Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/34

HD–34

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, August 20, 1919, at 3:30 p.m.

Paris, August 20, 1919, 3:30 p.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk.
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison.
  • British Empire
    • The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.
  • Secretaries
    • Mr. H. Norman.
    • Sir George Clerk.
  • France
    • M. Pichon.
  • Secretaries
    • M. Berthelot.
    • M. de St. Quentin.
  • Italy
    • M. Tittoni.
  • Secretary
    • M. Paterno.
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui,
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai.

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Captain Chapin.
British Empire	Captain E. Abraham.
France	Captain A. Portier.
Italy	Lt. Colonel Jones.
Interpreter—M. Demolon

1. Mr. Balfour said that he had received a telegram from the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, asking whether, in view of the appointment of a Greek Colonel as a consultative member of the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna, an Ottoman Colonel might be admitted on the same footing. Mr. Balfour asked whether he was authorised by the Council to reply in the affirmative. Attachment of Turkish Officer to Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna

(It was agreed that in view of the resolution taken on August 14th (H. D. 31, Minute 3¹) Mr. Balfour should reply that similar facilities to those afforded to the Greek representative should be granted to the Turkish representative on the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna.)

2. Mr. Balfour said that the position in the Baltic States was very surprising. He had prepared a summary of the reports received from Reval. He thought it might be of interest to the Council to have this report read. Situation in the Baltic States

The following Report was then read:—

“On August 14th after negotiations in which the French, British and American representatives appear to have taken a prominent part, a North-Western Government for the provinces of Pskoff, Novgorod, and Petrograd was formed. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs is Lianosov and General Yudenitch is Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief. General Rodzianko as acting Commander of the North-Western Army accepted this Government.

The Government proclaimed its intention of convoking a Congress of Representatives of the people in order to base itself on democratic principles. It was decided to establish the Headquarters of the Government at Reval, the reason being that the majority of its members feared that if they went to Pskoff their lives would be in danger from Balahovich, the former Commander of the Russian North-Western Corps, who might attempt a coup d’état.

The Government, which proclaimed itself as ‘a group acting as an independent government in the North-Western provinces as part of a united Russia’ proceeded to make a declaration of which the following were the principal points

(a) that they assumed complete responsibility for deciding all provincial questions;

(b) that they requested financial assistance as well as stores and equipment from the Allied and Associated Governments;

(c) that they requested the immediate help of the Esthonian Government with armed forces to liberate Petrograd as well as the rest of the Petrograd, Pskoff and Novgorod Governments from the Bolsheviks;

(d) that they requested the French, British and American representatives to obtain from their Governments the recognition of complete Esthonian independence;

(e) that they proposed to open negotiations with the Esthonian Government at once in order to obtain an outlet to the sea through Esthonian ports and to regulate commercial relations between the two countries;

(f) that they were informing the Supreme Russian Government of Koltchak of the decisions taken by them and were confident that he would appreciate the necessities of the situation.

As soon as this declaration was issued, the French, British and American representatives at Reval together presented to the Esthonian Government a note from General Gough urging co-operation with the Russian North-Western Government and stating that the Esthonian claim to complete independence would be represented to the Allied and Associated Governments.

The Esthonian Government have returned a formal reply, to the effect that they are unable to co-operate with the Russians as requested until the Allies recognise full Esthonian independence.

General Gough reports that unless this is given at once the collapse of the Russian Army may be expected and it will be impossible to control the situation. He also considers that the new Government should receive immediate support.”

M. Berthelot said that the French Government had received similar information. The Esthonian Government did not merely require recognition as an independent Government, but also material assistance in arms and money—the financial aid amounting to 600 millions of francs.

M. Tittoni said that he had read in a newspaper that General Balahovich together with the Bolshevik force which he commanded, had gone over to the Esthonians and had proceeded to Pskoff. This appeared to corroborate the information received by Mr. Balfour.

M. Berthelot said that this General had always played an ambiguous part. He could not be seriously trusted by any side.

Mr. Polk asked from what source Mr. Balfour had received his news.

Mr. Balfour said he had received his information on the previous day, after the meeting.

M. Pichon said that he had also received similar news on the previous evening.

Mr. Balfour said that the most noticeable feature of the news was that the French, British and American representatives seemed for the last week to have been engaged in fostering a coup d’état without consulting with their own Governments.

Mr. Polk said that there was no American representative in the Baltic authorised to act on behalf of the American Government. There was an American General associated with General Gough, and also an officer employed on relief work. The General had lately been telegraphed to, that he must take no part in local politics. The Allied Missions in the Baltic were composed of representatives who acted independently. They were not subject to the orders of General Gough.

M. Pichon said that he thought the conference had placed General Gough in command of the Allied representatives.

Mr. Polk observed that although General Gough was the senior officer, he was not in command.

M. Tittoni said that the Allied representatives might have argued that as the Conference had recognised Admiral Koltchak in order that he might fight the Bolsheviks, they were justified in recognising any other Russian organization with a similar purpose.

M. Pichon suggested that Mr. Balfour should ask General Gough to send supplementary information.

Mr. Balfour observed that General Gough had discreetly gone on leave. The really practical difficulty was that the Esthonians were, in a manner, putting a pistol at the Head of the Council. If they came to terms with the Bolshevists, there was no further hope of fighting Bolshevism in that area. They were threatening to do so. In other words, they were attempting methods of blackmail in order to be recognised and assisted with money and arms. General Gough informed the Council that failing recognition of the Esthonian Government, disaster would inevitably overtake the North-Western Russian Armies.

M. Berthelot pointed out that the Esthonians had been employing the same tactics for the last six months.

M. Balfour said that he thought the Council could do very little. He would enquire, however, what the British Government proposed to do regarding General Gough.

M. Tittoni said that Admiral Koltchak might be asked whether he would recognise the independence of Esthonia. He had already been asked to recognise its autonomy. With this the Esthonians were not satisfied.

M. Berthelot said that Admiral Koltchak would never recognise the independence of Esthonia. Admiral Koltchak had, hitherto, refused to recognise the independence of Finland. In any case, the Baltic provinces were necessary to Russia as an outlet to the sea.

Mr. Balfour observed that the second item on the Agenda, namely, ‘Allied Policy in the Baltic States,’ was connected with the topic under discussion. He had prepared on this subject a proposal which he begged to submit to the Council:—

“The Baltic Commission are requested to submit to the Council a declaration of Allied and Associated policy with regard to the international position of the Baltic States, in the place of the draft declaration considered, but not accepted, by the Council on July 26th.²

This declaration should be framed in strict accordance with the relevant portion of the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Koltchak on May 27,³ which, unless and until other arrangements are made, must be regarded as the governing document in all their transactions. The declaration should therefore provide in the first place that, unless an agreement is speedily reached between these States and Russia, a settlement will be made by the Allied and Associated Powers, in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations; and, in the second place that pending such settlement these States shall be recognised as autonomous, and fully competent to enter into relations with the Allied and Associated Governments.”

M. Berthelot observed that every time the autonomy of the Baltic States was mentioned, these States were exasperated, as they continually asked for independence. He thought it was desirable to try and find a slightly different formula.

Mr. Balfour said that the expressions used had been borrowed almost textually from the letter addressed by the Conference to Admiral Koltchak.

Mr. Polk said he understood the draft to be an instruction to the Baltic Commission.

Mr. Balfour said that this was so. The Baltic Commission was inclined to recognise the independence of the Baltic States. It did not keep in mind the larger policy of the Conference. He thought this draft would remind them of the wider aspect of the question.

Mr. Polk said that provided the Baltic Commission was being asked merely to submit a resolution for discussion by the Council, he would agree.

