File No. 723.2515/194.
The Chief of the Division of Latin-American Affairs of the Department of State to the Secretary of State.
Division of Latin-American Affairs,
Washington, November 10, 1910.
memorandum.
Dear Mr. Secretary: The following are extracts from correspondence during the present year regarding the disposition of the Chilean Government as to the Tacna-Arica question:
In October of last year the Chilean Government presented to the Peruvian Government bases for the settlement of the Tacna-Arica matter.2 Our Minister at Santiago reported, on November 1, 1909, that the Argentine Government had been assisting in inducing the Peruvian Government to accept Chile’s preliminary terms. The Argentine Minister at Santiago stated that his Government’s action had not been and would not be by way of intervention or mediation, but only by way of friendly counsel. The Argentine Minister desired [Page 1201] to know the probable disposition of the Department as to seconding Argentina’s action at Lima and Washington.
On April 5, 1910, our Chargé d’Affaires at Santiago stated1 that Peru had made a counter-proposal to Chile. He reported as follows:
As reported in my cable of April 2, however, Peru made answer in the form of a counter proposal suggesting, I am informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the division of the territories, which answer was communicated to Chile by the Brazilian Minister.
In stating that such a proposal could not be accepted by Chile, the Minister for Foreign Affairs told me frankly that Chile considered the possession of Tacna and Arica absolutely necessary for the proper military defense of her all-important territory in Tarapaeá. He appears anxious that the United States should understand why Chile is so determined to keep the disputed territories; that she wants them for the best reasons, as he called military defense; and that she is pursuing a determined policy, not out of caprice nor to take advantage of Peru, but because she feels she needs the territories. He added that, as he had informed Brazil, Chile would be disposed to pay as much as £3,000,000 as indemnity for the two territories.
The purpose of the proposed plebiscite for the settlement of the question as understood by Chile appears from the following extract from a note of the Chilean Government to the Peruvian Government of March 3, 1910:2
For the rest, I should remind your excellency that the plebiscites recorded in history prove that these are measures adopted by governments to mitigate, with the appearance of a popular vote, a cession or an annexation agreed upon beforehand, thus avoiding, as far as possible, the wounding of the national pride of the country dismembered.
The reason is obvious: The governments can not seriously consent to leave to the result of voting the fate of a territory susceptible, as in this case, of representing the security of their frontiers and the compensation of sacrifices of blood and money.
The preliminaries, the alternatives and the incidents of the diplomatic negotiations which resulted in the pact of Ancon clearly demonstrate that the plebiscite would be the only manner shown by history for satisfying the territorial exigencies of Chile without deeply injuring a national sentiment of Peru, which is supported by certain elements in order to bring down the vacillatory Government of the celebrated General Iglesias, who agreed to it.
In a telegram from our Chargé d’Affaires at Santiago, of March 26, 1910, it is stated that the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed him that “should any neutral power desire to assist the settlement it should address Peru, urging the acceptance of a money indemnity, Chile being very determined.”1
In a despatch from our Embassy at Petropolis, dated March 31, 1910,1 the Ambassador stated as follows in reference to the attempt made by Brazil to settle this matter:
In conversation with Baron de Rio Branco on the 28th instant this subject was reverted to and I advised him with reference to his suggestion made to Chile—that the Governments of Chile and Peru submit their question to those of Brazil, Argentina and the United States—of the readiness of the Government of the United States, in case the plan were acceptable to Chile and Peru, to respond to their request by contributing so far as possible to a solution of the difficulty.
The Baron then informed me confidentially that his overtures had so far resulted in failure, the Chilean Government declining to consider his proposal or anything savoring of arbitration. He had then proposed that the three countries be asked as amiables compositeurs to determine solely a proper division [Page 1202] of the provinces between the contestants, but this suggestion also was rejected. The only concession Chile was willing to make was to authorize the Brazilian Government to offer Peru clear title to the province of Talara, an interior and valueless strip claimed to have been turned over to Chile along with Tacna and Arica at the end of the war—a fact denied by Peru. This offer, as a settlement of the long-standing question, was so manifestly unentitled to serious consideration that it will not be officially communicated to Peru by this Government.
This was in reply to the Department’s telegram of March 24, in part as follows:1
The Government of the United States of course fully shares the hope of the Government of Brazil for a definitive settlement of the Tacna-Arica dispute. As for Baron Rio Branco’s important suggestion made to Chile—that the Governments of Chile and Peru submit the question to those of Brazil, the Argentine Republic, and the United States—if this plan were acceptable to Chile and Peru the Government of the United States would be prepared to respond to their request by contributing what it might toward a satisfactory solution of this very troublesome problem.
