File No. 811.34537/56.

The American Minister to the Secretary of State.

No. 758.]

Sir: With reference to the project to enlarge our naval station at Guantánamo, I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a, “Confidential memorandum” which I read to Sr. Sanguily, the Cuban secretary of state, this afternoon, and left with him at his request. This memorandum was compiled from several of the Department’s instructions or their accompanying documents (I from No. 254,2 II from No. 278, and III from No. 277), and was presented to Sr. Sanguily as a reply to his confidential note of February 8, of which a copy was sent in my despatch No. 623.

With regard to the progress of the negotiations, Sr. Sanguily said that the President and Government are ready to make the desired exchange of additional land at Guantánamo in return for the Bahía Honda release, and that the draft of a treaty in the premises is being prepared in consultation with the members of the senate committee on foreign relations. Some time ago a commission was sent to Guantánamo, but its report was unsatisfactory, and a new technical commission has now been named with instructions to study the limits of the proposed new concession on the spot, and to report upon the ownership and value of the land included therein and upon other pertinent matters.

I have, etc.,

John B. Jackson.
[Page 122]
[inclosure.]

The American Minister to the Cuban Secretary of State.

memoradum.

I.
The United States Navy Department is of the opinion that the military necessities connected with the naval base at Guantánamo are such as to render it inadvisable for the United States to surrender any of its jurisdiction over the shores and waters of the bay. Considerable work preparatory to fortification has already been done on the western shores, and it is impossible to determine at the present time what other places on the shore it may be thought necessary to fortify. The situation being so clear that although jurisdiction has been explicitly granted to the United States, the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba is nevertheless acknowledged, it is believed that it will not be difficult to issue instructions to the commandant of the naval station which will effectually prevent all friction with the Cuban authorities and all causes of annoyance; and this the Navy Department will undertake to do.
II.
(See Claim for the cost of intervention in Cuba.)
III.
(See Sovereignty of the Isle of Pines.)
  1. Not printed.