Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume IV

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03101/45

BC–38

Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Monday, 24th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Paris, February 24, 1919, 3 p.m.

Present	Also Present
America, United States of	America, United States of
Mr. R. Lansing	Dr. Mezes
Mr. E. M. House	Dr. Day
Secretaries	Mr. Dolbeare
Mr. A. Frazier	Mr. Beer
Mr. L. Harrison	British Empire
Mr. Auchincloss	Sir, Eyre Crowe, K. C. B.
British Empire	The Hon. H. Nicholson } For Albanian question only. Lt. Col. W. H. Gribbon, C. M. G. Sir W. Tyrrell, K. C. M. G., C. B. } For Poland question only. Lt. Col. Kisch, D. S. O.
The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, O. M., M. P.
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Milner, G. C. B., G. C. M. G.
Secretaries	France
Lt. Col. Sir M. P. A. Hankey, K. C. B.	Marshal Foch
The Hon. T. A. Spring-Rice	General Weygand
France	M. J. Cambon } For Poland question only. M. Hermitte M. Degrand Lieut. de Percin
M. Pichon
M. Tardieu
Secretaries
M. Berthelot
M. de Bearn	Italy
Italy	H. E. M. Crespi
H. E. Baron Sonnino	Col. Castola } For Albanian question only M. Galli
H. E. Marquis Salvago Raggi
Secretaries	Marquis della Torretta } For Poland question only.
Count Aldrovandi
M. Bertele	Albanian Delegation
Japan	Touran Pasha.
H. E. Baron Makino	Mehemid bey Konitza
H. E. M. Matsui	M. Louis Gouracontchi

Joint Secretariat

America, United States of	Colonel U. S. Grant.
British Empire	Major A. M. Caccia, M. V. O.
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lieut. Zanchi.
Japan	M. Saburi.
Interpreter: Prof. P. J. Mantoux.

(1) M. Pichon having declared the Meeting open, asked permission for Mr. Balfour to put a question, which was not on the Agenda Paper.

Austrian Debt: Payment of Coupons Due 1st March, 1919 Mr. Balfour said that Mr. Montagu, the Secretary of State for India and a member of the Committee for drafting terms of reference to the Financial Committee, had asked him to bring to the notice of the Conference a matter which the British Treasury and the British Finance Authorities regarded as of pressing interest to all the Allied and Associated Powers. The coupons of the Austrian Debt would fall due for payment on 1st March next. The representatives of all the fragments of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire were about to meet at the Ballplatz, Vienna, to consider what should be done in regard to this and other matters.

If the coupons in question were not paid on the 1st March next, and Austria were prematurely declared bankrupt, a general distrust of credit would result, followed by the closure of all banks and a general disturbance of business. If that were to happen, how was the food, which Mr. Hoover was arranging to supply, to be paid for? Although it might be impossible to make any definite arrangements to prevent the eventual bankruptcy of the fragments of the Austrian Empire, nevertheless the British Financial Authorities held the view that that was a situation which should be gradually prepared for. If that situation were suddenly sprung on the public, disaster would follow. Therefore the British suggested that a joint letter should be addressed by the Allied [and] Associated Powers to the Financial Authorities now assembled in Vienna to say that it was very important that the coupons due on 1st March should be paid, but the various countries that had formed part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire would not thereby assume any obligation in regard to the future apportionment of the debt. He understood that this was merely a temporary method of getting over the immediate crisis. It was, however, a very pressing case which the Conference should forthwith discuss with its financial advisers and decide.

Mr. House enquired what was the amount of the interest involved, and when would the next instalment fall due.

Mr. Balfour replied that he could not answer that question, but he presumed the interest would be payable quarterly.

M. Sonnino was under the impression that the subject had already been discussed by the Financial Committee, and enquired whether any decision had been reached.

Mr. Balfour explained that the Committee itself would not in any case be in a position to send the letter suggested, but M. Klotz, who was Chairman of the Committee in question, could be invited to attend on the following day and give the necessary explanations.

