Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume III

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/6

BC–2 +

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, January 15, 1919, at 14:30 O’clock

Paris, January 15, 1919, 2:30 p.m.

• Present
  • France
    • M. Clemenceau.
    • M. Pichon.
    • M. Dutasta.
    • M. Fromageot.
    • M. Berthelot.
    • Captain A. Portier.
  • Great Britain
    • The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George.
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
    • Lt.-Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.
    • Captain B. Abraham.
  • Italy
    • Baron Sonnino.
    • Count Aldrovandi.
    • Major A. Jones.
  • United States of America
    • President Wilson.
    • Mr. R. Lansing.
    • Mr. A. H. Fraizier.
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui.
    • Viscount Chinda.

Interpreter: Professor P. J. Mantoux.

1. The Official Language of the Conference M. Pichon said that the question of languages remained to be settled. He asked whether the text proposed by M. Clemenceau was accepted by the Meeting. This text was to the effect that the English, French, and Italian languages would be recognized as official languages at the Conference, the French version holding good in case of dispute.

President Wilson said that he wished to present one of the aspects of this matter. Undoubtedly, French had been the language of European diplomacy in the past, but we were now dealing with a new case. This case did not affect only Europe: the rest of the world had come into the arena. A new Great Power was now concerned in the business of world diplomacy. He referred to the United States, whose language was English. The precedent in favour of the French language in diplomacy was only a European precedent. The language of diplomacy on the other side of the globe was English. There were, therefore, two precedents. Neither could be followed exclusively, as this was a Congress of the whole world. A very large part of the people affected by the settlements we hope to make use the English language. It was doubtful whether Americans, if they had before them a French document, could ever feel quite sure that it accurately represented their thoughts. The same doubtless was the case with a Frenchman, if confronted with a document in English. He felt, therefore, that there should be two official languages. He made this proposal without intending any disrespect for the Italian language, the literature of which was justly admired throughout the world. The Italian language, however, would be known only to a small part of the representatives constituting the Congress. If the language of a minority were to be given official status, this principle would have to extend to the languages of other minorities. Harmony could be attained as between the languages by the Permanent Secretariat, the creation of which was contemplated. The officials on this Secretariat would, doubtless, have a perfect knowledge both of French and of English. Such knowledge of a greater number of languages would be hard to obtain. He therefore advocated the adoption of a bi-lingual scheme with great earnestness, as what we were about to do was to affect the future of the world, and all needless difficulties should be avoided. He therefore proposed that French and English should be the official languages.

Mr. Lloyd George then suggested that the English and French languages should be recognized as the official languages of the Conference, and that in any case of dispute the referee should be the League of Nations.

M. Pichon said that he wished to make certain observations. He wished to point out that this was not the first time that the nations of America were represented in an international diplomatic Conference in Europe. He would instance the two Hague Conferences. In both cases French had been adopted unanimously as the official language. At these Conferences, not only had the United States been represented, but also Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and the Argentine. That very morning President Wilson had recognized that French had an historical privilege in this matter. He therefore appealed to him in order that, at the end of a War in which France had suffered so heavily, she should not find herself by the very first act of the Conference deprived of this ancient prerogative. M. Clemenceau, in a conciliatory spirit, had agreed that there should be two other official languages in addition to French, only reserving for the last the text which might be appealed to in exceptional cases of disputed interpretation.

Baron Sonnino said that he was satisfied with M. Clemenceau’s formula, which recognized three languages as equally official, and, as a matter of convenience, reserved one for reference in case of contest. This was a departure from precedent. If a departure from precedent was to be made, he urged most strongly that Italian should not be excluded. Italy had put four to five million soldiers in the field, and that should be taken into account.

