without exercising them first against the nation, reputed innocent.

Though the right of the allies to make war on Paraguay may be lawful, the right only extends to conquest, and the imposition of conditions to force a reparation of offences and damages, and securities for the future; the alliance has no right to overthrow the government of Paraguay, for the right to destroy a government rests in the people who formed and constituted it.

The only competent judge of this question is the Paraguayan nation itself. Let it suffer from the mismanagement of its government; but, as long as it supports that government, no other nation has the right to do for the Paraguayans what they would not do for themselves.

To act in any other way is to undermine the principles of modern public law, principles that prevail in all the American States, and establish a doctrine which, if applied to Paraguay as it lately was to the Mexican republic, would place the rest of the American States at the mercy of any neighboring or remote powers that might choose to determine their destinies, present or to come. What security would a nation then have of preserving its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, institutions, and each and every one of those elements that constitute its autonomy? The existence of the governments, and by greater reason of the nations themselves, would not then depend solely and exclusively upon the will of the people, but upon the judgment, the estimation, and may be, the convenience of other governments and other nations. To admit of such a doctrine would be to renounce the principles of national sovereignty, which is the foundation of all the American states. To keep silence when we see this doctrine put in practice by one or several of the American nations, would be to acknowledge a doctrine or system which might be applied, sooner or later, to any one of them with good right.

The allies allow, as a forced consequence of the obligation to respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Paraguayan republic, the power to choose its own government and institutions, and do not pretend to annex it, or assume a protectorate, as a consequence of the war. Though it appears, from article 8 of the treaty, to be the decided will of the allies to respect the sovereignty of Paraguay, it is not less evident that there is a lesion of this sovereignty when the obligation to select a new government is sought to be imposed upon the Paraguayans as a condition of peace, even though the new government be very similar to the one now in existence.

As to the change of institutions suggested in the treaty, though seemingly left to the will of the Paraguayans, it is evident the allies mean it to take place, because, though the present government suits the people of Paraguay, it does not suit the allies, and must be altered according to the will of the latter, by right of conquest. That such is the intentions of the allies is plainly shown in article 9 of the treaty, by which the three governments bind themselves to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Paraguay for the period of five years. This guarantee is understood to refer to a country ruled by a new government, formed by the allies in accordance with article 7, and naturally on principles suggested by the influence of the alliance. Let a wsr treaty of offensive and defensive alliance be formed for the reparation of an injury—there is nothing more just and rational; but that this alliance should assume the right to pull down one government and put up another, with new principles and institutions, is to change the nature of the war. It is then no longer a war to restore rights and repair injuries, but purely and simply a war of intervention, which the other nations cannot look upon calmly while watching over the principles of public law common to all of them, and trying to preserve the continental balance of power for their own security.

The promise of the allies to guarantee the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Paraguay, declaring, moreover, that it should not be annexed nor ruled by any one of the allies, are deceptions altogether inconsistent with the promise to guarantee the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the country for the period of five years. This means that Paraguay may not be ruled by any one of the allied nations, but by all three; and the existence of Paraguay, as a nation, will depend upon the allies, at least for five years, and not upon the will of the Paraguayans, who wish to form their own government and remain a sovereign and independent State. And if the allies had the right to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of Paraguay, it is clear they had no occasion to give this guarantee and dispose of the nation as they pleased. We regret to say such principles cannot be accepted by the other American nations.

And after the five years what is to become of Paraguay? Free from their obligation, will the allies, or any one of them, annex Paraguay, or divide it among them, giving a portion to each neighbor ?

The treaty does not say, but the supposition that they will is the logical deduction from, the clause establishing the triple protectorate and offering a joint guarantee for only five years.

The destruction of Paraguayan nationality is so plainly foreshadowed in the treaty of alliance, that no provision is made in it to define the future limits of the respective territories.

The treaty does not say that the allied nations and Paraguay will proceed together to fix these limits after the war, but requires the new government of Paraguay to abide by the decision of limits fixed in article 16 of the treaty. It is unquestionable, from this peremptory stipulation, that if the Paraguay government resists, as it has a right to do, it would give a new cause of war that would be thought more just and legitimate than this one to overturn the government and introduce changes in the institutions of the country. In this way Paraguay will never be free from the allies; because, by article 17 of the treaty, the war is made perpetual and lasting, and the allies have not even taken the trouble to examine the justice or injustice of the demands that any of them might hereafter make against Paraguay.

That there might be no doubt about what the triple allianca proposed to do with Paraguay, a protocol in four articles was added to the treaty, to fix the meaning of the several stipulations.

These articles establish that the fortifications at Humayta shall be demolished, in fulfilment of the treaty of alliance, and no others of the kind shall be hereafter constructed; that, to secure peace with the new government of Paraguay, no arms or munitions of war shall be left in the country, and all that are taken shall be distributed among the allies, &c. Requiring a nation to demolish its fortifications, and prohibiting it from erecting others in future; obliging it to give up its arms and war materials, thus leaving it incapable of defence or protection, are pretensions without example in history, and forms the most explicit disavowal of the sovereignty and independence of Paraguay, which the allies had bound themselves to respect and guarantee. After the work undertaken by the allies is finished, will they say that Paraguay is still a sovereign and independent nation, with the exclusive control of its own destinies ?

The allies certainly did not think to inquire whether the system they were imposing on Paraguay would be approved by the other American nations or not! To make an American Poland of Paraguay would be a shame to all America. The Peruvian government relies upon the assent of its allies, as their respective representatives in Lima have already been informed, and we expect soon to hear from their governments a defence of the sovereignty and independence of Paraguay. Bolivia, Chili, Equador, and Peru would not say a word against the disastrous war now sprinkling the fertile fields of Paraguay with fraternal blood, were it not that this war is not confined to the right of demanding satisfaction for a wrong or injury, but goes so far as to oppose the sovereignty and independence of an American nation, and seeks to establish a protectorate over it and dispose of its future. Under these circumstances Peru and her allies cannot remain silent. It is their most sacred and imperious duty to protest in the most solemn manner against a war of such tendency, as well as against any acts that might lessen the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the Paraguayan republic.

That the governments to which you are accredited (those that signed the treaty of the 1st of May, 1860) may know the opinion of the Peruvian government on the subject of the, treaty and its tendency, contained in this protest, which they see themselves under the necessity of promulgating, the supreme chief charges me to order you to send a copy of this note to the cabinets of Buenos Ayres, Montevideo, and Rio Janeiro.

God preserve you.

T. PACHECO.

Lima, July 9, 1866.