M. Crespi said that he was a member of the Finance Committee and in a position, therefore, to give some explanations. The question under reference had not yet been discussed by the Financial Committee, but would come before it that afternoon. He could positively state that there were sufficient funds available in Vienna to pay the Coupons. The representatives of the different parts of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire had, however, stated that they would not agree to the payment of the interest due unless the question raised by Mr. Balfour were first settled, namely the future distribution of the Austrian Debt amongst the various new States to be constituted. Consequently, if a letter were sent to Vienna, as suggested by Mr. Balfour, stating that the payment of the March coupons would in no way prejudice the final apportionment of the debt of the late Austrian Empire, payment would, he thought, easily be made. On the other hand, the repudiation of the debt would be most disastrous, both to the various new States and to the Allied countries. He would, therefore, strongly support Mr. Balfour’s proposal, and he hoped the matter would at once be referred to the Finance Committee for report.

M. Pichon enquired whether Mr. Balfour’s resolution was accepted. If so, M. Crespi would perhaps inform the Finance Committee at the Meeting, which he would attend that afternoon: and the whole question could then be discussed by the Conference tomorrow afternoon.

(It was agreed that the question relating to the payment of the coupons of the Austrian Debt, due for payment on 1st March next, should forthwith be referred to the Committee for drafting terms of reference to Financial Committee, whose recommendations would be considered by the Conference on the afternoon of Tuesday, February 25th.)

2. M. Pichon said that the four texts had been circulated in accordance with the Resolution passed on Saturday last,¹ and he called on M. Sonnino to make his remarks.

Procedure to Expedite Business of Conference: (a) Amendment to Clause 2 (a) M. Sonnino called attention to the fact that the words: “and the renunciation of Colonies and territorial rights outside Europe” had been omitted from paragraph 2 (a) of the Resolution relating to Austria-Hungary. He agreed that Austria-Hungary had no Colonies, but Austria certainly had certain territorial rights outside Europe. He proposed, therefore, that the paragraph in question should be made to read as follows:—

(a) The approximate future frontiers of Austria-Hungary and the renunciation of territorial rights outside Europe.

(This was agreed to.)

(b) Proposed Amendment to Clause 1 M. Pichon pointed out that considerable objection had been raised to the use of the words “Preliminary Peace Terms” in Clause 1 of the Draft Resolutions. The view was held that those words implied that whatever might be done under the heading of Preliminary Peace Terms would in some cases, (as in the case of the United States of America), entail a reference to the national legislature. He proposed, therefore, to use the words “Preliminary Conditions” instead of “Preliminary Peace Terms”.

Mr. Lansing enquired what was meant exactly by the words “Preliminary Conditions.”

M. Pichon replied that his definition would be conditions, which did not form part of the Peace Terms. That is to say, the conditions would in reality form part of the Armistice.

Mr. Lansing said that he would very strongly object to any such change.

Mr. Balfour said that he shared Mr. Lansing’s view. But M. Pichon’s contention was that in the case of the United States of America, decisions taken under the heading: “Terms of Peace” would have to be referred to the Senate.

Mr. Lansing explained that in America only a final and negotiated Treaty, after having been signed by the President, had to be submitted to the Senate for approval, before the exchange of ratification. In regard to the provisions inserted in the Resolutions, if those were finally negotiated with Germany, the document containing these conditions would become a Treaty of Peace and ipso facto would have to be submitted to the Senate. Had he wished to raise an objection, it would have been to the use of the word “Preliminary”, but he did not wish to press that point.

(It was agreed to retain the words “Preliminary Peace Terms” in paragraph 1.)

Lord Milner said:—

(c) Naval, Military and Air Conditions “Speaking for myself, personally, I still think that the final disarmament of Germany, I mean our bringing her down to that degree of strength for war purposes which we are willing to allow her permanently to maintain, is extremely urgent, that it is a step which we ought to take as soon as we possibly can, and that it is a step which when taken, will greatly expedite the acceptance, not only by Germany but by all our enemies, of all other conditions of peace. It is also an absolutely essential preliminary to our own demobilisation on anything like the scale on which we all hope to demobilise.

