Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1910
Ambassador O’Brien to the Secretary of State.
Tokyo, January 24, 1910.
Sir: I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of the note from Count Komura to me, dated the 22d instant, in relation to the proposal to neutralize certain railways in Manchuria, etc.
I have, etc.,
The Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador O’Brien.
Tokyo, January 21, 1910.
Monsieur l’Ambassador: The note which your excellency did me the honor of addressing to me under the date of the 18th ultimo, In reference to the internationalization and administration of the railways of Manchuria, was duly received and has had, it is scarcely necessary to add, the most serious attention of the Government of His Majesty the Emperior.
The Imperial Government are well aware that the proposal of the United States is entirely disinterested, and that it has for its single inspiration a desire to promote what your excellency’s Government conceives to be the best interests of China, and I beg you to accept my assurances that the Imperial Government, upholding in all sincerity as they do the integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunity in all parts of China, would unhesitatingly lend their undivided support to the project if they could bring themselves to the conclusion that its realization would accomplish the result desired.
The relations of friendship and good understanding which so long existed between our two countries and the common desire of both that nothing may be permitted to weaken the sentiment of mutual good will and confidence afford, I am happy to believe, ample assurance that a frank exposition of the reasons which prevent my Government from giving their support to the scheme will not be misunderstood or misconstrued.
The most serious objection to the proposal in question lies in the fact that it contemplates a very important departure from the terms of the treaty of Portsmouth. That treaty was designed to establish in Manchuria a permanent order of things, and the Imperial Government firmly believed that in a strict and loyal adhesion to its provisions are to be found the highest guaranties of enduring peace and repose in this part of the world and of the orderly advancement of Manchuria. Not the least difficult of the many difficult and important problems that were definitely solved at Portsmouth was the question of railways. That adjustment subsequently received the deliberate confirmation of the Chinese Government in the treaty of Peking, and the railway operations now carried on in southern Manchuria are consistent with the original concessions which were with equal deliberation granted by the same power.
Nor can the Imperial Government see in the present condition of things in Manchuria anything so exceptional as to make it necessary or desirable to set up there an exceptional system not required in other parts of China. There is nothing in the actual situation in that region, so far as the Imperial Government are aware, which exceptionally interferes with the undisturbed enjoyment by China of her political rights. So far as the question of the open door is concerned the principle of equal opportunity possesses in its application to Manchuria a more comprehensive signification than it has elsewhere in China, since in virtue of Article VII of the treaty of Portsmouth the Japanese and Russian railways in those Provinces are dedicated exclusively to commercial and industrial uses. Finally, in the matter of railway administration, it is impossible for the Imperial Government to believe that the substitution of an international in place of a national régime would prove advantageous or beneficial. On the contrary, it seems to them that in the presence of such a system economy and efficiency would, in the nature of things, be obliged to yield to political” exigencies and that the divided responsibility of the system would inevitably mean an absence of due responsibility, to the serious disadvantage of the public and the detriment of the service.
These are the principal reasons why the project under examination does not commend itself to the favorable consideration of the Imperial Government. But there are other cogent reasons which can not be ignored.
In the regions affected by the Japanese railways in Manchuria there have grown numerous Japanese industrial and commercial undertakings which owed their inception, as they owe their continual existence, to the fact that the Imperial Government, possessing the railways in question, are able to extend to those enterprises and to the persons engaged in them due protection and defense against attack and pillage by lawless bands that still infest the country. In the development of these enterprises, which are contributing in such a marked degree to the prosperity and progress of Manchuria, a large number of Japanese subjects and large sums of Japanese money are enlisted, and the Imperial Government could not in good faith or with a due sense of their responsibility consent to surrender the means by which such protection and defense are made possible.
[Page 252]The observations which I have now the honor to present to your excellency, and which I venture to hope may prove as convincing to your excellency’s Government as they are convincing to my own, have reference to the plan in its widest sense, but they are, I should add, no less applicable to the scheme in its more restricted form, since the two plans are in principle the same and differ only in degree.
In conclusion, I wish to express to your excellency the sincere appreciation of my Government for the courteous intimation of the United States concerning the projected Chinchow-Aigun line, and to say that in principle the Imperial Government will be prepared to participate in the enterprise with the other powers interested in the question. But as that question is clearly distinguishable from the main subject of your excellency’s note, I will, with your permission, reserve this minor point for separate and independent attention when the necessary details regarding the matter are known.
I avail myself, etc.,