Mr. Balfour said this was all that was proposed.

(The draft instruction above quoted was then adopted.)

3. General Weygand explained the Report on the evacuation of Latvia by the Germans, prepared by Marshal Foch. (Appendix A.) He observed that the note was prepared exclusively from a military point of view. As regards General von der Goltz, the German Government had replied that they could not admit the right of the Conference to demand the recall of the General. Nevertheless there was news that he was at Mittau, on his way to Berlin. It was not yet clear whether he had been recalled or whether he was on his way to consult the German Government. As to the evacuation of the German troops by sea, he thought the German allegations were wrong. The operation was really possible and could only be settled locally by General Gough. As to evacuation by land, the German reasons were equally bad. The British, as far as he knew, had never promised to furnish engines. This question also could be settled locally. As to removal of material by the Germans, the Allied and Associated Powers had authority under the Armistice to forbid it. The conclusion was that of the five things asked for, only one, namely, the stoppage of reinforcements, had been agreed to by the German Government, although the Poles said that the agreement was not being fulfilled. As to the recall of General von der Goltz, the situation was not clear. As regards the remaining three, the Allies had a right to enforce their demands and General Gough was in a position to obtain satisfaction. Evacuation of Latvia by the Germans

Mr. Balfour asked whether the Allies had any right to make one particular German evacuate Latvia before any other.

General Weygand admitted that the Allies had no right to make a special case. However, General von der Goltz was undoubtedly the source of all the trouble, and he was every now and then disavowed by the German Government. In any case, the interpretation of his movements was not clear, and the matter remained in suspense.

M. Pichon said that according to the French representative at Helsingfors, General von der Goltz had certainly gone to Berlin.

(The conclusions of Marshal Foch’s Note, (Appendix A) were adopted and it was decided that General Gough should be asked by Marshal Foch to obtain the execution of the demands contained therein, with the exception of the recall of General von der Goltz, pending further information regarding that officer.)

4. M. Pichon said that he had obtained confirmation of the news communicated on the previous day regarding Silesia. He caused to be read a report of a speech by Chancellor Bauer before the German National Assembly. (See Appendix B.) In addition to the German version, he had received from M. Zamoiski⁴ the Polish version. (See Appendix C.) M. Zamoiski was of the opinion that unless the Allies intervened with troops, the situation would go from bad to worse. M. Pichon had told him that intervention in German territory was a very serious step, and that the Council had asked for further information. He had also told him that the Germans were to be informed that unless they could control the situation it might be necessary to intervene. Situation in Silesia

Mr. Balfour said that he had received a telegram from Sir Percy Wyndham,⁵ of which the following was the most significant passage:—

“Polish Foreign Office informed me this morning position considered very serious, and Government is afraid German regular army will invade Poland, and time has come when it will be impossible to resist the popular demand for intervention by Polish troops. Immediate outbreaks expected in Warsaw if this is not done. Deputation from Upper Silesia has arrived at Warsaw to bring pressure on Polish Government to above effect. Matters appear to be serious, and situation would be eased if Polish Government could be informed that the Allied Powers are bringing pressure to bear on German authorities.”

He proposed, subject to the approval of the Council, to send the following reply:—

“Evidently Germans have both the right and the duty of maintaining order in Upper Silesia until Treaty is ratified. In these circumstances the Poles would be breaking the Treaty if they send troops into the disturbed area except on German invitation.

We shall endeavour without delay to send Allied representatives to the disturbed area, who will report to the Council, and may be able to act as a moderating influence on the spot.

If we can by negotiation hasten the date at which the Inter-Allied Commission take charge of the plebiscite area, we will do so.

The interest both of Poland and of all Central Europe urgently requires that work should at once be resumed in the mines; that order should be maintained; and that the Polish population should be patient during the very few weeks which still separate them from the date of the German evacuation.

You should inform your Allied colleagues of this telegram, which has been sent after discussion at Supreme Council.”

This reply contained two practical proposals. The first to send representatives to Upper Silesia. Representatives of the Coal Commission were already being sent. It might be possible to attach a civilian mission not specifically concerned with coal. The second was that the Conference would attempt to negotiate with Germany, in order to hasten the date at which the Allied Commissioners should take charge of the plebiscite zone. In this connection it might be remembered that the German Government had forwarded a demand from the inhabitants of Danzig that the date of the separation of the town from the German State should be hastened. If the Germans favoured this in Danzig, they might be willing to show a similar spirit in regard to Upper Silesia. (The German note referred to was Note No. 5 of the 16th August. W. C. P. 1246.)

M. Pichon said that he sympathised with the proposals suggested by Mr. Balfour, but he must point out that it would be meeting the desires of the Poles. It would appear that the Polish workmen had brought about the strikes in Upper Silesia, with the purpose of rendering Allied intervention necessary.

Mr. Polk said that he had learnt from Mr. Hoover that he was conducting negotiations with the German Government regarding the coal supply. It might be possible to take advantage of this to ask Mr. Hoover to bring the situation of the Silesian coalfields to the notice of the German Government.

(It was agreed that the Coal Commission might urge the German Government to agree to an early holding of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia as a means of improving the coal supply for the coming winter.

It was further agreed that Mr. Balfour should send the telegram to Sir Percy Wyndham above quoted. The telegram drafted by General Weygand and sent to General Dupont in accordance with the decision of the previous day (H. D. 33, Minute 4⁷), was approved. (See Appendix D.)

5. General Belin explained the revised Naval, Military and Air Clauses prepared by the Military Representatives at Versailles. (See Appendix E.) He stated that the only matter on which there was no definite conclusion was the number of men Hungary was to be allowed to keep under arms. The Military Representatives had attempted to act in accordance with the instructions of the Council, given on the 8th August, 1919. (See H. D. 27, Min. 10.⁸) Various figures had been suggested, the two extreme figures being 45,000 and 18,000 men. The Military Representatives had suggested 35,000 as a compromise, and this was the only matter in which the clauses now proposed differed from the clauses inserted in the Treaty with Austria. Military, Naval and Air Clauses for Treaty of Peace With Hungary

M. Pichon said that on the matter of the number of men to be kept under arms in Hungary, he must reserve his decision pending the return of M. Clemenceau. With this exception he was prepared to accept the clauses drafted by the Military Representatives.

(Subject to the French reservation regarding the number of men to be maintained under arms in Hungary, the Articles proposed by the Military Representatives at Versailles, (see Appendix E) were accepted.)

6. The Council had before them draft replies to the German Delegation, prepared by the Committee for the Organization of the Reparations Commission, regarding:—

(a) Calculation of damages in the territories devastated by the war. Replies to the German Delegation

(b) Restitution of topographical plans of the mines of Costeplatz.

(The proposed replies, (see Appendices F. and G.) were accepted.)

7. M. Pichon said that on the previous day he and Mr. Polk had had a conversation regarding the demand of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to be heard on the subject of the reparations due from Bulgaria. They had both agreed that it was desirable to accede to their request. (See Appendix H.)Demand of Serbo-Croat Slovene Delegation To Be Heard on the Financial & Reparations Clauses in the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria

M. Tittoni said that he sympathised with the request, but he thought the objection was that it created a precedent. There was no doubt that interested parties should always be heard before a decision affecting them was taken. But in this case the matter had been fully discussed and all the Serbian arguments had been heard. It was needless to have these arguments repeated, and unless the Serbians had anything new to allege, it was an undesirable precedent, tending to call into question decisions of the Council already made.

