File No. 861.77/584
The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11.07 a.m.]
In the matter of Siberian railways, Stevens replied to my telegram of December 11, 6 p.m., as follows:
December 14, 11 a.m. Your cable December 11, 6 p.m. Proposed changes do not cover the most vital error, which is the lack of undivided authority. I can not change my views, which would be generally covered in adopting suggestions below, with dependable agreement that I should be elected president.
Amend lines 6, 9 and 7 [sic], section 1, so that technical committee shall be independent of inter-Allied committee in all matters operation.
Amend paragraph a, section 1, to read after word Siberia: “with full authority to administer technical and economic management of all railways in zone.”
Amend section 3, your second proposal, to read after words, operation of the railways: “We [who] shall have full authority in such executive supervision, technical board acting only as advisers. In case of disagreement among all members the decision of the president shall be final regardless of votes. He may appoint such assistants and inspectors and define their duties as he may decide is necessary cutting out the words, “with the approval of the board”.
Authority and not advice must be basic, also the concentration of authority in final analysis in one man in all matters operation.
The clause, section 3, assigning experts dangerous [in] that only experts same nationality as troops guarding particular station could be assigned there. That would obstruct instead of promote cooperation between Allies, particularly if United States had few troops along line. Stevens.
In an effort to meet his requirements, I prepared the following amended plan:
1. General supervision of the railways in the zone in which the Allied forces are now operating shall be exercised by special inter-Allied committee, which shall consist of representatives from each Allied power having military forces in Siberia, including Russia, and chairman of which shall be Russian.
The following boards shall be created to be placed under the control of inter-Allied committee, except in matters of technical operation: [Page 297]
- (a)
- Technical board consisting of railway experts of the nations having military forces in Siberia with authority administer technical and economic management of all railways in the said zone;
- (b)
- An Allied military transportation board for the purpose of coordinating military transportation under instructions of the proper military authorities.
2. Protection of the railways shall be placed under the Allied military forces. At the head of each railway shall remain a Russian manager, or director, with the power conferred by existing Russian law, subject only to the supervision herein provided.
3. Technical board shall elect a president to whom shall be intrusted technical operation of the railways. He shall have full authority in such operation, the technical board acting as adviser. He may appoint assistants and inspectors in the service of board chosen from among the nationals of the powers having military forces in Siberia to be attached to the central office of the board and define their duties. He may assign if necessary the corps of railway experts to the more important stations. In assigning railway experts to any of the stations, interests of the Allied powers, military protection of such stations shall be taken in due consideration. He shall distribute work among the clerical staff of the board whom he may appoint in his discretion.
4. Clerical staff of the inter-Allied committee shall be appointed by chairman of the committee, who shall have the right of distributing the work among such employees as well as dismiss them.
Comparing this with Japanese plan given in my cipher telegram December 3, 1 a.m., you will note that I endeavored to change wording only where necessary to give, to the technical board and the president, the authority which Stevens considers essential to succeed. I submitted this amended plan to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday afternoon and at the same time I left with him extracts from Stevens’s telegram[s] to me of December 5 and 9 and also following extract from your telegram to me December 7, 12 p.m. [4 p.m.]:
No agreement can succeed unless it can be arranged for the Russians to follow advice and carry out instructions and this Government would decline to have Stevens placed in a position where his special capability can not be made effective.
After examining amendments carefully the Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that the changes which they effected in the Japanese plan were “vital.” He appeared greatly discouraged and when I urged, in the interest of Siberia, prompt action he intimated that an early reply was unlikely. I surmised that he dreaded reopening the question with the military authorities. Bearing in mind the instructions in your cipher telegram December 7, midnight [4 p.m.], [Page 298] I concluded the interview stating that with these amendments approved I was authorized to promise consent to the plan when formally presented to missions.
I offer the following comments for the consideration of the Department.
The Japanese Government may meet the issue in any one of three ways:
(1) Indefinite delay.
This was suggested by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and has been also expressed during the last few days in apparently inspired newspaper articles.
(2) Eliminating Stevens and the Russian Railway Service Corps by the adoption of the plan now advocated by British representative in Siberia mentioned in the fifth paragraph of my November 30, 10 p.m.
In this connection following telegram from Stevens is significant:
December 12, 10 a.m. Kolchak has asked through British that Allied committee be formed to take charge transportation]. Jack1 has asked me if I will [accept?] plan substantially same as your cable December 2, 7 p.m.,2 to [omission]. I shall reply that our Government has obtained approval of all, including Russians, with sole exception Japanese, to a plan it desires to be adopted placing direction operation railways American hands without divided authority. That in view of the attitude of our Government [I] can not consistently try plan he suggests. This may result in their ignoring Americans but I can see no other way for me to take to follow the essential policy of the Department which is correct. I think the design is to get entering wedge to later on prevent American control. I shall strongly urge to him quick adoption of our plan. Stevens.
(3) Refusal to concur possibly followed by placing of Japanese railway experts in charge of Chinese Eastern and Amur Railways.
Stevens has never wavered in his conviction that this is the likely move. I will take occasion informally to convey to the Premier the substance of your December 11, 6 p.m. I will also seek an opportunity to present the situation once more to the Minister of War. My colleague from Italy stands ready to cooperate in any way I may suggest and the French Chargé d’Affaires has similar instructions. May I again suggest further pressure on the British Government. My British colleague failing to receive any reply from his Government to his proposal of joint representation as reported in my November 10, 7 p.m.,3 has relapsed into his former unsympathetic indifference. Would it be expedient at this time to point out to the [Page 299] British Government the broader reasons affecting the entire situation in the Far East, and particularly China, which call for closest cooperation of our two Governments in establishing a policy which shall limit spheres of exclusive commercial or political control?
Recent reports from Siberia are most discouraging. The following telegram from Caldwell was received this morning:
December 14, 7 p.m. Railway conditions in Siberia are intolerable. Road has ceased to function for all practical purposes. If change for the better is not soon insisted on it will be impossible to make distribution supplies expected from America. Congestion of freight (at) Vladivostok will be only result. We have previously mentioned this to Department in cable 25. Merchandise will arrive soon and (unless?) transportation is available our organization will be helpless. Under circumstances we feel that if feasible we should be advised of present status of negotiations and likelihood of decision being reached. Without such information it is impossible for us to plan our work. The Government’s generous plan of dealing relief will collapse unless railway question is settled. This conclusion should be plainly stated to the Department. Caldwell.