Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914–1920, Volume I

763.72/3261½

Memorandum by the Secretary of State¹⁷

[Washington,] February 7, 1917.

Notes on Bases of Peace

Article I

Would it be better to insert “equal” before the word “rights” in the last line?

Article II

Does this provide for the adequate expansion of territory as a result of increased population or an accumulation of capital desiring investment in territory under national control? That is, should not some provision be made for future colonization? So far as the American nations are concerned, and I think the same is true of Russia with its vast undeveloped territories and Great Britain with its great colonial possessions still but partially settled, a provision of this sort could be applied without danger of being disturbed for many decades, but is the same true of such populous countries as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, etc.? Is it possible to make a rigid and permanent delimitation of territory which will not in a short time be the source of trouble from the pressure of population? Will not such conditions cause aggression from necessity and in no sense from national ambition or improper motives? Is it possible to provide some elasticity as to territory which will furnish an outlet for surplus populations?

I do not think that the conditions for the application of a “world” treaty are the same as the conditions for the application of a Pan-American treaty. I have no suggestion to offer now as the problem seems to me to require very careful study. I am merely raising here possible objections to the present terms of this Article.

Article III

Does this provision apply to “economic warfare” by a single state against another state? If it does, then the power to retaliate for unjust commercial legislation or regulation by one nation, which though general in terms operates in practice against only one other nation, would be lacking and prevent the injured party from protecting itself from injustice. I assume the basic thought in this article is to prevent such international combinations as the Entente Allies had in mind during the Paris Economic Conference, which as I understand proposed to unite their nations in preferential trade facilities after the war so that they would benefit first the Allies, second, friendly neutrals and third, other neutrals, leaving the Central Powers commercially isolated or at least greatly handicapped in trade opportunities.

I am afraid that in its present form the article would be difficult of application. Who would be the judges as to the purpose of an economic war between states? Whose duty would it be to assume to judge of this matter? And whose duty would it be to enforce the guarantee after the authorized party had decided that action was necessary? This article seems to me much more difficult of practical application than either of the two preceding articles.

As a matter of fact I have never felt that the proposed plan of the Paris Conference could be carried out. Such a combination even if attempted would by the natural laws of trade fall to pieces in a short time.

Would it not be as efficacious and less difficult of application to enter into a mutual agreement not to form any international combination or conspiracy to interfere with the commercial enterprises or to limit the equal trade opportunities of any nation? This would not deprive a single nation of the power to act in its own interests, but would prevent the united or identical action of two or more nations.

Article IV

This seems to me the most difficult of all the articles for proper application. So much depends on the geographical location of territorial possessions and their relation to one another, to the state of civilization attained in colonies, to the proximity of territory to semi-civilized nations, to the restlessness of populations due to lack of intellectual development, to political oppression, to industrial injustice, to other causes of domestic unrest. In limited and settled populations with liberal institutions the difficulties could be easily overcome, but in the larger states where domestic peace depends on an adequate force to suppress uprisings, that force might in the hands of an ambitious and unscrupulous government be a very grave menace to small neighboring states.

I am sure that you will understand I am not arguing against this article. I believe in the purpose but I am endeavoring to raise in my own mind the possible difficulties of the practical operation of the provisions if they should be adopted.

Who would determine what armament a nation was entitled to maintain? What would be the basis for limitation? How would an increase or decrease be determined if conditions changed? How would a proper limitation be enforced, and who would determine when enforcement should take place?

These questions are to me very perplexing and very real, and I cannot feel that they should remain unanswered until after the proposal of such an article as this. They will have to be answered some time and better before than after the nations are committed, because they would then be a source of endless controversy and of possible discord.

General Note. As to this note I have no comment to make. It seems to me sound and to offer the best agency possible under present international conditions.

17. This memorandum bears no indication of authorship, but contains corrections in Secretary Lansing’s hand.