Mr. Polk said that the Serbian delegates thought that they would be discredited at home, if they failed to obtain a hearing from the so-called Supreme Council. He quite agreed that it was undesirable to hear a restatement of old arguments, but he did not wish the delegates to return to their country with a sense of humiliation. He thought that they might be required, in accordance with Mr. Tittoni’s proposal, to confine themselves in their arguments to any errors or omissions there might be in the Treaty.

M. Pichon said that he supported Mr. Polk’s views. Apart from the desire to show courtesy to the Serbians, he thought it was advisable to avoid incidents similar to those which had taken place previously. Before the Treaty was communicated to the Bulgarians it would be necessary to communicate it to a plenary session of the Conference. On a previous occasion M. Bratiano had caused a disagreeable incident at a Plenary Session.⁹ By pacifying the Serbian Delegation before hand, it might be possible to avoid a repetition of a similar incident.

Mr. Balfour said that he found himself in a difficulty. He understood Mr. Polk’s views and sympathised with them, but he did not know what had taken place in the previous stages of the discussion regarding reparation due to Serbia. He believed that the Serbians would demand the restitution of a larger number of cattle, cows, pigs, etc., than was allowed to them. But all nations had similar claims to make, and they could rarely be satisfied. If the Serbians were to be heard, the Roumanians would demand a hearing. The Roumanian case against Hungary at the present time, was based on a claim for restitution of what had been stolen from Roumania. The Allies, however, were saying to the Roumanians that they could not recoup their losses, and that they must take their share with the rest of the Allies. The Portuguese too had a sense of grievance and would, if they heard of this, repeat their demand for representation on the Reparations Commission. It would take up a good deal of the time of the Conference to hear a restatement of the claims of all the aggrieved nations. If the Serbians could be confined to a statement of the points on which in their opinion the Commissions had gone wrong he would be content, but he was afraid that it would be difficult to restrict them sufficiently.

Mr. Tittoni said that a compromise appeared possible. M. Pichon on behalf of the Conference might be deputed to listen to all the Serbians might have to say.

M. Pichon said that he thanked Mr. Tittoni, but felt that the Serbians would not be satisfied. He had already heard them and knew what they had to say. He did not think that anything they could bring forward would alter the decision greatly in their favour. If they were refused a hearing, however, he thought that a curt answer should not be sent them, but that a reply should be made giving in full the reasons for the point of view adopted by the Conference. In substance the Serbian complaint fell under two headings, (a) Insufficient restitution of cattle; (b) Exclusion from membership of the Reparations Commission in Bulgaria.

M. Berthelot said that Serbia was an agricultural country and could not revive without regaining her cattle. France and Italy had been partially invaded, and partially despoiled of cattle; Serbia had been entirely overrun and entirely despoiled.

(At this point Col. Peel entered the room.)

Mr. Balfour explained the above discussion to Col. Peel.

Col. Peel said that if the Serbians were allowed to present their case, the Greeks and Roumanians would ask to do likewise. A similar situation would arise with regard to Hungary. He quite agreed that the Serbians had suffered extreme hardship, but it was not the Serbians who were presenting this claim, but the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State. Two-thirds of this new state had been our enemies in the war, and probably contained quantities of cattle, some of them looted from the Allied countries. What the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation wanted was far more than could possibly be granted. They wanted the Treaty with Bulgaria to be on the lines of the Treaty with Germany. He could see no objection, however, to the hearing of the Delegation if they had anything new to say, which they had not previously urged.

(It was agreed that M. Pichon should reply to the request of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Delegation to the effect that their request could not be accepted for the various reasons given in the above discussion. If, however, the Delegation had any new facts or arguments to bring forward, the Council would be pleased to receive them, and then to decide whether or not a hearing was desirable.)

8. Mr. Polk said that he had received the following telegram:—

“In the Sessions of August 18, the Commission heard Admiral Horthy, Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Forces. He gave information as to the resources on which he counts in organising these forces. They seemed to consist chiefly of officers. He thinks that the Roumanians are influenced by the Bolshevists. He thinks that the workmen have still many concealed arms. He calls attention to the considerable requisitions effected by the Roumanians. The Commission summons for the 19th the General commanding the Roumanian forces or his representative. He will indicate the measures that he has taken, with a view to respecting the indications of the verbal note of August 16. He will make it known whether these measures are being carried out, especially concerning requisitions. Situation in Hungary

Interallied Military Commission.”

In this connection he had a proposal to make, which he would not ask the Council to accept at once, but which he would ask his colleagues to consider (see Appendix I).

9. Mr. Polk said that the American officer in touch with the Austrian Delegation informed him that the Delegation when it received the final answer of the Conference, proposed to take the terms back to Vienna to submit them to the Austrian Assembly. It was further said that in all probability should no alterations be made in the territorial frontiers laid down for Austria, and especially should a plebiscite in Styria be denied, Dr. Renner would not be authorised by the Assembly to sign the peace. He would be forced to resign and a change of Government would result. Intentions of Austrian Delegation

(The Meeting then adjourned.)

Villa Majestic, Paris, 20 August, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–34

Translation

August 18, 1919.

commander-in-chief of the allied armies
general staff, 3rd section
general headquarters

From: The Marshal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

To: President Clemenceau.

Subject: The evacuation of Latvia by the Germans.

In its telegram of June 18 (Document No 1)¹⁰ the Supreme Council requested the German Government to begin as soon as possible the evacuation of all territories which had before the war formed part of the former Russian Empire, according to the stipulations of Article XII of the Armistice of November 11, 1918.

Later, General Gough was charged in the name of the Entente with arranging with the regional German authorities the conditions of this evacuation and with insuring the control of it.

On July 21 this general reported¹¹ the impossibility of arriving at an understanding with General von der Goltz, whose policy of intrigue and evasion tended only to retarding to the maximum the execution of the measures of evacuation, and to finishing the seizure of Latvia by the Germans.

To remedy this situation, General Gough proposed:

a) the immediate recall of General von der Goltz,

b) the carrying out of the evacuation by sea,

c) the completion of the transportation by August 30,

d) to forbid the Germans to move any war material in Latvia without previous authorization.

e) the cessation of all German reinforcements sent into Latvia.

These propositions, accepted by the Supreme Council, were sent to the German Government for execution on August 1 (Document No. 2).

The German Government has replied to this notification in a Note dated August 13 (Document No. 3), in which it discusses and finally rejects, almost in their totality, the decisions of the Supreme Council.

The point of view of the German Government, as well as the remarks it calls for, are set forth herewith:

a) Recall of General von der Goltz.

The German Government represents this recall as “an attempt on the power of command of the German military authorities.”

It is, in fact, a measure of a special character, and which, as the German Government remarks, can not be exacted by invoking Article XII of the Armistice of November 11.

But this measure is necessary.

General von der Goltz is the soul of the resistance to the decisions of the Entente. It was he that organized the coup d’état against the Ulmannis Government, faithful to the cause of the Allies.

Beaten on this ground, he tried to reestablish the situation. All his efforts tend to maintain himself in the country at least till after harvest, in order to send it into Germany, then to install himself definitively in Curland^*.

To this end:

He continues to bring in reinforcements (40,000 men in Curland)^†, in spite of the prohibition against sending new contingents into Latvia;

In spite of the orders of his Government, he is incorporating his elements in the Russian Bermont corps, after having acted in the same way in regard to the detachment of Prince Lieven. He even announces that he will favor the passage of entire German formations into the Russian troops at the moment that the evacuation is finished;

He is granting leaves of three years to German soldiers who desire to settle in the country;

At the same time, he is organizing Bolshevist propaganda at Riga, in order to create new pretexts for intervention;

Finally, in his relations with General Gough, he incessantly eludes discussion, and insolently refuses to allow any control on the part of the mandatory of the Allied Powers (Document No. 4, bis).