Till Saturday last I thought we were all agreed upon this. Now I feel some doubt about it. I do not wish to raise any further discussion over the Resolutions which we are just about to pass. But I hope I am justified in assuming that the passing of these Resolutions does not preclude us from proceeding at once to impose upon Germany those final military, naval and other conditions of a like nature, which Marshal Foch and his colleagues are at present discussing, if when we see them, they commend themselves to us. I hope in other words that it still remains free to any one of us to raise at that juncture the question of their immediate presentation.”

M. Sonnino said that he had himself made the same proposal yesterday and it had been opposed.

M. Pichon thought that paragraph 2 gave complete satisfaction to Lord Milner’s opinions, since the naval, military and air conditions had been specially excluded. He thought that in accordance with the decision reached on Saturday last, military terms could be discussed and settled as soon as they could be presented by the Commission appointed to draw up the necessary recommendations.

Marshal Foch pointed out that the military conditions would merely define Germany’s military situation for the time being. Certain military conditions would be imposed on Germany: but in three or four months when the other conditions would have to be imposed, the moment might be less favourable to the Allies; for whatever military conditions might be imposed on Germany she would still be in a position in due course to reconstitute her army, material means to that end being still available. In addition to the military clauses, it was essential that other clauses relating to frontiers, indemnities, etc., should at the same time be imposed on Germany. That is to say, a summary of the Peace Treaty should forthwith be drawn up and presented to Germany. Otherwise, when the time came to present the final peace terms, the Allies who would have continued to demobilise, would find themselves unprepared to face a re-constituted German army.

M. Tardieu thought that in reality no contradiction existed between Marshal Foch’s and Lord Milner’s views. He thought the military terms would be ready for discussion in a few days’ time, and in accordance with the Resolutions the rest of the conditions would be submitted to the Conference by the 8th March next, so that only a short interval of time would elapse between the settlement of the two sets of questions.

Marshal Foch explained that all he had meant to say was that a connection between the two sets of questions would be necessary.

Mr. House expressed the view that in reality no difference of opinion existed between the Members of the Conference. He suggested that further discussion could be deferred to the time when the necessary reports of the Committees would be received.

(It was agreed to accept the four sets of Resolutions relating to the procedure of the Preliminary Peace Conference, as amended.

For full texts see Appendices A(i), A(ii), A(iii) & A(iv).)

(Members of the Albanian Delegation and the experts entered the council Chamber.)

(3) Touran Pasha read the following statement:—

(Note—The Statement will be inserted later.)²

Statement of Albaninan Claims (The Delegates and experts then withdrew.)

(It was agreed that the questions raised in Touran Pasha’s statement on the Albanian territorial interests in the peace settlement should be referred for examination, in the first instance, to the Committee now examining Grecian problems.

It should be the duty of the Committee to reduce questions for discussion within the narrowest possible limits and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee should be authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned.)

(The representatives of the Allied Commission on Poland entered the Council Chamber.)

(4) M. Pichon said that it would be within the knowledge of the Conference that M. Noulens, the Chairman of the Allied Commission to Poland, had telegraphed to ask that a division of General Haller’s Army³ should be sent to Poland as soon as possible, together with complete equipment and a reserve stock of ammunition. The question had been referred to the Polish Liaison Committee, who had submitted the following report:— Poland: Despatch of General Haller’s Army

“After taking notice of the telegrams 8 and 9 from M. Noulens, the Committee for Polish Affairs in their meeting of February 20th, have been unanimous in expressing the opinion that there was occasion to send to Poland within the shortest possible delay, General Haller’s division, as per request of the Inter-Allied Committee of Warsaw.

General Le Rond observed that, in order that the transportation of the Polish troops might be effected, it was absolutely necessary to occupy Dantzig, the only possible landing base, and the railway lines Dantzig-Thorn (doubled by waterway) and Dantzig-Mlawa. He recalled that the principle of this occupation had been already agreed to previous to the departure of the Inter-Allied Mission for Warsaw.

He ended by saying that pending the settlement of the Eastern frontiers of Germany, the best way to ensure the occupation of Dantzig and of the rail-and-water ways would be to exact from the Germans the withdrawal of their troops on this side of a line to be determined: on one hand west of the Dantzig-Thorn railway line, on the other hand East of the Dantzig-Mlawa railway-line according to the procedure which has been applied in Posnania, as the Committee have given their support to the views expressed by General Le Rond, the matter should be referred to the Supreme Allied Council that Marshal Foch may receive instruction.”

