File No. 763.72119/1000
The Chargé in Switzerland ( Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 28, 1.40 p.m.]
2124. On Sunday the 25th, Count Károlyi, member of Hungarian Parliament, sent a messenger stating that he would like to call as he desired to make a statement to me. Knowing Károlyi’s influence in Hungary, I felt the matter might be of such importance that I could not risk for the benefit of our Government refusing to see him. He therefore called at the Legation and spoke to Dolbeare and myself.
He sketched his situation in Austria-Hungary. He stated that he has maintained an independent situation and striven for democratic ideals and the defeat of German domination as typified in the Mittel Europa scheme. At the beginning of the war he worked with Apponyi and at the beginning of Czernin’s chancellorship he worked with him but in Austria he found them too influenced from Berlin and was compelled to split. At present he has twenty-five followers in Hungarian Parliament but is acknowledged leader of Labor, Socialist and Feminist Parties and is capable of causing general strike in Hungary. Has been many times offered portfolio in Wekerle Cabinet. He has consistently refused offer because he does not feel that the course of events as yet bend in accordance with his views.
[Page 323]Károlyi feels that very probably in a short time he will overthrow Czernin and enter Cabinet and that the tendency will be in accord with his views. At present after victory on Italian front the Kaiser’s head is turned and Czernin is flushed with victory. At first defeat by Allies there will be strong reaction and his opportunity will come.
He sketched the future for Austria in the event of a German victory, a drawn fight, and a German defeat. In any one of these cases he believed that Austria would be ruined. Austria would be ruined in the event of German victory because it would be dominated by Germany. In the event of a drawn battle it would still be dominated by Germany. In the event of a German defeat it would pay the brunt of the penalty and be classed with the Germans. He reasons that there is one way only of salvation for Austria which lies in the proposal which follows.
In the event of Károlyi’s entering into the Cabinet, no matter what the outward characteristics or representation of that Cabinet might be, it may be assumed that the Hungarian Cabinet as well as the Imperial Cabinet will be opposed to the Middle Europe scheme and ready for the following proposition: that the Entente should offer a peace conference on the basis of the relinquishment of occupied territories and a discussion at the conference of debatable territories such as Italian claims, Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, etc. Austria-Hungary would then declare to Germany, “We must send delegates to the conference as we cannot fight longer,” and Germany would then be obliged to send delegates in order not to be isolated. A secret agreement would, however, in the meantime be arranged between Austria-Hungary and the Entente on the following basis:
The Entente would guarantee that Austria-Hungary would not be heavily penalized territorially; that the brunt of the penalties would fall on Germany; and that Austria-Hungary should receive financial backing and raw materials to reconstruct her economic life. In return she would support the claims of the Entente in the debatable lands. Thus the Entente and Austria-Hungary would isolate Germany and throw the burden of the payment of the war upon her.
Károlyi believes that, however desirable, a separate peace is out of the question because of Germany’s military hold on the country.
In developing his proposal Károlyi made certain interesting statements pertinent to the question.
When Kaiser Karl came to the throne he showed some liberal tendencies but he is very young and not very bright, he was given the glory of Italian offensive and it went to his head. Czernin is playing a double game. He talks about a conciliatory peace and is [Page 324] determined to annex Poland and to give Lithuania and Courland to Germany.
Although Károlyi holds no cabinet position, he claims through his influence he is consulted on every important question that arises and if any electoral reform law is passed he will have a majority in the Hungarian Parliament.
In urging his project he cited the war of 1877 [between] Russia and Turkey, where after seeing advantageous treaty of San Stefano, Russia was shorn of fruits of victory by diplomatic isolation in treaty of Berlin.
He is convinced Germany has supplies for another year and a half and still has tremendous military forces and he does not exclude the possibility of a successful attempt to attack Paris by breaking the line in France with the help of the troops from the Russian front before America can be an effective factor in the war.
He declared that recent victory in Italy has flattered the vanity of both Emperors and has made the military party in both Austria-Hungary and Germany stronger than ever before. He then asked me point-blank how my Government and the Entente would view such a program in the event of his being able to create its possibility. He inquired of me most earnestly whether the American Government would be inclined to this proposal or was absolutely determined to crush Germany. I replied that I was unqualified to express an opinion to him on such things. I made no further statements to him of any kind through whole interview. He continued by begging me to examine his career from any source in order to be convinced of his courage, determination, independence and honesty for carrying through this project. He declared that the investigation would show that he had been an independent thinker and speaker even against the antagonism of his family and relatives and that if his fears should be realized and Hungary should fall under German domination he would leave the country forever as no free-thinking man could exist under German rule.
He impressed upon me the necessity to use discretion with whom I would speak of this matter as he had placed himself in a very dangerous position by coming to me and was risking his liberty and perhaps his life.
He stated that a hint that the matter was being given consideration, and better still, favorable consideration, would be of the greatest encouragement to him and he could use it discreetly and in proper quarters advantageously in assisting the realization of his program. Such a hint he would not consider as a guarantee but merely as a suggestion that there is a possibility from our side of a realization of his program. He has left a means at my disposal to convey this [Page 325] hint, should the American Government or the Entente desire it conveyed, which is entirely secure and without risk of being compromising.
I will make prompt investigation of his position in the political world in Austria-Hungary and report thereon.
Further discussion is probably out of the question as he must return in a few days to Hungary and it is problematical whether he would receive authorization to return here as he has been attempting for a year and a half to get a passport for this trip.