President Wilson said that if he listened only to his sentiment he would yield at once to M. Pichon’s appeal. He and the people of the United States felt nothing but admiration and affection for France, but he felt obliged in this matter to omit sentiment. The work of this Conference concerned the future and not the past. The documents prepared by it were not merely to be useful to historians, but were to be the basis of the life and of the action of Governments in the future. Amongst the peoples to be affected by these documents were a very considerable number whose speech would be English. He had constantly to remind himself that the task in hand was a practical one and not a sentimental one. He was not concerned with the respective merits of various languages, but only with the case of interpretation in the future furnished by any one of them. He would be greatly distressed if it were thought that he felt any disrespect for any language. He wished the future to think that this Conference had done its best in a practical spirit, and placed in the hands of posterity the most useful instruments that could be devised.

M. Pichon drew attention to the procedure followed by the Joint Secretariat of the Supreme War Council at Versailles. He read the note appended to the procès-verbaux by the Joint Secretariat, which is as follows:—

“The French text of the Minutes was prepared in the French Section, and has been approved by the Joint Secretariat. The English text was prepared in advance in the English Section for the benefit of the British Government. It differs in no essential from the French, but the latter is the official text.”

Mr. Lloyd George said that when this had been decided the case lay between two European Powers. There was now another Power whose language was English and, moreover, the affairs of the Congress concerned the whole world. He, further, would point out that, when the Supreme War Council met in London, the official language was English. It was only French when the meetings took place in France. In addition to North America, the population of India should be considered. It might safely be said that English was the language of some 500,000,000 or 600,000,000 people. He had no desire to minimise the importance of The Hague Conferences which had been referred to, but there was no doubt that the public had been at that time apathetic, and had taken very little interest in what was debated there. Such was not the case now. Practical considerations, therefore, inclined him to support President Wilson.

M. Clemenceau said that there was, perhaps, more agreement than appeared on the surface. He, for one, would never forget that, but for the intervention of English-speaking peoples, not only from America but from the British Empire, France would have been lost. He also, like President Wilson, wished to make a new world and to do new things, but (it was perhaps a trite observation) the future was attached to the past, and had its root in it. The English would remain English and the French French. This war had been a European war. Peoples had come to it from all parts of the world, but it had occurred in France. He agreed that it was indispensable to pay a tribute to the people who had come from so far and in so generous a spirit, but he would point out that in this matter something new was being done. He himself, a French statesman, had proposed that the official documents which an Englishman or an American would get should be in English. That was a novelty, but some care must be taken. If, in the archives at The Hague, for instance, a document in the French language were kept, which in quite exceptional circumstances might be required by a tribunal for the correct interpretation of a text, in what way could this offend any nation? In respect to Italian, he was opposed to its exclusion. Italian was spoken in Italy, in Asia Minor, in the Argentine. We were endeavouring to give a status to small Nations. Why should we therefore limit the official languages of Great Powers? He felt that as each nation matured it would acquire a right to a text in its own language. But, nevertheless, there must at all times be one final text to which to appeal. He therefore held to the proposal he had made that morning.

Mr. Lloyd George said that we need not for the moment decide whether there should be two or three official languages. The point under consideration was whether one should have the position of a final standard, for this language would in effect be the official language. If French were adopted for this purpose, it would be the duty of all concerned to scrutinize the text very carefully. He, for his part, did not feel competent of his ability to detect the shades of meaning in a French text. He would therefore revert to his proposal that when difficulties of interpretation arose the case should be referred to the League of Nations. There was a precedent for this in Canada, where laws and enactments were promulgated in two tongues. When the Court declared that the texts were different the matter was referred to Parliament, which then decided what the meaning should be. He made these observations without prejudice to the question of whether Italian should be an official language or not, though he felt that perhaps one Latin and one Anglo-Saxon language would suffice.

President Wilson pointed out that all Treaties between France and the United States had been drawn up in the two languages; the English version was submitted to the American Senate for confirmation. Should any difference of opinion arise in the interpretation of the agreement between the two countries, the only solution could be a friendly meeting between representatives. Neither language in this case could be the standard.