M. Jules Cambon said that he had little information to add to that contained in the report just read. He had communicated to the members of the Liaison Committee the contents of the telegram received from the Allied Commission in Poland. In addition, General Le Rond, who had attended the meeting as the representative of Marshal Foch, had explained the military situation in Poland. General Le Rond had been asked whether General Haller’s troops could be sent to Poland by land by the southern route. He had replied in the negative, and insisted that the only possible route was the one by Dantzig. To proceed from Dantzig into Poland two lines of railways could be used: the Dantzig-Thorn line, and the Dantzig-Mlawa line. These two railway lines represented a length of some 160 miles, and would have to be militarily occupied. He (M. Cambon) used the word “occupation” to cover any means which might be devised for ensuring security. As a result of General Le Rond’s report, the Committee had reached the conclusion set forth in the report read by M. Pichon, as affording the only practical means of obtaining the desired result.

M. Pichon said that Marshal Foch might perhaps be able to give the general military point of view.

Marshal Foch said that to constitute Poland, an army must be sent. In order to send General Haller’s army, the Allies have reserved to themselves the right by the terms of the Armistice to use the Dantzig-Thorn railway line. That railway line was at present in the occupation of the Germans and therefore, though apparently unavailable for the free transportation of troops, it was in fact the only possible means of communication. Consequently, steps must be taken to make that route available, and only one measure was possible, namely: Allied military control of the line.

On the 11th January, 1919, the Military High Command had suggested to the Supreme War Council the occupation by Allied contingents of the railway lines in question. But the proposal had been rejected, and the Conference of the Great Powers had eventually decided to send an Allied Commission to Warsaw to enquire and report on the possible measures to be taken. So far no definite proposals had been submitted, and the only possible solution appeared to be the following: the eastern boundaries of Germany should forthwith be determined as a line passing to the west of the Thorn-Dantzig railway and at the next meeting with the Germans, they should be required to accept that frontier line and to withdraw their troops behind it. In that way free transit over the Dantzig railway lines would be obtained.

Mr. Balfour said he wished to put a question to Marshal Foch. On the 11th November, 1918, the Allies had obtained the right to use the railway line in question for the purpose of maintaining order in Poland. Consequently, the Germans had no right to take any action along the Dantzig-Thorn line, which would prevent the free exercise by the Allies of the rights granted them. It was therefore merely a case of making the original armistice effective. Consequently, he wished to enquire wherein the difficulty really lay.

On the other hand, he feared another difficulty might arise in connection with the transport of troops to Poland by sea. So far, no mention had been made of that question, either by M. Cambon, or in the report which had been submitted by the Polish Liaison Committee. He wished to enquire, therefore, what decision, if any, had been reached on that point.

M. Jules Cambon replied that the question had been discussed by the Polish Liaison Committee, but Sir William Tyrrell had pointed out that the question had already been studied by the Maritime Transport Council, whose report should be awaited.

Marshal Foch explained that in theory the Allies did possess the right to use the railway lines in question, but in practice a base would in the first place have to be established at Dantzig and, in order to establish a base, some territory would have to be occupied by the Allies. The Allies, however, were not, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, entitled to the occupation of any territory at Dantzig, and the Germans would only grant the request under compulsion. Furthermore, in order to transport the troops, trains would have to be secured, and those would have to be obtained from the Germans, who would probably express their inability to supply them. Finally, the passage of the trains along the railway line would have to be assured, and that implied the military occupation of the railway line. In a word, all these things were unrealisable unless effective occupation were undertaken.

That was the reason why the Military High Command had submitted in January last a proposal to the effect that Allied troops should be sent to that region to supervise all such works. But the Governments had refused.

Mr. Balfour found some difficulty in reconciling the various statements which had been made. Apparently it appeared to be possible to send Allied troops to Dantzig to occupy the town and the railway lines between Dantzig and Thorn without first establishing a base. That being the case, why could not the same thing be done by Polish troops? The Military experts agreed that Allied troops could be sent, followed by Polish troops. Why could not Polish troops be sent straight away?

