File No. 763.72/7867

The Special Agent in Corfu ( Dodge) to the Secretary of State

No. 22

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that in the course of a general conversation yesterday, Mr. Pashitch, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, referred to the visit of a few hours’ duration which Mr. Venizelos, the Greek Premier, made to Corfu the day before yesterday while on his way to visit Rome, Paris and probably also London in connection, it is believed, with financial matters and the equipment of the Greek Army. He stated that he had had a talk of one and a half hours with Mr. Venizelos and had been extremely glad to find that the Greek statesman’s views exactly coincided with his own. Mr. Venizelos had stated that he hoped to be able in due time to mobilize about fifteen divisions of the Greek Army but that he was in want of arms and equipment for them. Mr. Pashitch thought, from his conversation, that Mr. Venizelos’s political position had of late been considerably strengthened as the result of the publication of the Greek White Book and other documents showing the activities of the former King Constantine. These he believed had been a revelation to the Greek people who had previously no adequate idea of the lengths to which the former King and his camarilla had gone.

Regarding the military value of the Greek Army once mobilized, Mr. Pashitch did not appear to estimate it very highly but stated that it could undoubtedly be counted upon to fight against Bulgarian troops although the Greek people appeared to show a disinclination to fighting in the Allies’ cause. He felt convinced that with 100,000 good troops added to those now already on the Salonica front, it would be possible to advance on this front and to cut off the Austro-German forces from Bulgaria and Turkey. In such an event, it would be no difficult matter to make peace with Bulgaria and as for Turkey, she would not be able to hold out more than two months after her communications with Germany had been broken. Mr. Pashitch expressed the opinion, which he as well as the other more prominent members of the Serbian Government often express, that the Allied powers have never fully appreciated the importance of the Balkans front. Among other advantages which the Austro-Germans obtained from their possession of Serbia and the greater part of Rumania and their communications with Turkey, he laid particular stress upon the immense quantities of supplies which the Central powers derived from these countries.

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Regarding the recent serious defeat of the Italian First Army on the Carso front, Mr. Pashitch stated that he believed from the reports received that the Italian armies had now been able to reform their lines and that with French and British support, a further considerable advance of the Austro-German forces was unlikely. A large number of the Austrian troops on the Italian front were Slavs. If the Italian Government could bring themselves to make some declaration determining exactly Italy’s attitude toward the Jugoslav peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and showing to them that she was friendly to their aspirations, he thought it unquestionable that the military task of Italy would be greatly facilitated for in that case the Austrian Slav troops would practically cease fighting as they had done on the Russian front and the Jugoslav population would also afford considerable help by movements against the Austrian domination.

Italy’s policy thus far, he considered, had lacked breadth of view and had been far too much engrossed in seeking to obtain small and really insignificant advantages for herself. It had failed in that hearty cooperation with the aims of France and England which was necessary to success. As an instance of this he cited Italy’s efforts to get possession of Albania, as by contriving to induce certain Albanians to petition her to declare a protectorate over a portion of the country. It was true that Baron Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, had lately referred both in the Italian Chamber and Senate to Italy’s desire to live on friendly terms with the Yugoslavs, even at the price of “sacrifices.” Both speeches however gave no indication of Italy’s territorial designs nor as to the extent of the “sacrifices.”

Mr. Pashitch thought that the recent great Austro-German drive against Italy was likely to be the last great effort of the Central powers as the season was now getting late for extensive offensives, and as in the spring the advent on the fronts of the American troops would give such a preponderance to the Allies that the Central powers, already further weakened by the results of the intensive blockade and other causes, would no longer be capable of attempting further great offensives. He was also disinclined to believe in any Bulgarian offensive movement for the present against the Salonica front. The reports to this effect brought in by recently captured Bulgarians, he believed to be most probably a Bulgarian ruse.

I may add that Mr. Pashitch, as might be expected, very often refers to the great desirability in his opinion of reinforcing the Salonica front and of making a forward movement there (despatches Nos. 7 of August 23 and 8 of August 31, 19171). Another idea which he often develops in conversation is that in the interest of civilization [Page 321] and as a barrier to German threats in the Near East, quite apart from Jugoslav aspirations, the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is necessary. So long as Austria-Hungary exists it will, in his opinion, inevitably continue to be a German power, for though the most extreme federative principle might be adopted for the peoples composing Austria-Hungary, they must continue to have a common army and foreign office. As the heads of these departments would be nominated by the Emperor, himself a German, they would also inevitably be of German character. Mr. Pashitch remarks however that the case would of course be wholly different if after Austria-Hungary’s dismemberment some or all of the free nations then created should agree to form together a federated state. In such a case the authorities of this state would in no wise be German.

I have [etc.]

H. Percival Dodge
  1. Neither printed.