Mr. Conger to Mr. Gresham.

[Extract.]
No. 436.]

Sir: I have to report another important change in the cabinet of Vice-President Peixoto.

On the 27th ultimo Dr. Innocencio Serzedello Oorrea tendered his resignation as minister of finance, and on the 28th Admiral Custodio José de Mello surrendered the portfolio of marine.

On the 30th Dr. Felisbello Firmo de Olivier a Freire, the recently appointed minister of foreign affairs, was transferred to the ministry of finance, still having charge of the foreign ministry ad interim, and Admiral Felippe Firmino Rodrigues Chaves was appointed minister of marine.

The reasons given for the resignation of Serzedello Correa were a general disagreement with the vice-president on matters of financial administration. Admiral Custodio de Mello sets forth as his grievances the refusal of the vice-president to adopt his views for a settlement of the civil war now in progress in Rio Grande do Sul, and a general disposition on the part of the vice-president to manage matters without consultation with him. This is a very serious rupture in the vice-president’s official family; from the fact that these two resigned ministers were the strongest and most influential characters in the cabinet, Admiral de Mello having been the chief organizer and leader of the movement of November 23, 1891, which deposed Marshal Deodora from his assumed dictatorship, and restored the legal government with Vice-President Peixoto at its head.

It is also currently reported and believed that both Dr. Serzedello and Mello are candidates for the Presidency at the election which must take place in March next.

What the result of this crisis will be can only be conjectured; but as the immediate future will shortly disclose it, I shall not offer any prophecy. As setting forth more particularly the situation, I inclose a copy of an editorial clipped from the Rio News, together with the letter of Admiral Custodio de Mello.

I have, etc.,

E. H. Conger.
[Inclosure in No. 436.—Clipping from the Rio News of May 2, 1893.]

cabinet changes.

The long impending rupture in the cabinet took place on the 27th, the minister of finance offering his resignation on that day and the minister of marine withdrawing from the council of ministers to send in his resignation on the following day. That [Page 33] dissensions existed has long been known, and it was also known that they were sufficiently serious to make it impossible for the cabinet to act harmoniously much longer. The resignation of Dr. Limpo d’Abreu a fortnight since was of too personal a character to indicate the course which other members of the cabinet would pursue, but as it was well known that the ministers were not entirely agreed upon the coercive policy begun in Rio Grande it was certain that the recent policy adopted by the minister of war could not fail to bring these differences to an issue. This was practically what occurred at the cabinet meeting of the 27th. Instead of appearing the minister of finance sent in his resignation, which was based on the financial policy of the executive, and the minister of marine withdrew to prepare a letter tendering his resignation for the following day.

The immediate cause of the resignation of the minister of finance was a communication received by him from the President on Thursday evening containing a memorandum for a decree reforming the tribunal de contas, or annulling its acts in trying to restrict public expenditures to the legislative appropriations. The requirements of the army in Rio Grande have caused many extraordinary and unauthorized expenditures, and the opposition properly shown by the tribunal to these unwarranted uses of the public money led the President to resolve upon its practical dissolution. Although Minister Serzedello has not been particularly sensitive over these dictatorial acts of authority, he resolved not to be an accomplice in the destruction of so necessary a branch of the treasury as this auditing commission.

In his letter of resignation he first alludes to the critical situation of the treasury and to the “urgent measures” which he presented at the last cabinet meeting to secure economy in expenditures. Among these were the suppression of advances and commissions abroad, a reduction of expenses abroad, the postponement of all public works not urgently required, a reduction in the China and Chicago commissions, and the recall of all naval vessels in foreign waters, the expenditures for all of which are now increasing the deficit.

As to the tribunal de contas, he considers it the best protection the Treasury can have, and for this reason he considers the proposed reform a serious error. Instead of auditing accounts and refusing those not regular, or not legal, it will become simply an instrument for conferring and registering them, without power to protect the treasury against abuses in expenditures.

The reasons for the resignation of the minister of marine are both political and administrative, and as they relate to the civil war in Rio Grande we give them in full:

letter of resignation of the minister of marine.

Rio de Janeiro, April 28, 1893.

Marshal: Much more than a month ago I had the honor of apprising your excellency, in a cabinet council, of the possibility of a pacific solution of the conflict in which Rio Grande do Sul is engaged. My purpose was patriotic, and would, by means of a conciliation, have relieved that state of the Republic from a situation which has converted it into a perennial source of hatreds and internal discords.

In order to not disturb the country at a time when the action of the government in a time of such political gravity should be homogeneous, I did not at once hand in my resignation of the portfolio which I held, and, insisting on the solution proposed and which your excellency afterwards undertook to realize, I hoped to see peace soon reestablished in that unhappy state.

In view, however, of the mission with which the minister of war has been charged by your excellency of continuing the conflict which is imbruing Rio Grande do Sul with blood, I consider my permanence in the government unprofitable, since it was not permitted me to secure that desideratum of mine for internal policy and public peace.

In a ministerial conference realized on the 20th instant, after hearing me, your excellency was good enough, in accord with the whole ministry, to accept my reasons, and then again undertook to transmit your orders in a sense of a pacification.

After a promise so categorically and twice confirmed, it was not permitted me to doubt that it would be at once realized, and therefore, to my amazement, I was yesterday surprised with a declaration in a sense wholly opposed to the preceding undertakings and solemnly agreed to by your excellency.