Marshal Foch explained that it was evident the Germans would never dare to interfere with Allied troops for fear of energetic retaliatory measures on their western frontier. On the other hand the Germans would naturally raise very violent opposition to an occupation of the line by the Poles, with whom they were at war, especially in view of the fact that the Polish troops were not fully organised.

Mr. Balfour suggested, for the consideration of the military authorities, that a very small contingent of American, French, British and Italian troops should accompany General Haller’s forces. The Germans would then realise that any attack on these forces would immediately be followed by reprisals on their Western front.

Marshal Foch agreed that Mr. Balfour’s plan would no doubt help to make a start. But the best and most effective solution of the difficulty would be, as he had already stated, to fix straight away the Eastern frontiers of Germany, thus freeing the town of Dantzig and the railway lines leading from that port into Poland.

Mr. House stated that it would be necessary for the American representatives to discuss the whole question with General Bliss, and he suggested an adjournment.

Mr. Balfour agreed that the case should be postponed for two reasons. In the first place, it would be necessary to await the report of the Maritime Transport Council, and in the second place, for the reason given by Mr. House. In the face, therefore, of these military and naval reasons, an adjournment became inevitable; but he trusted the matter would be finally disposed of with as little delay as possible.

Sir William Tyrrell explained that General Le Rond had promised to submit a report relating to the transportation of the troops without delay, but, so far, the report in question had not been received.

M. Cambon said that he would undertake to obtain the report from General Le Rond for to-morrow’s meeting, if possible.

M. Pichon, summing up, said that there were two proposals before the Conference, namely:—

(1) Marshal Foch’s proposal to fix, as soon as possible, the temporary Eastern boundaries of Germany, and

(2) The immediate despatch of General Haller’s Army, provided necessary transportation could be made available.

(It was agreed to adjourn the consideration of these two questions to the Meeting to be held on the afternoon of Tuesday, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

5. M. Pichon suggested that the following questions should be discussed at the Meeting to be held on the following day:—

(1) Austrian Debt: Payment of Coupons due March 1st next. Agenda for Next Meeting

(2) Poland.

(3) Morocco: the Act of Algeciras.

Mr. Lansing enquired how the Moroccan question was to be presented, as it was of importance that his delegation should know what character the discussion would take.

M. Pichon said that a memorandum on this question had been circulated by the French Government, and read the following extract:—

“In the treaty of Peace with Germany, the settlement of the Moroccan question is of especial importance to France. France requests that in the articles of the Peace Treaty, there be stipulated: Firstly, the Repeal of the Algeciras convention imposed by Germany; Secondly, the necessary guarantees to make it impossible for Germany to resume the policy which she has for ten years pursued against France in Morocco.”

Mr. Lansing enquired what was meant by the words “imposed by Germany”. The Allied and Associated Powers had all participated in the Algeciras Conference and could hardly claim that its terms had been imposed on them by Germany.

(It was agreed that the following questions should be discussed at the Meeting to be held on Tuesday afternoon, 25th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.:—

(1) Austrian Debt: Payment of Coupons due March 1st next.

(2) Poland.

(3) Morocco: the Act of Algeciras.

(The Meeting then adjourned until Tuesday, February 25th, 1919, at 3 p.m.)

Appendix A (i)

Resolution No. I

(Relating to Germany)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Germany and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover inter alia the following points:—

(a) the approximate future frontiers of Germany, and the renunciation of colonies and territorial rights outside Europe;

(b) the financial conditions to be imposed on Germany;

(c) the economic conditions to be accorded to Germany;

(d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects, it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Germany.

Paris, 22 February, 1919.

Appendix A (ii)

Resolution No. II

(Relating to Austria-Hungary)

(As Amended—See I. C. 148 [BC–38], Minute 2)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Austria-Hungary and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The Preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover inter alia the following points:—

(a) the approximate future frontiers of Austria-Hungary and the renunciation of territorial rights outside Europe;

(b) the financial conditions to be imposed on Austria-Hungary;

(c) the economic conditions to be accorded to Austria-Hungary;

(d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects, it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Austria-Hungary.