In short, General von der Goltz is pursuing in Latvia and Curland a very clear policy of German expansion, doubtless with the secret approval of his Government.

While appearing to accept the principle of evacuation, he is managing to reinforce his effectives, to get his hands on the Russian local formations and to insinuate himself into the interior affairs of the country, thus consolidating the situation and the prestige of Germany in Latvia.

He personifies clearly the German policy of duplicity.

All the Allied Representatives are of the opinion that his immediate recall is necessary, as a measure of prime importance.

This recall had already been laid down in principle, under certain conditions, by the Allied Powers, as early as May 28 (Document No. 9, telegram 2726 of May 28).

None of these conditions having been fulfilled, the Powers renewed their request on August 1.

They obtained only a dilatory reply.

It is necessary, taking for basis the facts that have been set forth above, to exact categorically that the recall of General von der Goltz be ordered without delay.

b) Evacuation by Sea.

This method of evacuation has been demanded by General Gough; General von der Goltz declares it to be impossible. This is a question of modality, which demands only a new examination by the Inter-Allied Mission at Riga, and which must be settled on the ground. What is important, in fact, is that the evacuation be assured, as rapidly as possible by all possible means: maritime or land.

On the subject of this question of the evacuation the German Government, revealing the plan that it has formed for colonizing Latvia, recalls the promise made by the Ulmannis cabinet to grant to German volunteers the right to settle in Latvia; it protests against violation of this promise and declines in advance all responsibility for dangers that may result from it.

The Lettish Government has settled this claim in a letter signed by its minister of Foreign Affairs, Herr Meierevitcs, addressed to the German Chargé d’Affaires in Latvia (Document No. 10).

There is no necessity therefore to consider this last question.

c) Plan of Evacuation To Be Submitted Before August 15—Time Limit of Evacuation Fixed From August 15 to 30.

The German Government declares it impossible to present a detailed plan of evacuation, and to complete the repatriation by August 30, since it does not know the number of locomotives to be put at its disposal, which, it says, have been promised by the English.

Now, no promise of this sort has been made, to my knowledge, by the British Government.

Moreover, this absence of locomotives would be one more reason for carrying out the repatriation by sea, as General Gough demands.

However this may be, this situation in no wise prevents the drawing up of a general plan, fixing the order of urgency for the removal of the various elements.

The development of this plan, as well as the time limits for the carrying out of the repatriation, will be determined as a function of the means, maritime or land, at the disposal of the Germans, as soon as an agreement on the subject of these means shall have been reached between General Gough and the German regional command, as indicated in S b¹² above.

Subject to this condition, the decisions of the Entente are then to be maintained on this point.

d) Prohibition To Move War Material in Latvia Without Authorization—Obligation To Give Information on the Emplacement of Food and Material Stores.

The German Government protests against this requirement, which it claims is based on no provision of the Armistice of November 11.

Now, on one hand, Article XIV provides:

“the immediate cessation by the German troops of all requisition, seizure, or compulsory measure with a view to procuring resources destined for Germany, in Rumania or Russia within their limits of August 1, 1914”.

On the other hand, numerous sources of information (see especially Document No. 11, letter No. 2725 of May 28) have already revealed that the Germans, in the course of the evacuation, were carrying out of the Baltic countries important resources, notably railway material, and were proceeding to the destruction and removal of electric installations and communications.

If the Germans have the right, in the present circumstances, to carry off their war material, it falls within the competency of General Gough, nevertheless, to verify what they send away, to assure himself that no material and no resource are levied on the evacuated countries.

It is under the heading of this verification that the dispositions mentioned in paragraph d must be maintained.^‡

e) Prohibition To Send Any Reinforcements Into Latvia.

The German Government accepts this provision.

Nevertheless it is true that at last news German troops were still being sent to Mitau (see Documents No. 7 and No. 8).

Conclusions

From the preceding it results that the provisions covered by paragraphs b, c, and d, above, must be maintained, subject to supplementary instructions to be given to General Gough with a view to settling, in accord with the German regional command, the question of means of transport in effecting the evacuation, and that of the time limits for the execution of it, which depends directly on the first question.

But the essential conditions of a rapid and complete evacuation is still the immediate recall of General von der Goltz.

Experience proves that this measure cannot be obtained by new injunctions transmitted in the usual form, in the name of an armistice already old, and whose provisions cannot be invoked in this particular case.

The recall of General von der Goltz is before all a measure of a political nature. For this reason it necessitates a direct action of the Allied Governments with the German Government.

I have the honor to request that energetic steps be taken to this effect, without delay, and directly by the Supreme Council with the German representatives at Versailles.

Annex B to HD–34

Berlin, August 19, 1919—5:50 p.m.

[Note From the French Representative at Berlin (Haguenin)]

[Translation]¹³

The pan-German newspapers represent the situation in Upper Silesia as very grave. Word comes from Kattowitz in the paper Der Abend (August 19) that the districts of Kattowitz and Myslowitz remain in the hands of the Government’s troops; aside from that the whole district of Kattowitz is in the possession of the insurgents. Yesterday numerous conflicts took place in the region of Rosdzin, Schoppinitz, Janow, Gieschewald with bands armed with machine guns and well supplied with ammunition; these latter have in places succeeded in dispersing the troops of the Reichswehr. It was necessary to bring up strong reinforcements from Kattowitz and from [Myslowitz?]. This afternoon Chancellor Bauer made the following statement before the National Assembly on the subject of the situation in Upper Silesia:

“In opposition to the efforts of the Governments which were trying to establish neighborly relations between Prussia and Poland, Polish agitators in Upper Silesia have attempted to provoke an armed insurrection The most alarming news has been spread regarding this matter; I am happy to be able to announce that it is in large measure exaggerated and that the situation is appreciably better than one might have believed at first. The Government has received the following official report. The Commanding General is completely master of the situation in Upper Silesia. The Poles who participated in the movement are defeated or prisoners. Other military measures are being carried out. The only region occupied by the Poles on August 18 was that situated to the northeast of the Benthen-Kattowitz line. It is the only place where regular Polish troops have passed the frontier. It has been established that the revolt which broke out near Myslowitz is also the work of Polish bands. There are among the Poles nationalist groups who fear that a plebiscite would not turn out to their advantage, and who for that reason wish to create at any cost an accomplished fact. We shall have the duty of opposing such attempts, and of taking such action that Upper Silesia may be able to make its choice freely and impartially. We are pleased to state that the Polish Government is absolutely a stranger to this affair and that the Polish troops have taken no part in it. I believe that this declaration will contribute appreciably toward producing an appeasement in Upper Silesia.”

Haguenin

Annex C to HD–34

[Translation¹⁴]

[Statement on the Situation in Silesia by the Polish Minister at Paris (Zamoiski)]

With the object of creating a strong army the Germans are carrying out an energetic mobilization. The Spartacist disorders are intentionally exaggerated to serve as a pretext to the Allies for reinforcing the German Army.

In principle, armies are being made ready which, if an occasion offered, might move against Poland and the Allies while keeping in the background the German Government, whom these armies would ostensibly refuse to obey.

Moreover, in Upper Silesia, according to the express statements of the chief of Section of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government is ready to furnish, for the promotion of action in preparation for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, a sum of a billion marks. Twenty millions are set aside for the corruption of the Allied officers of the armies of occupation; a special political committee has received from the German Government the sum of 500 million marks to pay out to the voters during the plebiscite.