M. Clemenceau said that if arbitration occurred the arbiter would have to decide on the French text. He further pointed out that the Treaty of Versailles,¹ which concerned America, had been drawn up in French.

President Wilson retorted that at the time of that Treaty America had no Constitution requiring reference of Treaties to the Senate. He further pointed out that the Bryan Treaty² had been drawn up in two languages, and a special official status had not been granted to either.

M. Pichon said that that was the first time that French had been challenged as the language of diplomacy throughout the world. Even such as related to customs, telegraphs, cables, treaties of commerce, &c., were made in French. Even Bismarck, who was no friend of France, had raised no objection to the use of French in the Treaty of Berlin.

Mr. Balfour said that Great Britain had always accepted the tradition of French as the diplomatic language. As between France and England, the French text would undoubtedly have been appealed to in any case of dispute; but as in the United States it was the Senate that had authority to conclude treaties, it was clear that that body must ask for an English text.

M. Clemenceau said that he adhered to his proposal, and did not feel that he could make any further concession.

President Wilson suggested that the subject should be postponed and reconsidered at a later date.

2. Scheme of Regulations. Article 9 M. Pichon read Article 9.³

After some discussion it was decided to amend this article as follows:—

“Every document’ which is to be included in the official proceedings shall be presented in writing by the Plenipotentiaries who have brought it forward.

“No document or proposal may be brought forward save by one of the Plenipotentiaries and in the name of the Power which he represents.”

The question of language in the original text of this Article was reserved for future discussion.

M. Pichon read Article 10 which, on President Wilson’s suggestion, was amended as follows:—

Article 10 “A Plenipotentiary wishing to make a proposal unconnected with questions on the agenda or not arising from the discussion should give notice thereof twenty-four hours in advance, in order to facilitate discussion. This rule, however, applies only to original motions, not to amendments or subsidiary questions.”

M. Pichon then read Article 11.

Article 11 After some discussion, this Article was amended, on Baron Sonnino’s proposal, to read as follows, with the object of restricting the circulation of certain documents concerning only the Great Powers:—

“Petitions, memoranda, observations, or documents forwarded to the Conference by any person other than Plenipotentiaries should be received and filed by the Secretariat. Such of these communications as are of political interest will be summarized in a list to be distributed to all the Plenipotentiaries. This list will be kept up to date as occasion requires. All such documents will be deposited in the Archives.”

Article 12 Article 12 was read by M. Pichon and accepted without amendment.

Article 13 Article 13 was read by M. Pichon and accepted without amendment.

Article 14 Article 14, on the Proposal of President Wilson, was suppressed.

Article 15 Article 15 was read and accepted without modification.

Article 16 Article 16 was read by M. Pichon. After some discussion, it was agreed that the drafting of resolutions should be left to the General Secretariat of the Conference.

The article therefore reads:—

“It will be the duty of the General Secretariat to draft the Resolutions adopted by the Conference.”

3. Censorship of Cables M. Pichon said that the decision that only official communiqués should be given to the Press required to be reinforced by certain measures. It was necessary to be able to check the despatch of telegrams to the Press in other countries. He therefore suggested that each Power should delegate a Representative [to join a representative]⁴ of the French Government and act with him for this purpose.

President Wilson said that this proposal caused him some embarrassment. Not long before he had left America, the Government had taken over the cables. It had then been suggested that this was done because he was coming to Europe, and meant to prevent the forwarding of any message unfavourable to himself. He had repudiated this insinuation, but if he now agreed to the censorship he would be convicting himself. In effect, he did not believe that anything was sent to America apart from the official communiqués, save what the American journalists obtained from the local Press. There were some eighty American journalists engaged in sending cables. The censorship of all their messages would involve a great deal of work and would entail great delay. He was of opinion that this matter could be set right if great care were taken by all concerned in the Conferences themselves. He also pointed out that France, if she so desired, could refuse any messages returning from America.

