Mr. Peirce to Mr. Adee.
St. Petersburg, September 1, 1900.
Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram dated August 29, 1900.1
Immediately upon receipt of your telegram I addressed a note to Count Lamsdorff asking for a special interview, which he accorded me yesterday at half past 11 o’clock.
I read to him carefully the text of your telegram, leaving a copy with him as a memorandum. The Count listened with very great interest, and when I had finished he expressed satisfaction that the Government of the United States will consent to withdraw from Pekin, but regret that apparently the Russian chargé d’affaires had not made the purposes and views of the Russian Government clearly understood by you. He asked me, therefore, to telegraph you the substance of his remarks, which I believe I have faithfully done, so far as the reasonable limits of telegraphic communication permit.
[Page 374]I will, however, repeat his remarks in extenso.
In your telegram you quoted the Russian chargé d’affaires as having said: “Russia has directed the Russian minister to retire with his official personnel from China, and that the Russian troops will likewise be withdrawn.” Count Lamsdorff was especially desirous that this impression be corrected. He said that there is no intention of withdrawing either the Russian minister or the Russian troops from China, but that they are about to retire from Pekin and remain at Tientsin awaiting developments.
In explaining to me the motives which actuate the Russian Government in arriving at this decision, which he is anxious that you should fully understand, he said that Russia, in common with the other powers, has made certain declarations regarding the Chinese troubles to which the Russian Government feels strictly bound to adhere.
These are that war in China is not existent, and that the object of the military relief expedition to Pekin and its entry into the city was to rescue the legations and those under their protection, and that one of the purposes of the presence of Russian forces in China is to aid the Chinese Government to restore order.
That, the declared object of the relief expedition being accomplished, it is the strict duty of Russia to withdraw her forces from Pekin, since their remaining there would be of the nature of a military occupation of the capital of the country, constituting an act of war, and that, far from aiding the Chinese Government to restore order, such an act would paralyze the functions of the Government, at least temporarily, and diminish its power in the restoration of order by discrediting it with the Chinese people.
He therefore deems that good faith and the dignity of Russia require the withdrawal of the Russian forces from Pekin.
In addition to these arguments he considers that as a matter of policy, in the interest of a speedy return to peaceful conditions in China and the negotiation of terms satisfactory to the powers, he believes that the withdrawal of all the forces from Pekin to Tientsin would be advantageous.
The whereabouts of the Chinese Government is at present unknown, but he believes that it exists as a potentially de facto Government, and that, if it is prevented by foreign occupation of its capital from returning there, it will establish a new seat of Government in some inaccessible place in the interior, where it will be extremely difficult to deal with it. On the other hand, that, if Pekin is evacuated by the forces of the powers, that Government will return and reestablish itself there, where it is practically within reach of negotiations from Tientsin.
He considers also that terms negotiated from Tientsin would have more valid force than would terms wrested from China under the compulsion of the presence of armed forces within the capital.
Moreover, he regards the occupation of Pekin as fraught with grave responsibilities in the preservation of order and the protection of life and property, which he regards it as unnecessary and superfluous to incur.
He stated that it is the purpose of the Russian Government to retain its minister and forces at Tientsin, the former to negotiate with the plenipotentiary of the Chinese Government whenever the time for such negotiations shall arrive, and in the event of the refusal of the Chinese Government to accede to the just demands of the powers, it [Page 375] would be the policy of Russia to present an ultimatum to China and, if necessary, to enforce it by a declaration of war. He believes, however, that the Chinese Government will quickly put itself in negotiation with the powers upon the evacuation of Pekin and will promptly accede to all reasonable demands.
He reiterated the earnest desire of Russia to act concurrently and in unison with the other powers regarding China, and I have received the impression that he especially desires the cooperation of the United States.
Respectfully submitting the above report of my interview with Count Lamsdorff,
I have, etc.,
Charge d’Affaires ad interim.