Paris, 22nd February, 1919.

Appendix A (iii)

Resolution No. III

(Relating to Bulgaria)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Bulgaria and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions should inter alia cover the following points:—

(a) the approximate future frontiers of Bulgaria;

(b) the financial arrangements to be imposed on Bulgaria;

(c) the economic conditions to be accorded to Bulgaria;

(d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Bulgaria.

Paris, 22nd February, 1919.

Appendix A (iv)

Resolution No. IV

(Relating to Turkey)

1. The Conference agree that it is desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of preliminary Peace Terms with Turkey and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed.

2. The preliminary Peace Terms, other than the naval, military and air conditions, should cover inter alia the following points:—

(a) the approximate future frontiers of Turkey;

(b) the financial arrangements to be imposed on Turkey;

(c) the economic conditions to be accorded to Turkey;

(d) responsibility for breaches of the laws of war.

3. In order that the Conference may have at its disposal with the least possible delay the results of the labours of the various Commissions which have been investigating these subjects it is requested that the various Commissions will send in their reports to the Secretary-General not later than Saturday, March 8th. This will not apply to Commissions set up after February 15th which may be unable to render their final reports at so early a date, but it is requested that in these cases interim reports may be presented dealing with all matters affecting the preliminaries of peace with Turkey.

Paris, 22nd February, 1919.

Addendum

ALBANIAN CLAIMS

Statement by Tour an Pasha

Refer to Page 8,⁴ BC–38, Report for February 24, 1919

The Albanians base all their hopes on the justice of this High Assembly, on whom they rely utterly. They trust that the principle of nationality so clearly and solemnly proclaimed by President Wilson and his great Associates will not have been proclaimed in vain, and that their rights—which have, up to now, been trampled underfoot—will be respected by the Congress whose noble mission it is to dower humanity with a peace which, to be durable, must be based on right and justice.

It was the Congress of Berlin which first of all denied the rights of the Albanian nation. The reasons therefor are explained by the fact that Albania, unlike other Balkan nations, has never had any protectors, and also by Albania’s very advantageous geographical position, which has from time immemorial excited the cupidity of her neighbours.

The Treaty of Berlin⁵ deprived Albania of the territories of Antivari, Hoti, Grouda, Triopchi, Kichi, Podgoritza, Plava and Goussigne, to the benefit of Montenegro; and of a part of Southern Albania (Epirus) between the Gulf of Proveza and the Kalamas River, to the benefit of Greece. This flagrant injustice led the Albanians to form the Prizrend Patriotic League, which opposed the handing over of the territories of Plava, Goussigne, Hoti, and Grouda by force of arms. The Great Powers thereupon gave Montenegro the port of Dulcigne in compensation for those territories, which the Albanians retained. This compensation was carried out by means of a naval demonstration, well known under the name of “Dulcigne Naval Demonstration”.

In the south, the Prizrend League made the same energetic resistance. The International Commission which came to Preveza to carry out the transfer of Albanian territory to Greece met with popular resistance, and had to leave the country without fulfilling its ungrateful task. On the strength of its report, the Powers who had signed the Treaty of Berlin were obliged to acknowledge as Albanian the region which they had decided to cede to Greece, and fixed the Greek frontier at the Arta River.

The Treaty of Berlin has justly been called “Albania’s Funeral Treaty”. Nevertheless, the mutilations made by it might be called scratches, when compared with those later inflicted on Albania by the Conference of London of 1913. This Conference not only settled the Kalamas line (repudiated by the Albanians, as stated above), but also gave Greece the whole region from Arta to Cape Stilos. This region, which is known as the Chameria and is between 30 and 40 kilometres long, had a population of 63,000 before the Balkan War—40,000 being Albanians, 14,000 Christian Albanians, and 9,000 Greeks (or speaking Greek among themselves).

