Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917–1972, Volume VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963

63. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, November 27, 1961.

We can expect a major propaganda attack by the communist bloc in the event that defoliant operations are undertaken in Viet-Nam.²

We should be able to cope with propaganda repercussions arising from defoliation of guerrilla hide-out areas, border areas and roadsides.

But chemical attacks on crops would, in my opinion, put us in an altogether different position with respect to world opinion, especially in the newly developing countries where food has been a perennial problem. There would appear to be a strong possibility that destruction of food crops would be interpreted largely as an effort to suppress a disaffected Viet-Nam population.

The campaign we would face might compare in stridency with the communists’ “germ warfare” charges during the Korean war and the “potato bug” furor they stirred up in Eastern Europe about the same time.³

It might well compare the new dimension of chemical food-killing with the American use of atomic weapons against Asians in Japan—tie us, in effect, to another “first” in warfare.⁴

I fear we would be deluding ourselves if we hope to escape blame for these actions by having them carried out by Vietnamese planes and pilots. Leaflets to loyal inhabitants of affected areas would be helpful locally, but would make little difference in our world-opinion problem.

In the event that you decide we must carry out chemical operations against crops, I concur with the Secretary of State that we take every step possible to get the technical facts of non-toxicity-to-humans across before we are put in a defensive position. I would hope our emphasis throughout could be on what the insurgents are trying to do to Viet-Nam, keeping our tactics in the perspective of necessary steps to combat a mortal threat to that country’s independence.⁵

Edward R. Murrow

1. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/61–12/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Neilson. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Field Far East (IAF) 1961)
2. In a November 21 memorandum to the President, Gilpatric stated that Diem had asked for U.S. support of a defoliation program in Vietnam. The memorandum outlined the operation of such a program, noted the advantages and disadvantages, and recommended that the President approve an option that involved a “selective and carefully controlled program starting with the clearance of key routes, proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created, and holding Zone D [25 miles northeast of Saigon] and the border areas until we have realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Box 332, National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 115, Defoliant Operations in Vietnam) Rusk, in a November 24 memorandum to the President, indicated that he concurred with Gilpatric’s memorandum and recommended that the President approve the program and the option favored by Gilpatric. Rusk’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Vietnam, 1961, Document 275.
3. In his November 24 memorandum to the President (see footnote 2, above), Rusk stated: “We will, of course, be the object of an intense Communist ‘germ warfare’ campaign which may be picked up by some neutrals. You will recall that this was the case during the Korean war although the Communist charges had no factual basis whatever. “On the other hand, I am satisfied that successful plant-killing operations in VietNam, carefully coordinated with and incidental to larger operations, can be of substantial assistance in the control and defeat of the Viet Cong.”
4. Reference is to U.S. dropping of atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.
5. NSAM No. 115, signed by Bundy on November 30 and addressed to Rusk and McNamara, indicated that the President had approved the recommendations made by Gilpatric and Rusk and had “further agreed that there should be careful prior consideration and authorization by Washington of any plans developed by CINCPAC and the country team under this authority before such plans are executed.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Box 332, National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 115, Defoliant Operations in Vietnam)