No. 12.
Mr. Osborn
to Mr. Fish.
United
States Legation,
Buenos
Ayres, April 12, 1875. (Received May
22.)
No. 48.]
Sir: In my dispatch numbered 43, and dated March
15, I had the honor to inform you of the mission of Dr. Carlos Tejedor to
the Brazilian government.
The departure of Dr. Tejedor has been delayed by the yellow fever reported at
Rio de Janeiro. I understand now, from Mr. Lamarca, secretary of the
legation, that passage has been secured on the steamer that leaves here on
Thursday next.
Since my arrival here I have abstained from transmitting any opinions to the
Department in reference to the foreign affairs of this country, as I desire
first to acquire some knowledge of its language and history, to enable me to
do so with some exactness.
Since the dispatch of the acting chargé d’affaires of this legation, dated
November 15, 1872, and published by the Department, the official
correspondence has been confined to matters of routine, caused doubtless by
the frequent changes in the personnel of the
legation.
I think it not improper now to take up the thread of events concerning the
Paraguayan question since the date of the above dispatch, and unravel it to
the present time, as another and probably successful effort is about to be
made to settle it between Brazil and the Argentine Republic, the two
principal parties to the controversy.
The somewhat celebrated note of Dr. Tejedor to the Brazilian governent, dated
April 27, 1872, which was transmitted to you with the dispatch mentioned,
remains as yet without any substantial contradiction, and must, I think, be
considered as already belonging to the truths of history.
The mission of General Mitre to Rio de Janeiro subsequent to the note of Dr.
Tejedor, while serving to pacify the irritation caused by the language of
the note, in fact accomplished nothing as regards the main question of the
limits beween the Argentine and Paraguayan Republics, to which is intimately
allied the evacuation of Paraguay and of the Argentine island of Cerrito, at
the junction of the Rivers Parana and Paraguay, by the forces of Brazil.
In the agreement, the sole result of this mission, signed by the Brazilian
and Argentine plenipotentiaries at Rio de Janeiro, and which was approved by
the Argentine government, but as yet never sent to Congress for
ratification. Article VI provides that the two contracting parties shall
withdraw their forces then in Paraguay (November, 1872) within three months
after the celebration of the definitive treaties with
[Page 26]
Paraguay; or, in case of a delay of more than six
months from the date of this agreement, then Brazil and the Argentine
Republic will come to an understanding as to a time for the evacuation, when
Brazil will also leave the island of Cerrito, (or Otajo.)
* * * * * * *
The discussion of boundaries between this country and Bolivia has made no
progress for more than a year, although Dr. Tejedor placed on record some
three years ago the cordial desire of this Government to help Bolivia to a
solution of its difficulties, by granting a liberal boundary, and material
aid to construct a railway (originated by an American citizen) from the
capital of Sucre to the River Paraguay, by the valley of the Pilcomayo, its
natural southern outlet.
These limits are intimately connected with all the other matters above
mentioned, and perhaps a tripartite arrangement between the three republics
would be the best way to settle them, although it does not appear that
Paraguay has any original right or reasonable claim to any part of the
Chaco. I have conversed with several Paraguayans, and they all say that a
separate jurisdiction over the opposite bank of their river is the only way
to enable civilization to penetrate to their country, as well as the only
safeguard of their own lives in case of insurrection or revolution. The
latter has proved to be the case several times in the last three or four
years. The claim to the opposite bank they declare really originated, and is
sustained by the influence of the Brazilian government, with their chiefs,
for the sole purpose of preventing that friendship between the two republics
which a common origin and a common interest so imperatively require.
Dr. Tejedor goes to Rio de Janeiro to make a fifth attempt to bring all these
difficulties to a final solution. He goes, as it is understood, at the
express desire of the Emperor, and under positive promises previously
rendered, which will probably make his mission a success on Argentine
principles. But time alone can prove the truth of this.
In the event of an unfavorable result, I think no war will ensue between the
two countries for some time, as I think neither party is mad enough to
desire it or begin it, and would prefer to wait and leave matters as at
present.
The whole diplomatic and consular corps at Montevideo, a few days ago,
protested against the passage of a law making paper money a legal tender
there. The Argentine government immediately by telegraph disapproved of the
action of its minister, and ordered him to withdraw his signature and
apologize. This act has been severely commented on by the press, and the
course of this government fully approved.
I have, &c.,
[Inclosure in No.
48.—Translation.]
department of foreign affairs—memorandum on the
question of limits with paraguay.
There are two periods to the negotiation with Paraguay.
- In the first, Dr. Quintana could not obtain an understanding with
Baron Cotegipe, in reference to certain previous declarations
intended to define the obligation taken by Brazil, to protect the
territorial rights of the Argentine Republic as far as Bahia
Negro.
- In the second, General Mitre was unable to come to an
understanding with the Paraguayan
[Page 27]
government, notwithstanding the unlimited
countenance offered by the empire, according to the agreement of
November 19, celebrated in Rio de Janeiro, 1872, where useless
efforts of two of the most distinguished men of the republic are
alone sufficient to prove that the negotiations with Paraguay
contain something more than difficulties about limits. In fact the
war with Paraguay so completely prostrated that country, that its
own sons doubt the possibility of preserving its national
independence.
The death of Lopez gave it liberty; a constitution irreproachable in a
theoretical point of view has confirmed it; but the civilization,
customs, and power necessary to maintain it are wanting; and it is the
general conviction that Paraguayan liberties for a long time will be at
the mercy of daily insurrectionists.
Under these circumstances, a negotiation in which this republic only
defends its national integrity, presents a complicated problem of
difficult solution, and the undersigned, minister of foreign affairs,
when a resolution is about to be taken which may be of incalculable
consequence, feels the necessity of setting forth in writing the motives
for his opinion.
