763.72/11679½
The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 14.]
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have just returned from an interesting, and from the point of reinvigoration, very successful visit to France and England. On other accounts also I esteem my visit to have been profitable, if not successful, for I was able to see both Mr. Baker and General Pershing and impress on them the absolute need of not disappointing Italy in her expectation of having American troops sent here. Indeed, to see General Pershing and get this necessity lodged in his mind was the main object of my visit to France.
I can not say that I consider my mission there to have attained complete success or, for the present, any success at all. In fact I made it clear to General Pershing that I was not asking that he should send any troops whatsoever from France at this time who would by possibility be available in the present offensive, but I addressed my efforts to securing his assent to sending them later on when the offensive, and any immediate consequences it may have, shall be finished.
I was appalled to find not only the ignorance of matters Italian, but the indifference to all such matters as I found among those with whom I came in contact in France. I do not say this of General Pershing or of his Chief of Staff, for they struck me as being open minded, but the majority of those to whom I mentioned the importance of supporting Italy in what is really a very serious moment not only for her, but for the Allies, “pooh-poohed” Italy as wholly negligible, and more than one met my assertion of Italy’s need with the argument that it was held by some well informed military personages that the Allied cause would be stronger without Italy than with her. In other words, that Italy’s balance with the Allies was one of burden and not one of assistance. They appeared to stand blindly on the military aphorism that a general should not divide his forces, which I take to apply to tactics rather than to strategy. I cited to them, in response to this, the signal example of Napoleon’s having divided his forces and conquered Europe through Austria; and the further examples of Lee having divided his forces again and again and won substantial victories over his adversaries; and of Grant having divided his forces and sent Sherman across the south while he held Lee in his trenches from Cold Harbor to Petersburg.
Irrespective of the foregoing, however, I must say that at this moment Italy is holding her own defensively with firmness, and the [Page 155] spirit of her people up to the present is as high as it ever was. But this I attribute, to an important extent, to her confidence in the United States. The San Mihiel victory has given her new spirit but if, during the late autumn and early winter, the United States does not send troops to Italy, this feeling is liable to evaporate and she will feel that she has been abandoned by the great power to which she has trusted.
Her efficient forces are far less numerous than they are generally supposed to be. Colonel Buckey has made a careful study of this matter and has sent me a statement of her resources in man power based on official figures and verified by him to the best of his ability. From this it appears that Italy has only 1,589,000 combatants actually serviceable at this moment. I enclose a copy of Buckey’s statement on this subject which is complete.6
Add to such inferiority in numbers her want of articles of absolute necessity such as coal, steel, gasoline, and other crude materials, and the condition of poverty in which her people find themselves, as compared with the condition of the people of France and England, and you can see what a field exists here for pacifist propaganda, socialistic or other.
The peril of this situation is recognized not only by the Italians themselves from the very highest down, but by every American who comes here with an open mind and sees the situation for himself. I can not tell you how many men of the most serious character have told me what their apprehensions are should America leave Italy unassisted with soldiers this autumn. But they range from the chief of state down, however veiled their method may be of giving this information.
The need, indeed, of supporting Italy with American troops is much greater from other standpoints than from the military. The feeling between the people of Italy and the people of France is one of at least acute rivalry, and Italy, that is the Italian people, feel profoundly that France is now growing fat on America while Italy grows poorer and poorer.
The sudden lowering and control of Italian exchange will, I trust, in time have a good effect, but the immediate consequence is that the Italian currency buys less than it did before the exchange fell because the prices are maintained at the old figures.
The foregoing, my dear Mr. Secretary, is but a small part of what I could say on this most important question. I will add only another hint on the political situation.
[Page 156]Our people have saved France and England. They can, I believe, save Italy and then they may rest contented with having saved the world.
Always [etc.]
- Not printed.↩