File No. 600.119/482
The Ambassador in Great Britain ( Page) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 18, 2.35 p.m.]
8290. For the information of the War Trade Board from Sheldon:
No. 37. I have naturally discussed tentatively with the Allies the form of control to be adopted for any agreement with a northern neutral which might be concluded, and have maintained that any one country should not have predominating influence such as has been the case with Great Britain in its relations with the Netherlands Oversea Trust; furthermore, as you agree to appoint a representative on the Swiss Blockade Committee, I supposed that your wishes would be to have an organization similar to that for the northern neutrals, should any agreement be concluded, in order to be ready in time with an inter-Allied blockade committee. It is time now to consider this question and make a decision, for I believe the Foreign Office plans to convoke a meeting of Allied representatives to discuss this matter. I do not see any other feasible way than to set up an inter-Allied blockade committee, for, if each country is to have the right to say that it alone shall be the judge of what is shipped from its own territory, I cannot see how an inter-Allied blockade committee can work smoothly.
In this connection the War Trade Board cable No. 13, sent through the State Department to Paris on November 23 [24],1 presupposes and [that?] the War Trade Board license will be final and that its licenses in all cases are to be honored. This same plan also reiterated in your telegram to me of January 10, paragraph 7. It is my opinion that in the long run we would gain more than we would lose if an inter-Allied blockade committee should have the final decision on what exports should go forward to neutrals. This committee would be composed of representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, and ourselves, the British and United States Governments having a proportionately larger vote than the other two. As an illustration of what is happening under the present individualistic scheme, the figures for imports into Holland in November show that, while nothing was received from the United States, there were imports from Great Britain, in addition to coal, of 1,400 tons of cement, 9,420 tons of oil, seeds, and fats, 980 tons of salt, 460 tons of shipbuilding materials, and smaller quantities of wines, cotton, yarn, and piece goods, woolen waste and piece goods, paper, borax, china, caustic soda, feathers, etc. All these imports were made without consultation [Page 946] with other Allies, so far as I know, and in spite of the declared embarkation [embargo?] policy. This could be regulated satisfactorily only by an inter-Allied blockade committee, and it is bound to continue until such a committee is established and become more, fruitful source of friction. Under the working of a joint agreement, I am inclined to believe that the apparent acceptance by the (contraband?) committee of the principle in your telegram of November 24 was due to the fact that they will enjoy the same prerogatives as regards exports from Great Britain, but in the event of an agreement being concluded with a neutral, it would seem that an inter-Allied blockade committee would be a far preferable plan.
As regards the political effect on American shippers, it would seem that no valid objection would exist if a license were refused by the War Trade Board on the advice of the inter-Allied blockade committee, and that this is very different from their being refused a navicert by the British authorities.
The subject matter of your telegram of January 10 is being put forward to the Foreign Office by the Embassy in accordance with instructions, but I commend the above suggestions to you for your early consideration.
Since writing above, your No. 10 received,1 which we will endeavor to answer as quickly as possible.