Paraguay, withdrawn by the Dictator Francia from the general movement of
manipulation in 1810, when that movement commenced, was a province of
the vice-royalty, and bound by the rivers Paraguay and Parana; even the
line of the Parana was only de facto, because her
true limits on that side was the river.
The province of Paraguay in colonial times did not permanently occupy any
point whatever on the left margin of the river Parana, nor of the right
bank of the river Paraguay, the Villa Occidental being of much later
origin, as also the Tranguera de Lareto upon the Parana.
The treaty of May 1, (Alliance, 1865,) establishing, as it does by
Article XVI, the right to exact the definitive treaty-limits on the
following bases: the Argentine Republic shall be separated from the
republic of Paraguay by the rivers Parana and Paraguay until the limits
of Brazil are met, these being at Bahia Negro, on the right bank of the
river Paraguay, did nothing more than corroborate the truth of facts and
right.
The Argentine Republic neither received nor increased a single right
through victory.
In the first negotiation, nevertheless, Baron Cotegipe did not wish to
admit any declaration which might oblige the empire to countenance
claims which passed to the north of the Pilcomayo.
In the second, the marquis of San Vincent admitted the force of the
treaty of alliance in all its points; but it appears that his government
reserved to itself the right again to deny its approval beyond the
Pilcomayo, Señor Magalhaens having said in Asuncion that he said San
Vicente had disobeyed his instructions by not thus stating in the
agreement of November 19.
The question, therefore, of the Chaco with Paraguay, is only on the
territory comprised between the Pilcomayo and Bahia Negro; or rather in
the Villa Occidental, which Paraguay does not wish to lose, and which
Brazil wishes her to keep.
The Argentine Republic as a danger to the independence to Paraguay; as a
menace to her commerce.
It may here be asked, is the real danger for Paraguay, perchance, to come
from the Argentine Republic? Could not the alleged inconveniences to her
commerce be settled by customs agreements? Is not the independence of
Paraguay recognized by the Argentine government and guaranteed by the
allies? But the answer to all these questions would carry me too far,
and I must sacrifice them to brevity, only occupying myself with the
attitude which it becomes the republic to assume in this delicate
situation.
The Argentine negotiator decided in favor of the cession of the Villa
Occidental, and all the territory comprised between the Pilcomayo and
Bahia Negro, with the promise on the part of Paraguay to recognize to
the Argentine Republic dominion over the missions, island of Cerrito,
and Chaco from the frontiers of Sante Fé to the Pilcomayo.
On my part I have maintained my previous negotiation with Bolivia, and
during the present one with Paraguay, that the Villa Occidental ought to
belong to the Argentine Republic, its northern boundary being the
nearest stream or river, and ceding the remainder up to Bahia Negro to
the republic which first treated with us.
The reasons on which we both founded our different-opinions are
extensively set forth in the notes exchanged during the negotiations,
and it seems useless to repeat them now. In this memorandum I ought to
limit myself to considerations of another order, which corroborate my
opinion before omitted, to wit, the cession of the Villa Occidental,
were it granted, would import its immediate evacuation, thus repudiating
our own conduct when we occupied it. By this cession our frontier on
that side would de facto be withdrawn to the
populated part of the province of Sante Fé, [Note
by translator.—Seven hundred miles down the river,] leaving the
intermediate bank subject to new settlements de
facto, of Paraguay, such as those realized from 1810 to
1850.
[Page 28]
Paraguay being master of the banks from twenty degrees to twenty-five
degrees thirty minutes of latitude, would hold the power to again impede
the navigation of the river, and withdraw itself from the civilizing
influences of commerce and contact with other nations.
The weakness of the present government of Paraguay offers no security
that it would not fall before the compact which contained such a cession
could be constitutionally ratified; or that the successor would refuse
to continue it; or congress, on its part, to approve it; then the
Argentine government would have entered upon the road of concession, in
which it would not be possible to stop.
The instability of the Argentine government, and the resistance of its
congress to: a treaty made by the executive upon the above-mentioned
basis, are not to be feared to the same degree; nevertheless, in
prudence, they ought not to be forgotten, because it is not impossible
that, for the purpose of rejecting such a treaty, we might witness a
coalition of those who formerly opposed the alliance on account of its
enemies, no matter in what form it might have been made, because they
are the enemies of the empire, whose little friendly influence in this
emergency could not be concealed.
But, supposing all for the best, while the Argentine Republic, fulfilling
its word, should immediately evacuate the Villa Occidental, Paraguay,
through the Brazilian forces, would be subject to an agreement which
could not be evaded for much time, neither from considerations of public
order in Paraguay, nor from the guarantee offered in the Cotegipe
treaties, or from the want of participation of the republic of Uruguay;
this fact constitutes a greater danger than the want of treaties with
Paraguay.
I do not believe that the good name and patriotism of the Argentine
government ought to be exposed to so many and great inconvenience in
order that a conventional law may grant that which she already
possesses; and, on my part, I propose as follows:
- 1st.
- That within the time fixed by the Paraguayan government, it be
informed that the last word of the Argentine government is
arbitration, exclusively applied to the territory confined
between the Pilcomayo and Bahia Negro, including the Villa
Occidental; or, instead of this, the definitive line of the
Pilcomayo by way of transaction, saving to the Argentine
Republic the Villa Occidental.
- 2d.
- That this same communication be made simultaneously to the
Brazilian government by means of its envoy extraordinary near
the Argentine government, Baron de Araguaya, expressing to him,
at the same time, the desire that he receive instructions to
support either of these pacific solutions; or, in defect
thereof, agree to the evacuation of Paraguay, according to
article 6th of the agreement of November, 1872.
CARLOS TEJEDOR.
Buenos
Ayres, October 14,
1873.