Mr. Lloyd George said that he was not certain that if information went to America it would not on its return find its way into the British. Press. It would certainly cause great discontent if the British Press obtained its information in this roundabout fashion. It was not possible to allow one half of the world to obtain news while depriving the other half.

President Wilson said that up to date nothing had been done in America to set the world on fire. He thought we could afford during the initial stage, when nothing of a very inflammatory nature was being discussed, to put the Press on trial. The British Government and the United States Government, and perhaps other Governments, dealt with one man, who acted as liaison between them and the Press. That person could be asked to assemble the pressmen and obtain a pledge from them to do nothing which might hamper the success of the Conference.

M. Clemenceau doubted whether this method would be successful in France.

Mr. Lloyd George was of the same opinion with regard to Great Britain, but was willing to give this method a trial.

Article 7 Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to Regulation No. 7, which he felt was not practicable. He felt that it would be impossible for the Secretariat to furnish bulletins in the time specified. He therefore suggested the following alternative:—

“The Conference to give general directions to the Secretariat as to what should be published, and what should not be published. If the Secretariat were in agreement on the text, publication would follow at once. If not, reference should be made to the heads of Delegations, or to any nominee acting on their behalf.”

(This proposal was adopted.)

4. Attendance at First General Meeting of Peace Conference M. Pichon asked what the feeling of the meeting was concerning the meeting of the Peace Conference on the following Saturday. Should only belligerent States be summoned to attend, or also those who had severed diplomatic relations with Germany? As this was the first meeting, he himself was of opinion that both categories of States should be asked to attend.

(This was agreed to.)

M. Pichon further stated that he proposed to send the invitations to the Ambassadors or Ministers representing the various States, because he was as yet unaware of the exact identity of the various Plenipotentiaries. The invitation to the British Dominions and India would likewise be sent to the British Embassy.

President Wilson enquired whether the session on Saturday was to be a public one.

M. Pichon returned a negative answer.

Viscount Chinda enquired whether Technical Representatives would be present.

M. Pichon again answered in the negative.

5. Russia M. Clemenceau suggested that the question of Russia should be resumed on the following morning.

Mr. Lloyd George agreed, but added the proviso that no communication of this intention should be given to the Press, as it was most unlikely that any conclusion would be reached on this subject, either on the following day or even the day after. This might lead the Press to suppose that there was disagreement. He would, therefore, suggest that memoranda should be prepared by each Power concerning Russia, giving the actual information at their disposal in regard to the present situation both in Russia and Siberia.

Mr. Balfour pointed out that such memoranda could not be ready for the following day.

(It was understood that these memoranda would be prepared as soon as possible.)

6. Acceptance of Regulations by the General Conference Mr. Balfour enquired whether it would be advisable to obtain from the General Conference an endorsement of the regulations now agreed upon.

M. Pichon was of opinion that if all these regulations were submitted to the Conference, there would be a protracted debate, especially on the subject of the numbers of Delegates. The small Powers were well aware that these regulations were being prepared by the Great Powers. No protest had as yet been made.

President Wilson enquired whether there was any objection to the communication to the Press by the Secretariat of all the conclusions reached that day.

Mr. Lloyd George suggested that a short communication should be prepared containing items of such interest as the numbers of Delegates, the panel system, that there was no question of voting by Delegates, but that each Delegation, whatever its size, would be regarded as one.

(It was decided that the next Meeting should take place at 10:30 a.m. on the following day.)

Villa Majestic, Paris , January 15, 1919.

1. Apparently a reference to the Declarations for Suspension of Arms and Cessation of Hostilities, signed at Versailles January 20, 1783; see Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (Washington, 1931), vol. 2, p. 108.
2. Treaty of September 15, 1914, between the United States and France for the advancement of general peace; English and French texts in Treaty Series No. 609; English text in Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 380.
3. Of section VI of the French plan of procedure printed in vol. i, p. 386.
4. These words appear in the British print but were omitted, apparently by typographical error, from the American print.