66. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy1

SUBJECT

  • Castro’s Standing in Latin America

In answer to the two questions you posed recently, new survey data from five major Latin American cities indicates that

1) Opinions of Fidel Castro, already low when measured last January,2 trended slightly lower by November.

2) Castro’s standing—the influence people think he has—is lowered when the people, particularly the educated, hear less about him from top U.S. officials.

The November survey in Rio de Janeiro, Bogota,3 Buenos Aires, and Montevideo included 400 interviews in each city. Additional data came from a survey already underway in Mexico City.

(Since the survey vehicle was in the field, a number of other questions were added to determine attitudes toward the U.S., the Alianza, land and tax reforms, and American business. In view of your projected trip,4 this information with emphasis on the Colombian answers, will be sent to you later this week.)5

While comparisons of opinions of Castro in the January and November surveys show little change, many respondents when asked the direct question, felt their opinion of him had dropped. Percentages of those who thought so were 18 per cent in Rio, 25 in Mexico City, 28 in Montevideo, 29 in Buenos Aires, and 35 in Bogota. Between 5 and 6 per cent in all cities thought their opinion of him had gone up.

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Asked whether Castro’s government sets a good example for their countries, majorities did not think so. The percentages were 50 in Rio, 58 in Montevideo, 55 in Buenos Aires, and 74 in Bogota. From 6 to 13 per cent favored his example.

While the overwhelming majority were opposed or indifferent to Castro, this does not mean the general populace opposes radical social and economic change. Previous surveys have shown that proposals to break up large estates and to expropriate foreign (and even locally-owned) property have had more appeal than the Castro symbolism.

Although not sold themselves on Castroism, 3 or 4 in 10 think Castro and those who support him have substantial influence in Latin America. The Fidelista movement, consequently, may benefit from this image of strength. However, when asked the direct question, more people think his influence is decreasing than think it is increasing. An exception is Bogota where 36 per cent think his influence is growing in Latin America, 32 think it is declining, 24 think it remains the same.

The effect of the policy of ignoring Castro was difficult to pin down because, while the highest U.S. officials said less, the overall anti-Castro barrage continued heavy.

Only a minority have the impression that high U.S. officials have been saying less about Castro lately. Among the university-educated, however, there was an awareness that high U.S. officials had been saying less about Castro, since this elite group could distinguish between top-level U.S. statements and the run of anti-Castro material.

Correlating the awareness and influence data suggests that top-level reticence works more effectively with the sophisticated, whereas the general population may react more effectively to a heavy flow of Castro criticism.

Edward R. Murrow6
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Field Latin America (IAL) 1961 October–December. Confidential. Drafted by Oren Stephens. Wilson sent the memorandum to Goodwin under a December 12 covering memorandum, in which he indicated that the President “asked us to conduct a survey to assess Castro’s present standing in Latin America. We tacked on to the Castro questions some further questions about the Alliance for Progress.” (Ibid.)
  2. See Document 55 and footnote 2 thereto.
  3. In his October 20 memorandum to the President (see Document 55). Wilson indicated that Lima, rather than Bogota, would be one of the survey sites.
  4. The President traveled to Caracas and met with Betancourt December 16–17 and then traveled to Bogota and met with Lleras Camargo on December 17. For the memoranda of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, American Republics, Documents 124, 125, 334, and 335.
  5. Not found.
  6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.