To the North, the Conference gave Montenegro and Serbia the territories of Kraya and Anamalit and the clans of Hoti and Grouda, the districts of Plava, Goussigne and Ipek, the Eastern part of the Mitrovitza district, the districts of Prichina, Guilan, Ferizovitch and Kachanik, part of the Uskub district, and the districts of Prizrend, Kalkandelen, Gostivar, Karcheva, Dibra, Strouga and Ochrida. The Albanian population of these districts, which are situated in the ancient vilayets of Kossova and Monastir, forms an 80% majority over the Slav elements. We therefore claim all these territories, which were torn from us by the Treaty of Berlin and the Conference of London of 1913.

Kossovo, also known as Old Serbia, has been inhabited by Albanians from time immemorial. The Serbs only appeared there in the 7th century, but could never establish their mastery owing to continual insurrections by the Albanians and to Bulgar rivalry.

Serbian preponderance in the Kossovo region has always been transitory, and in spite of Serbian oppression and persecution the large majority of its population has always been Albanian. The Serbian population which has penetrated there forms a minority of only 15%.

During the last few years and especially in 1910, 1911, and 1912, the Albanians attempted to regain their independence by insurrections. In 1912, 18,000 Albanians of Kossovo captured the town of Uskub after a desperate struggle against the Turkish Army, and compelled Turkey to grant them certain concessions.

The Ottoman Government was about to own the justice of Albanian aspirations by granting autonomous administration to part of Albania comprising the vilayets of Kossovo, Scutari and Yaninia, and part of the vilayet of Monastir. The Balkan States realised the weakness of a Turkey unable to subdue the Albanians, and feared the creation of an autonomous Albanian state in territory which they had long desired to possess. They therefore hastened to declare war against Turkey, and so the Albanians were unable to benefit by the concessions which they had won by armed force.

At the time of the territorial readjustment of the Balkans in 1913, our country was sacrificed for the sake of its neighbours, because the imminent danger of a European conflagration had to be averted at all costs. But now that the conflagration is over and the questions connected therewith are being settled by the triumph of the rights of nationalities, we are fully convinced that the rich districts which are wholly Albanian and as such necessary to the existence of Albania, will in justice be restored to their mother country.

Even though small foreign minorities must inevitably be included within the boundaries of the State of Albania, large groups of Albanians will, on the other hand, remain outside its boundaries.

The Conference is certain to appreciate the difference between our own legitimate desire for the return of brother Albanians to the Albanian family and the unjust claims of our neighbours, who, not content with having snatched from us so much wholly Albanian territory by force, now ask permission from the Congress to take yet more away.

Thus Greece claims the part of Southern Albania called Northern Epirus, arguing that it has a population of 120,000 Greeks and 80,000 Albanians. We dispute these figures, and maintain that the pro-Greek population of that region does not exceed 20,000 inhabitants. These 20,000 inhabitants live in the valley of Drinopoli and the plain (Vource) of Delvino; they are farmers who possess neither fields nor houses, but cultivate the land belonging to the Albanians.

It is also argued that all orthodox Albanians should be considered Greeks, regardless of nationality. This empty claim has naturally induced the Greek clergy to make their religion an instrument of oppression and tyranny.

The League of Prizrend had wrung from Turkey permission to open an Albanian school at Koritza; but the Greek clergy excommunicated orthodox parents who sent their children to this school, and denounced them to the Ottoman Government as conspirators against the State.

By this means they procured the deportation and imprisonment of many heads of Albanian families and led to the said school being closed.

As the Ottoman Government, for its part, brought the same pressure to bear on Mussulman parents to prevent them from sending their children to the Albanian school, the Greek clergy were in this instance allies of the Ottoman Government against patriotic Albanians.

Those who consider orthodox Albanians as Greeks urge that it would be unjust to attempt to subject a Christian majority, with a superior civilisation, to a Mussulman minority with an inferior civilisation.

There can be no question of a difference of civilisation between children of the same race who live together under the same conditions, speak the same language, and have the same customs. If orthodox Albanians have attended Greek schools, Mussulman and Catholic Albanians denied the right to be taught in their native tongue have, on the other hand, attended Turkish, French, Italian, English and American schools.

Much emphasis is laid on the Greek sympathies of orthodox Albanians. In contradiction to this we bring forward the opinion of Lord Hobhouse, who accompanied Lord Byron to Albania and at the beginning of the 19th century wrote as follows concerning the populations forming the Ottoman Empire:—

“Only the Albanians are conscious of nationality; all the other peoples of the Empire are grouped according to religion”.