The German campaign against the reunion of Upper Silesia with Poland makes use principally of the following points:

a) Poland must pay off the Russian debt.

b) Upper Silesia must meet the German debt and also of course the Polish debt.

c) The Germans would give autonomy to Upper Silesia, Poland would never grant it.

d) The anti-Semitic organization in Berlin is spreading the idea that in Poland the Jews have the benefit of exceptional laws, and that their influence is greater than that of the Christians.

As regards the state of mind prevailing in the territories subject to the plebiscite, it may be said in general that those Germans who are included among the intellectuals, the employes of private institutions, the landed proprietors, the merchants lean toward the side of Poland.

Finally, it is important to note that troops are being moved from Berlin to the railway stations nearest to Upper Silesia.

Annex D to HD–34

[Translation¹⁵]

Allied General Headquarters, August 19, 1919.

Code telegram

From Marshal Foch, Commander in Chief, Allied Armies

To General Dupont, Chief of the French Military Mission in Berlin

No. 3972

Following is a telegram addressed to you by Minister for Foreign Affairs:

(1) The Supreme Council of the Allies is informed that the strike movement reported in Upper Silesia, has degenerated into armed insurrection, that the insurgent workingmen have seized Kattowitz, Pless, Bujakow, Jedlin, Cechow [Chechlau?], after having disarmed the German troops of the Grenzschutz; that the work in the mines has completely stopped, as well as movements by rail.

This insurrection seems to imply responsibility on the part of the Germans who are operating against the Poles, arresting and shooting workingmen whom they accuse of supporting a Spartacist movement.

The whole of Central Europe depends upon this region for coal, and it is necessary that order be restored there, and that the work in the mines be resumed, under pain of the most serious complications in all countries dependent on it.

(2) The only means to that end would be the immediate occupation of the disturbed regions by Allied troops, but no clause of the armistice would justify this immediate occupation, which only the coming into force of the treaty of peace would authorize in a regular manner.

(3) This situation has been considered by the Supreme Council which is of opinion:—

a) That the outbreaks in Upper Silesia are going to deprive all the neighboring states of coal, that the Council cannot be indifferent, and that it may be impelled to ask the Polish Government to reduce or even eventually to cut off the shipments of coal intended for delivery to Germany.

b) That the maintenance of order in a region which must presently undergo a plebiscite, falls upon Germany, and failing that, in order that it may be directly assured, immediately upon the Allies by anticipation of the treaty.

(4) These advices are given you for your personal information.

(5) The Supreme Council instructs you:—

a) To inform it fully on the present situation in Upper Silesia.

b) To indicate to it your feeling regarding the practical measures which might be taken without meeting direct opposition from the German Government, perhaps even in accord with it, in order to remedy the situation at once without incurring any danger for the Polish population.

The Supreme Council authorizes you, in making inquiries, to use the information in the present telegram, if you consider it opportune.

S. Pichon

You are requested to forward reply with utmost despatch.

P. O. /General Staff

Georges

Appendix E to HD–34

SWC–454 (MR–80)

British Section, Supreme War Council, 12. 8. 19.

CONDITIONS OF PEACE (HUNGARY)

Revised Military, Naval and Air Clauses

Military, Naval and Air Clauses

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Hungary undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

Section I—Military Clauses

chapter i—general

Article 1

Within three months of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Military forces of Hungary shall be demobilised to the extent prescribed hereinafter.

Article 2

Universal compulsory military service shall be abolished in Hungary. The Hungarian Army shall in future only be constituted and recruited by means of voluntary enlistment.

chapter ii—effectives and cadres of the hungarian army

Article 3

The total number of military forces in the Hungarian Army shall not exceed 35,000 men, including officers and depot troops.

Subject to the following limitations, the formations composing the Hungarian Army shall be fixed in accordance with the wishes of Hungary:—

(1) The effectives of units must be fixed between the maximum and minimum figures shown in Table IV annexed to this Section.

(2) The proportion of officers, including the personnel of staffs and special services, shall not exceed one twentieth of the total effectives with the colours, and that of non-Commissioned officers shall not exceed one fifteenth of the total effectives with the colours.

(3) The number of machine guns, guns and howitzers shall not exceed per thousand men of the total effectives with the colours those fixed in Table V annexed to this Section.

The Hungarian Army shall be devoted exclusively to the maintenance of order within the territory of Hungary, and to the control of her frontiers.

Article 4

The maximum strength of the Staffs and of all formations which Hungary may be permitted to raise are given in the Tables annexed to this Section; these figures need not be exactly followed, but must not be exceeded.

All other organisations for the command of troops or for preparation for war are forbidden.

Article 5

All measures of mobilisation, or appertaining to mobilisation are forbidden.

In no case must formations, administrative services or staffs include supplementary cadres.

The carrying out of any preparatory measures with a view to requisitioning animals or other means of military transport is forbidden.

Article 6

The number of gendarmes, customs officers, forest guards, members of the local or municipal police or other like officials may not exceed the number of men employed in a similar capacity in 1913 within the boundaries of Hungary as fixed by the present Treaty.

The number of these officials shall not be increased in the future except as may be necessary to maintain the same proportion between the number of officials and the total population in the localities or municipalities which employ them.

These officials, as well as officials employed in the railway service, must not be assembled for the purpose of taking part in any military exercises.

Article 7

Every formation of troops not included in the Tables annexed to this Section is forbidden. Such other formations as may exist in excess of the 35,000 effectives authorised shall be suppressed within the period laid down by Article 1.

chapter iii—recruiting and military training

Article 8

All officers must be regulars (officiers de carrière). Officers now serving who are retained in the Army must undertake the obligation to serve in it up to the age of 40 years at least. Officers now serving who do not join the new army will be released from all military obligations; they must not take part in any military exercises, whether theoretical or practical.

Officers newly appointed must undertake to serve on the active list for 20 consecutive years at least.

The number of officers discharged for any reason before the expiration of their term of service must not exceed in any year one twentieth of the total of officers provided for in Article 3. If this proportion is unavoidably exceeded the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh appointments.

Article 9

The period of enlistment for non-commissioned officers and privates must be for a total period of not less than 12 consecutive years, including at least 6 years with the colours.

The proportion of men discharged before the expiration of the period of their enlistment for reasons of health or as a result of disciplinary measures or for any other reasons must not in any year exceed one twentieth of the total strength fixed by Article 3. If this proportion is unavoidably exceeded, the resulting shortage must not be made good by fresh enlistments.

chapter iv—schools, educational establishments, military clubs and societies

Article 10

The number of students admitted to attend the courses in military schools shall be strictly in proportion to the vacancies to be filled in the cadres of officers. The students and the cadres shall be included in the effectives fixed by Article 3 of the present Section.

Consequently, all military schools not required for this purpose shall be abolished.

Article 11

Educational establishments, other than those referred to in Article 10, as well as all sporting and other clubs, must not occupy themselves with any military matters.

chapter v—armament, munitions and material

Article 12

On the expiration of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the armament of the Hungarian Army shall not exceed the figures fixed per thousand men in Table V annexed to this Section. Any excess in relation to effectives shall only be used for such replacements as may eventually be necessary.

Article 13

The stock of munitions at the disposal of the Hungarian Army shall not exceed the amounts fixed in Table V annexed to this Section.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Hungarian Government shall deposit any existing surplus of armament and munitions in such places as shall be notified to it by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

No other stock, depot or reserve of munitions shall be formed.

Article 14

The manufacture of arms, munitions and war material shall only be carried on in one single factory, which shall be controlled by and belong to the State, and whose output shall be strictly limited to the manufacture of such arms, munitions and war materials as is necessary for the military forces and armaments referred to in Articles 3, 6, 12 & 13.