It is evident that this question has had an indirect but very irritating effect upon the former Peru-Bolivia and the present Peru-Ecuador questions.
On April 2, 1910, the Ambassador at Petropolis telegraphed:1
Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 28th, confidentially informed me Chile had declined to consider his proposals or anything in the nature of arbitration of the Tacna-Arica question. He asserted Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs is prejudiced by unfounded suspicion of some secret understanding between Brazil and Peru consequent upon recent settlement of their boundary question. Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs intends therefore to leave matter in abeyance pending the arrival President Montt on this coast.
On the same date, the Chargé d’Affaires at Santiago telegraphed:1
Peruvian counter proposal on the basis of dividing territories received yesterday by Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs through Brazilian Minister was found utterly unacceptable as Chile needs both territories for military defense. Minister for Foreign Affairs says he told Brazil Chile would be disposed to nay as much as three million pounds sterling indemnity for both Tacna and Arica and that if Peru would accept the decision of a third nation or of the United States, Brazil and the Argentine Republic on the basis that Chile will keep Tacna and Arica, Chile would be willing to pay even more, should the Powers so decide and also to cede Tarata.
The Chargé d’Affaires at Lima reported, on March 14, 1910, that Mr. Porras, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had informed him that:1
His own hope was that an international tribunal of American Powers (preferably the United States, Brazil and the Argentine) would be formed with full powers to judge of the merits of the case. He said that even ignoring Peru’s well founded rights (in his opinion) the award might be made acceptable by Peru in one of two ways as follows:
- (1)
- Tacna and Arica to be erected into a buffer state.
- (2)
- The provinces to be divided between Peru and Chile with due consideration of Peru’s rights and of the status quo.
In connection with this information, the Chargé d’Affaires stated:
As regards the United States, I respectfully suggest that some direct indication of the Department’s views regarding the matters set forth above would be of the greatest value in the not wholly improbable eventuality of a crisis in Peruvian-Chilean affairs.
I have considered it wise to report at some length in view of the fact that whatever be the political fate of Mr. Porras, the results of his policies as indicated are likely to have a considerable influence on the foreign relations of Peru for some time to come.
The Department replied to this in a despatch, No. 113, of April 13th, 1910,1 stating in part:
Referring to your suggestion that some direct indication of the Department’s views on the intervention of neutral third powers in the Tacna-Arica question would be of the greatest value, you are informed that the Department has recently indicated its willingness to join with Argentina and Brazil, at the suggestion of the latter, in an attempt to see a solution reached of this troublesome dispute.
On May 15th, 1910, the Minister at Buenos Aires telegraphed:2
[I] respectfully submit that because next week Chilean President and Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Peruvian Vice President will visit Buenos Aires, adjustment Tacna-Arica might be reached by American Legation cooperating with Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs. Because Chile is overconfident that Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs prejudiced in their favor, arrangement might be reached submitting question to joint arbitration of United States and the Argentine Republic. Believe Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs would use all his influence to effect above arrangement because he would receive the public credit for it. Believe that he can deliver Chilean assent if he desires, but doubt his serious efforts to that end if Brazil were included as arbitrator. If foregoing in any way meets your approval, may I be favored with early instructions to permit me to open the subject with the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs before arrival of said Chileans and Peruvians?
The files do not show that any reply was sent to this telegram.
There is no subsequent reference of importance to this question in the files. There are statements in several late despatches from Buenos Aires, I think, that some of the leading men in Peru at least realize that Chile will never consent to any settlement which will not guarantee Chilean sovereignty in Tacna and Arica, but there seems to be nothing to show that the previous irreconcilable attitude of the Peruvian Government has altered! The present Chilean Ministry is reported to be less aggressive in regard to this question than its predecessor in which Mr. Edwards was the Foreign Minister. Recently an interesting memorandum, written by the Chilean Minister in Mexico, was forwarded by our Ambassador there,3 and reconfirms what appears from the above correspondence—that Chile will not consent to any arbitration which does not, first of all, guarantee her sovereignty in Tacna and Arica.
It will be noted from the above correspondence that both Argentina and Brazil have tried to settle this question during the present year, but have failed.
Both Argentina and Brazil are friendly to Peru, and both are now—especially the former—on friendly terms with Chile.
This inquiry of the United States may be a last resort after Argentina’s and Brazil’s failure. Whether we could succeed any better than these two Powers seems very questionable.