Monsieur Aubaret, French delegate on the Commission for Eastern Roumelia, says in a Memorandum presented to the said Commission on August 13th, 1880:—

“They (the Albanians) live in complete unity; they are Albanian before everything else. If it is true that the Catholics are warmly attached to their religion, it is not less true that both they and their Mussulman fellow-countrymen value national consciousness, love of the soil and respect for old customs very highly, and put them before all other considerations.”

In “L’Illustration” of 7th April, 1917, M. Vaucher writes concerning the Koritza district:—

“Albania for the Albanians is the motto of all the inhabitants of this rich plain of Koritza …

“For two months (as a Republic) the Albanians have … shown that they are capable of living on good terms with one another. There are no more religious quarrels, for the excellent reason that there is nobody now to stir them up.”

Our opponents claim precisely that part of Albania which was burnt out by the Cretan bands of Zographos and disguised Greek soldiers under the command of Greek officers. This is clearly shown by the sketch which I have the honour to submit to you,⁶ and which gives the names of the villages concerned.

It is a curious fact that the Greeks set fire to precisely those villages which they considered and still consider Greek. On this subject M. Vaucher, correspondent of “L’Illustration,” writes:—

“The whole region of Kolonia has been laid waste since Greek bands passed through it in 1913. Names marked on the map are merely memories, for in reality they are only represented by shapeless ruins marking the site of Mussulman villages.”

The Greeks are probably claiming Northern Epirus in order to intimidate the Albanians and make them renounce their just claim to Southern Epirus and especially to the Chameria district, which is essentially Albanian.

At a time when our opponents maintain that the orthodox Albanians of Northern Epirus desire to be united to Greece, the Vlachs of Pindus (who, nevertheless, have experienced Greek rule) are asking for union with Albania. How can these two desires be reconciled?

How can one admit that the Albanians wish to disown their fellow-countrymen, when a foreign community like the Vlachs, which has lived under Greek rule, asks nothing better than to be united to Albania?

Taught by suffering, Albania in her reconstituted form will feel it incumbent upon her to live in perfect unity, in a spirit of wide tolerance, and she will allow foreign minorities all rights granted to them by the most civilised countries.

The southern boundary line of Albania seems to have been drawn by nature; it is the chain of the Gramos and Pindus mountains. This is the only boundary corresponding to the defensive and economic requirements of a country as weak as Albania.

If Albania had been free to act, she would certainly have offered to help the Allies by every means in her power. Until the country was invaded by the enemy she put all available resources at the disposal of the Allies, by helping and feeding Serbian troops during their retreat through Albanian territory.

This help given to Serbian troops gains a new significance in view of the atrocities and systematic massacres perpetrated on the Albanian population of Kossovo by those same Serbian troops during and after the Balkan wars. They also burnt numerous Albanian villages, as all European press correspondents reported at the time.

The Albanians were of the greatest assistance to the Italian and French troops after their arrival in Albania, and furthermore refused to form auxiliary Albanian corps in Southern Albania, in spite of all the promises made them by Austria and a Balkan State.

The Conference desires to lay the foundations of a lasting peace. There can be no such peace in the Balkans unless the rights of nationalities are respected.

If, for instance, the Congress, contrary to this principle, were to confirm the dismemberment so unfortunately effected in 1878 and 1913, the country would never enjoy the peace which is essential to its economic development. Such a proceeding would, moreover, give rise to periodical crises in Greece and Serbia, neither of which could absorb an Albanian majority so proud of its independence and so deeply attached to its national traditions. Such a situation would stir up continual disturbances along the frontiers of the Albanian State.

The excesses and massacres suffered by the Albanian populations inhabiting districts annexed by the above-named States give just cause to fear the fate in store for them, and their only hope of peace would be emigration or death.

The probable fate recalls the words of Tacitus: “Ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant”.

1. See ante, p. 83.
2. It appears as an addendum, p. 111.
3. Polish army in France.
4. See minute 3, p. 104.
5. Foreign Relations, 1878, p. 895.
6. Not filed with the minutes.