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all other establishments for the manufacture, preparation, storage or design of arms, munitions or any other war material shall be closed down or converted to purely commercial uses.

Within the same length of time, all arsenals shall also be closed down, except those to be used as depots for the authorised stocks of munitions, and their staffs discharged.

The plant of any establishments or arsenals in excess of the amount required for the manufacture authorised shall be rendered useless or converted to purely commercial purposes in accordance with the decisions of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control referred to in Article 35.

Article 15

Within three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, all arms, munitions and war material, including any kind of anti-aircraft material, of whatever origin, existing in Hungary in excess of the quantity authorised shall be handed over to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery shall take place at such points in Hungarian territory as may be appointed by the said Powers, who shall also decide on the disposal of such material.

Article 16

The importation into Hungary of arms, munitions and war material of all kinds is strictly forbidden.

The manufacture for foreign countries and the exportation of arms, munitions and war material shall also be forbidden.

Article 17

The use of flame throwers, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all similar liquids, materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Hungary.

Material specially intended for the manufacture, storage or use of the said products or devices is equally forbidden.

The manufacture and importation into Hungary of armoured cars, tanks or any similar machines suitable for use in war are equally forbidden.

Table 1

Composition and Maximum Effectives of an Infantry Division

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men
Headquarters of an Infantry Division.	25	70	(a) Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry, each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 machine-gun Company. (b) Each Battalion comprises 1 Headquarters, 2 Pioneer Companies, 1 Bridging Section, 1 Searchlight Section. (c) Each Regiment comprises 1 Headquarters, 3 Groups of Field or Mountain Artillery, comprising 8 batteries, each Battery comprising 4 guns or Howitzers (field or mountain). (d) This detachment comprises:— Telephone detachment, 1 Listening Section, 1 carrier pigeon Section.
Headquarters of Divisional Infantry.	5	50
Headquarters of Divisional Artillery.	4	30
Regiments of Infantry (a) (on the basis of 65 officers and 2,000 men per Regiment).	195	6,000
Squadron	6	160
Battalion of Trench Artillery (3 Companies).	14	500
Battalion Pioneers (b) (5 Companies).	14	500
Regiment Field Artillery (c).	80	1,200
Battalion Cyclist (comprising 3 Companies).	18	450
Signal Detachment (d)	11	330
Divisional Medical Corps	28	550
Divisional Parks and Trains	14	940
Total for an Infantry Division.	414	10,780

Table 2

Composition and Maximum Effectives for a Cavalry Division

Units	Maximum number authorised	Maximum effectives of each Unit		Remarks
		Officers	Men
Headquarters of a Cavalry Division.	1	15	50	(a) Each Regiment comprises 4 Squadrons. (b) Each group comprises 9 fighting cars each carrying one gun, 1 machine gun and 1 spare machine gun, 4 communication cars, 2 small lorries for stores, 7 lorries, including 1 repair lorry, 4 motor cars.
Reg. of Cavalry (a)	6	30	720
Group of Field Artillery (3 Batteries).	1	30	430
Group of Motor machine-guns and armoured cars (b).	1	4	80
Miscellaneous services		30	500
Total for a Cavalry Division		259	5,380

Note:—The large Cavalry Units may include a variable number of regiment and be divided into independent brigades within the limit of the effectives laid down above.

Table 3

Composition and Maximum Effectives for a Mixed Brigade

Units	Maximum effectives of each unit		Remarks
	Officers	Men
Headquarters of a Bridge	10	50	(a) Each Regiment comprises 3 Battalions of Infantry, each Battalion comprises 3 Companies of Infantry and 1 Machine gun Company.
2 Regiments of Infantry (a)	130	4,000
1 Cyclist Battalion	18	450
1 Cavalry Squadron	5	100
1 Group Field Artillery	20	400
1 Trench Mortar Company	5	150
Miscellaneous services	10	200
Total for Mixed Brigade	198	5,350

Table 4

Minimum Effectives of Units Whatever Organization Is Adopted in the Army

(Divisions, Mixed Brigades, &c)

Maximum Effectives (for reference)		Units	Minimum Effectives		Remarks
Officers	Men		Officers	Men
414	10,780	Infantry Division	300	8,000
259	5,380	Cavalry Division	180	3,650
198	5,350	Mixed Brigade	140	4,250
65	2,000	Regiment of Infantry	52	1,600
16	650	Battalion of Infantry	12	500
3	160	Company of Infantry or Machine Guns.	2	120
18	450	Cyclist Group	12	300
30	720	Regiment of Cavalry	20	450
6	160	Squadron of Cavalry	3	100
80	1,200	Regiment of Field Artillery	60	1,000
4	150	Battery, Field Artillery	2	120
3	150	Company of Trench Mortars	2	100
14	500	Battalion of Pioneers	8	300
5	320	Battery of Mountain Artillery	3	200

Table 5

Maximum Authorised Armaments and Munition Supplies

Material	Quantity for 1,000 men	Amount of Munitions per arm (rifles, guns, &c.)	Remarks
Rifles or Carbines	1,150	500 rounds	Automatic rifles or carbines are counted as light machine guns.
Machine guns; heavy or light	15	10,000 rounds
Trench Mortars, light		1,000 rounds
Trench Mortars, medium	2	500 rounds
Guns or howitzers (field or mountain).	3	1,000 rounds

Note:—No heavy gun, i. e. of a calibre greater than 105 mm. is authorised with the exception of the normal armament of fortified places.

Section II—Naval Clauses

Article 18

From the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty all Austro-Hungarian warships, submarines included, are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

All the monitors, torpedo boats and armed vessels of the Danube Flotilla will be surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Hungary will, however, be allowed to maintain for the Danube River Police Service patrol launches, which will be selected by the Commission provided by Article 43 of the present Treaty.

Article 19

The Austro-Hungarian auxiliary cruisers and fleet auxiliaries enumerated below will be disarmed and treated as merchant shins:

• Bosnia.
• Gablonz.
• Carolina.
• Africa.
• Tirol.
• Argentina.
• Lussin.
• Teodo.
• Pelikan.
• Herkules.
• Pola.
• Najade.
• Pluto.
• President Wilson (Ex-Kaiser Franz Joseph).
• Trieste.
• Baron Bruck.
• Nixe.
• Gigante.
• Dalmat.
• Persia.
• Prince Hohenlohe.
• Gastein.
• Helouan.
• Graf Wurmbrand.
• Elizabet.
• Melcavich.
• Baron Call.
• Gaea.
• Cyclop.
• Vesta.
• Nymphe.
• Buffel.

Article 20

All warships, including submarines, now under construction in ports which belong or previously belonged to Austria Hungary shall be broken up.

The work of breaking up these vessels will be commenced as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Article 21

Articles, machinery and material arising from the breaking-up of Austro-Hungarian warships of all kinds, whether surface vessels or submarines, may not be used except for purely industrial or commercial purposes.

They may not be sold or disposed of to foreign countries.

Article 22

The construction or acquisition of any submarine, even for commercial purposes, shall be forbidden in Hungary.

Article 23

All arms, ammunition and other naval war material, including mines and torpedoes, which belonged to Austria-Hungary at the date of the signature of the Armistice of November 3, 1918,¹⁶ are declared to be finally surrendered to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Hungary will only be held responsible for the delivery (Articles 18 and 23), the disarmament (Article 19), the demolition (Article 20) as well as the disposal (Article 19) and the use (Article 21) of the objects mentioned in the preceding Articles, as far as these remain in Hungarian territory.

