File No. 600.119/411½
The Ambassador in Great Britain ( Page) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 14, 11.40 a.m.]
7416. Gunther1 has been shown a series of telegrams sent since October 1 by the Foreign Office to Sir C. Spring Rice outlining imperative demands which the Foreign Office suggests should be made of neutrals. These instructions to Spring Rice seem to answer the last sentence in your confidential telegram to me, 5575 of October 9, 9 p.m.,2 to the effect that the British Government seem to desire a complete embargo but hesitate “to definitely recommend” such a course. On the contrary the prolongation of the present British embargo is not in the least desired. It was adopted as a temporary measure pending acceptance by the border neutrals of the Allied demands and concessions. It has already cost Great Britain a matter of £50,000,000 not to speak of the adverse effect on exchange.
[Page 971]The British Government are confident that complete demands can now be made without risk of driving any border neutral into the war on the side of Germany. The British have examined into this supposed danger, which did exist earlier in the war, by military, political and economic experts, and they have satisfied themselves that the danger now no longer exists. An Allied victory is now so certain that none of these states if it wished would dare join the enemy. Some of the reasons for this conclusion were set forth in Cecil’s memorandum transmitted with my despatch No. 6758 of August 13 last.1
Some of the Scandinavian states are intimating that they might be driven into the enemy’s camp. But they have long used this threat against the British and it is natural that they should still use it. They have little else to use. Pending negotiations they continue their profitable exports to Germany which are of great use to the Germans and individual go-betweens take energetic advantage of the interval of indecision.
On the other hand these neutrals are becoming weary of our detention of their ships and there are indications that they would really welcome definite demands by us and that they expect them to be severe. The British believe that the neutral representatives will continue to bluff as long as they think they can thereby gain their ends but that when a clear policy is put into effect they will become tractable.
The Russian objection is not regarded here as of the greatest importance. Doubtless it could be met through diplomatic agreement. It is believed that too much deference can easily be shown to Russia in such case to the jeopardy of the general cause. Even if retaliatory measures are adopted by Sweden, which is believed unlikely, the disadvantage would be of short duration if we act promptly.
In the matter of Swedish transit the Swedes have played both fast and loose. Spring Rice can explain the subterfuge of giving through bills lading to Germany but not to Russia on the grounds of the break in transit at Haparanda.