I was and am of opinion that the federal government ought to sustain the governors elected by the states. The principle, however, can not be absolute. It admits exceptions like all those which regulate the guidance of public opinion. It is publicly known and felt that the actual administration in Rio Grande do Sul does not represent the majority of our compatriots in that state. It is not a chosen government imposed by popular opinion, and under such conditions it is a weak government, which can only be sustained by the support of the federal military forces.

Now, marshal, the republican situation needs stability; its institutions need to be consolidated, and the first condition of steadiness which the Republic stands in need [Page 34] of is, precisely, peace and public tranquility, avoiding henceforth and forever these internal commotions which disturb our credit and hold the country constantly under the threat of armed agitations and the surprises of sanguinary conflicts.

I have within me the unalterable conviction that the revolutionary movement of the south has no purpose of restoration. At the front of it are to be found historic republicans, whose political traditions exclude every suspicion of an attempt against the political institutions of the country. Most of them fought after the coup d’ état of 3d November for the revindication of national honor and dignity, cooperating in the great movement of reaction in favor of legality.

Under such conditions it would be a libel to assert that the revolutionists are lighting to-day for another cause that shall not be a guarantee of the rights and liberties which have been trampled under foot. We ought at least to judge these our compatriots with the impartiality which old servitors of the country are entitled to and by their political antecedents.

You now say that you can not adopt by suggestion because the constitution is opposed to the means that would have to be used to carry it out.

But, marshal, your excellency must understand that no law can be opposed to order, nor be made an obstacle to the progress and development of a nation. If our constitution is, in your opinion, an obstacle to the pacification of Rio Grande do Sul, the executive, whose duty it is to maintain domestic peace and watch over public tranquility, and which can not, therefore, leave to an armed struggle the fate of the whole state, should, in my opinion, in a question of public safety, like that which is now agitated, adopt extraordinary and even extra-legal measures to save the country at all hazards.

Your excellency thinks that a reconciliation with the revolutionists may be effected after the federal troops have won a victory over the enemy; but if you admit the possibility of a conciliation after a battle, why not admit it before a battle?

What, then, justifies this bloodshed? Does the Federal army require it?

It is assuredly not the blood of immolated brethren that will give it glory and luster.

And who can assure us that this victory is certain? Who knows what means of action are at the disposal of the revolutionists, who certainly have the advantage of being inured to the effects of the climate which can not fail to decimate our brave, intrepid, and valiant northern soldiers.

And what if the revolutionists, whose policy seems to be to wear out our soldiers, refuse to give battle?

You perceive, then, marshal, that you propose a solution that does not correspond to the present political emergency, nor find any justification whatever in history. Your policy, then, endangers the public weal, aggravating a situation that can not be maintained and against which protest the simplest precepts of humanity and all feelings of republican fraternity. It is a perennial source of evils for the Republic, since you indefinitely postpone a just and reasonable solution for a crisis to which you should have long since put an end.

There is another circumstance of great political weight which strengthens my purpose of resigning my portfolio, and that is the want of skill with which, in my opinion, the military operations have been conducted and from which resulted the disaster at Alegrete, a disaster which will inevitably be followed by others.

No one more than myself, marshal, renders homage to the spirit of rectitude which governs your conduct in public and private life, and which places it above the suspicion of any motive not dictated exclusively by your concern for the public weal, and it is, consequently, to be regretted that you should retain in the Republic of Uruguay as a purchasing agent for the army a man who, according to information received from trustworthy sources, including a letter from our minister in Montevideo, is wanting in respectability, and is otherwise unqualified for so responsible a position.

I regret, I repeat, that the information which has been furnished to you in regard to this commissioner does not coincide with that to which I have just referred.

In addition to what has herein been set forth, your excellency has not only failed to consult me in regard to matters connected with the revolutionary movement in Rio Grande do Sul, but has actually withheld them from my knowledge in a manner highly offensive to the honorable office that I hold. Some of the most important acts have been performed without my intervention.

There has been nothing to justify this treatment, and your excellency can not deny that I have displayed the utmost solicitude in affairs of state, offering free and loyal support to the head of the Government and giving the republican administration all the political and moral force which it has needed in the arduous task, imposed upon us by circumstances, of upholding the sway of the law. Neither my political self-respect nor the elevated office which I hold will permit my remaining in the position in which your excellency has thus placed me.

I hold, marshal, that I do not merely share the political responsibility of the Government [Page 35] and of its administrative acts; it is my duty as minister to manage public affairs and to be responsible for the events that may result from the manner in which they are managed, especially at this period, bristling with difficulties. Thus, equally upon the head of the Government and his ministers public opinion is entitled to exercise the right of criticism and censure. I can not, then, submit to the role of an automaton, nor will a republican administration find worthy men who will sacrifice the nobility of their political mandate to an office which does not elevate, but degrades; which does not ennoble, but humiliates.

For these reasons I present my resignation; but outside of the Government I will continue to serve the Republic, upholding its institutions and legally constituted authorities, with the same devotion, fortitude, and loyalty with which I have served it as minister.

With the utmost respect and esteem I have the honor to sign myself,

Your friend, admirer, and obedient servant,

Custodio de Mello.