Article 24

During the three months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Hungarian high-power wireless telegraphy station at Budapest shall not be used for the transmission of messages concerning naval, military or political questions of interest to Hungary, or any State which has been allied to Austria-Hungary in the war, without the assent of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. This station may be used for commercial purposes, but only under the supervision of the said Powers, who will decide the wave-length to be used.

During the same period Hungary shall not build any more high-power wireless telegraphy stations in her own territory or that of Austria, Germany, Bulgaria or Turkey.

Section III—Air Clauses

Article 25

The Armed forces of Hungary must not include any military or naval air forces. No dirigibles shall be kept.

Article 26

Within two months from the coming into force of the Present Treaty, the personnel of the air forces on the rolls of the Hungarian land and sea forces shall be demobilised.

Article 27

Until the complete evacuation of Hungarian territory by the Allied and Associated troops the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Hungary freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing.

Article 28

During the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture, importation and exportation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft shall be forbidden in all Hungarian territory.

Article 29

On the coming into force of the present Treaty, all military and naval aeronautical material must be delivered by Hungary and at her expense to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

Delivery must be effected at such places as the Governments of the said Powers may select, and must be completed within three months.

In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or were designed for warlike purposes:—

Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled.

Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen.

Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft.

Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of Hungary, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles, may at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to Hungary until the time when the dirigibles are handed over.

Engines for aircraft.

Nacelles and fuselages.

Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo apparatus, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus).

Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or of material for their manufacture).

Instruments for use on aircraft.

Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft.

Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads.

The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments.

Section IV—Inter-Allied Commissions of Control

Article 30

All the Military, Naval and Air Clauses contained in the present Treaty for the execution of which a time limit is prescribed shall be executed by Hungary under the control of Inter-Allied Commissions specially appointed for this purpose by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.

The above-mentioned Commissions will represent the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in dealing with the Hungarian Government in all matters concerning the execution of the Military, Naval and Air Clauses. They will communicate to the Hungarian authorities the decisions which the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have reserved the right to take or which the execution of the said Clauses may necessitate.

Article 31

The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control may establish their organisations at Budapest and shall be entitled, as often as they think desirable, to proceed to any point whatever in Hungarian territory, or to send a sub-commission or to authorise one or more of their members to go, to any such point.

Article 32

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control all such information and documents as the latter may deem necessary to ensure the execution of their mission, and all means (both in personnel and in material) which the above-mentioned Commissions may need to ensure the complete execution of the Military, Naval or Air Clauses.

The Hungarian Government must attach a qualified representative to each Inter-Allied Commission of Control with the duty of receiving from the latter any communications which it may have to address to the Hungarian Government and furnishing it with, or of procuring, all information or documents demanded.

Article 33

The upkeep and cost of the Commissions of Control and the expense involved by their work shall be borne by Hungary.

Article 34

It will be the special duty of the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control to receive from the Hungarian Government the notifications relating to the location of the stocks and depots of munitions, the armament of the fortified works, and the location of the works or factories for the production of arms, munitions and war material and their operations.

It will take delivery of the arms, munitions, war material and plant intended for war construction, will select the points where such delivery is to be effected, and will supervise the works of destruction, and rendering things useless, or of transformation of material, which are to be carried out in accordance with the present Treaty.

Article 35

It will be the special duty of the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control to proceed to the building yards and to supervise the breaking up of the ships which are under construction there, to take delivery of arms, munitions and naval war material, and to supervise the destruction and breaking-up provided for.

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Naval Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and documents as the Commission may deem necessary to ensure the complete execution of the Naval Clauses, in particular the designs of the warships, the composition of their armaments, the details and models of the guns, munitions, torpedoes, mines, explosives, wireless telegraphic apparatus, and in general everything relating to naval war material, as well as all legislative or administrative documents or regulations.

Article 36

It will be the special duty of the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control to make an inventory of the aeronautical material which is actually in the possession of the Hungarian Government, to inspect aeroplane, balloon and motor manufactories, and factories producing arms, munitions and explosives capable of being used by aircraft, to visit all aerodromes, sheds, landing grounds, parks and depots which are now in Hungarian territory, and to authorise where necessary a removal of material and to take delivery of such material.

The Hungarian Government must furnish to the Aeronautical Inter-Allied Commission of Control all such information and legislative, administrative or other documents which the Commission may consider necessary to ensure the complete execution of the air clauses, and, in particular, a list of the personnel belonging to all the air services of Hungary and of the existing material, as well as of that in process of manufacture or on order, and a list of all establishments working for aviation, of their positions, and of all sheds and landing grounds.

Section V—General Articles

Article 37

After the expiration of a period of three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty, the Hungarian laws must have been modified and shall be maintained by the Hungarian Government in conformity with this part of the present Treaty.

Within the same period all the administrative or other measures relating to the execution of this Part must have been taken by the Hungarian Government.

Article 38

The following portions of the Armistice of November 3, 1918: paragraphs 2, 3, of Chapter I (Military Clauses), paragraphs 2, 3, 6 of Chapter I of the annexed Protocol (Military Clauses), remain in force so far as they are not inconsistent with the above stipulations.

Article 39

Hungary undertakes, from the coming into force of the present Treaty, not to accredit nor to send to any foreign country any military, naval or air mission, nor to allow any such mission to leave her territory; Hungary further agrees to take the necessary measures to prevent Hungarian nationals from leaving her territory to enlist in the Army, Navy or Air service of any foreign Power, or to be attached to such Army, Navy or Air service for the purpose of assisting in the military, naval or air training thereof, or generally for the purpose of giving military naval or air instruction in any foreign country.

The Allied and Associated Powers undertake, so far as they are concerned, that from the coming into force of the present Treaty they will not enrol in nor attach to their armies or naval or air forces any Hungarian national for the purpose of assisting in the military training of such armies or naval or air forces, or otherwise employ any such Hungarian national as military, naval, or aeronautic instructor.

The present provision does not, however, affect the right of France to recruit for the Foreign Legion in accordance with French military laws and regulations.

Article 40

So long as the present Treaty remains in force, Hungary undertakes to submit to any investigation which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority vote, may consider necessary.

aerial navigation

Article 41

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall have full liberty of passage and landing over and in the territory of Hungary and shall enjoy the same privileges as Hungarian aircraft, particularly in case of distress.

Article 42

The aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall, while in transit to any foreign country whatever, enjoy the right of flying over the territory of Hungary without landing, subject always to any regulations which may be made by Hungary, and which shall be applicable equally to the aircraft of Hungary and to those of the Allied and Associated countries.

Article 43

All aerodromes in Hungary open to national public traffic shall be open for the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers, and in any such aerodrome such aircraft shall be treated on a footing of equality with Hungarian aircraft as regards charges of every description including charges for landing and accommodation.

Article 44

Subject to the present provisions, the rights of passage, transit and landing, provided for in Articles 41, 42 and 43 are subject to the observance of such regulations as Hungary may consider it necessary to enact, but such regulations shall be applied without distinction to Hungarian aircraft and to those of the Allied and Associated countries.

Article 45

Certificates of nationality, airworthiness, or competency and licenses, issued or recognised as valid by any of the Allied or Associated Powers, shall be recognised in Hungary as valid and as equivalent to the certificates and licenses issued by Hungary.

Article 46

As regards internal commercial air traffic, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Hungary most favoured nation treatment.

Article 47

Hungary undertakes to enforce the necessary measures to ensure that all Hungarian aircraft flying over her territory shall comply with the Rules as to lights and signals, Rules of the Air and Rules for Air Traffic on and in the neighbourhood of aerodromes, which have been laid down in the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between the Allied and Associated Powers.¹⁷

Article 48

The obligations imposed by the preceding provisions shall remain in force until January 1, 1923, unless before that date Hungary shall have been admitted into the League of Nations or shall have been authorised by consent of the Allied and Associated Powers to adhere to the Convention relative to Aerial Navigation concluded between those Powers.

Appendix F to HD–34

Paris, 1919.

Proposed Reply to German Note With Respect to Estimation of War Damages in the Devastated Regions

From: President Clemenceau.

To: Baron von Lersner.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 2, concerning the ascertaining of damage in the territories devastated by the war.

You offer to communicate to the French and Belgian Governments all the documents and information that the German Government possesses on the subject of these damages, and notably concerning “field” requisitions and requisitions “For the interior”, as well as to transmit the studies made by it on the subject. You ask, in order to complete the work, the restoration, even temporary, of archives left by the German armies in their retreat. Finally, you propose a discussion, a verification and an examination in common and from opposite sides, between the representatives of the German Government and the representatives of the French and Belgian Governments, with a view to ascertaining the amount of damage, to collecting the material and to fixing the amount to be paid.

We take note of the offer made by the German Delegation and we are disposed to receive all the information that it is ready to communicate to us; the Allied and Associated Governments can only consider with satisfaction anything that will facilitate and accelerate the execution of the Peace Treaty. In the same spirit they will be happy to receive the same documentation on the subject of the damage caused in the zones of operations other than France and Belgium notably Italy and Serbia.

Concerning the archives whose temporary restoration is requested, it would be well for the German Delegation, since it is the one to make the demand, to communicate the list of services and archives in question. No decision can be reached in the matter till this is done. Finally, the Allied and Associated Governments must indicate at once, in the clearest manner, that there can be no question of discussion, verification and examination, in common and from different sides, on the ascertaining of the amount of damage and the fixing of the sum to be paid; they pledged themselves to this neither in the reply that they made of June 16¹⁸ to the remarks of the German Delegation on the Peace Conditions, nor in the additional Protocol of June 28 to the Treaty of Versailles. On the contrary, in the aforesaid reply of June 16, they laid down the absolute conditions that “the categories of damages and the reparation clauses will be accepted by the German authorities as being outside of all discussion”. Now, the Peace Treaty signed by Germany provides expressly, in paragraph 10 of Annex II to the reparation clauses, that “the Commission will study the claims and will give the German Government a fair right to be heard, without its being able to tax [take?] any part whatever in the decisions.”

I will add, in closing, that the Allied and Associated Governments are ready to examine the propositions that you announce in your letter, concerning the restoration of the devastated regions.

Moreover, in confirmation of their reply of June 16, 1919, they will give Germany, in good time the necessary facilities to furnish a serious basis for the offers to be presented by her; without waiting for the Treaty to come into force, it is possible now to give the first facilities in certain sectors. Verbal indications will be given on this subject.

Appendix G to HD–34

[Proposed Reply to the German Note With Respect to] The Restitution of the Topographical Plans of the Costoplatz Mine

From: President Clemenceau.

To: Lersner, German Delegation.

I have the honor to inform you that during its Session of August 12, 1919, the Committee on Organization and [of] the Commission on Reparations, examined a request from the Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom in France, relative to the topographical plans of the Costoplatz mine. These plans are supposed to be in the hands of two officers of the German army, Messrs. Winter and Kramer, belonging to a Company of Sappers who exploited the mine during the occupation. The Delegation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom in France requests their Restitution.

The Committee requests you to kindly make the necessary investigations immediately and inform them of the result.

Accept, etc.

legation of the serb,
croat & slovene kingdom
in france

At the time of the evacuation of Serbia, German troops took the topographical plans of a coal mine, belonging to Mr. George Wenfert, located at Costoplatz on the Danube (Pojarevatz Department in Serbia) with them. These plans at the present time are in possession of two lieutenants of the German army, Winter and Kramer, attached to the company of Sappers who had exploited the said mine during the occupation.

By order of its Government, the Legation of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom has the honor to request the Minister of Foreign Affairs to kindly have a search instigated, by the intermediary of the French military authorities in Germany, in order to locate the German officers above mentioned and recover the documents appropriated by them. The Royal Legation has the honor to remark that, without these documents, all exploitation of the Costoplatz mine is impossible, which, under the present circumstances constitutes a great injury to our national industry.

Paris, April 8, 1919.

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Quai d’Orsay.

Annex H to HD–34

Paris, August 17, 1919.

[The Serb-Croat-Slovene Plenipotentiary (Pachitch) to the President ad Interim of the Peace Conference (Pichon)]

[Translation]²⁰

delegation of the kingdom of the
serbs, croats and Slovenes
at the peace conference

No. 3.222

Mr. President: In continuation of my letters addressed to His Excellency Monsieur G. Clémenceau on July 28 and August 7, I am earnestly pressing upon Your Excellency the necessity of an oral statement to the Supreme Council by our delegation regarding the draft of a treaty of peace with Bulgaria, before it receives definitive form.

Our country being, for every sort of reason, more interested than any other in the conclusion of this treaty, I forbear to dwell more fully on the reasonable grounds for this request.

In order to make easier the task of the Supreme Council, I take the liberty of sending you enclosed an aide-mémoire, containing the principal points to which our delegation wishes more particularly to draw the attention of the Conference, and I indulge the hope that our great Allies will be inclined to reserve for it a friendly and benevolent reception.

Accept [etc.]

N. P. Pachitch

[Enclosure]

Aide-Mémoire

reservation by the delegation of the kingdom of the serbs, croats, and slovenes on the draft of a treaty of peace with bulgaria

The armistice with Bulgaria having been concluded without the assistance of our military and civil authorities, none of the Serbian interests was guaranteed (as was done for the other Allied Powers in similar conventions with the enemy).

The principal provisions contained in the draft treaty of peace with Bulgaria have been decided upon without the collaboration of our delegation, and our most vital and just interests are threatened by the solutions proposed by the commissions.

In order to prevent the injustices which may result, it is necessary to reconsider at least the points which are herein presented as briefly as possible.

(1)

In spite of the fact that Serbia has found herself at war with Bulgaria for the third time since Bulgaria’s liberation from the Ottoman yoke, and that on the last two occasions Bulgaria treacherously attacked Serbia (the Allies as well, the last time), we have asked from Bulgaria only a rectification of frontiers, a rectification which is imposed as an absolute necessity in consequence of the experience of these recent years, an experience for which our allies have with us paid dearly.

Not only does the Territorial Commission grant us no more than an insignificant part of the territories which we claim, but even for the part granted, the intention would be to impose upon us burdens not justified by the usage of international law. We are Obliged, therefore, to insist upon the necessity of an acknowledgment of our territorial claims.

In its first draft, the Commission on Reparations did not recognize our right to “the recovery of property stolen or removed from our territory, a refusal contrary to what was stipulated in behalf of the other Allies as against Germany (armistice of January 16,²¹ art. VI; treaty of peace art. 238), as against Austria (art. 180), contrary also to moral and legal principles as old as the world. The Commission on Reparations reversed this decision after a lively protest on our part, but on that occasion too it stopped half-way, since in recognizing the substantial basis of our right, it recognized it only in principle, and no more than in principle; inasmuch as, contrary to what was laid down in the treaty with Germany in favor of the other Allies, and contrary also to universal law, the Commission imposed on us the obligation of proving that our stolen properties “are to be found in Bulgarian territory.” We do not at all consider ourselves as going beyond the limits of an elementary and incontestable right in asking here for the application, pure and simple, of the same provisions as were prescribed (and with how many reasons) in the treaty with Germany and in the armistice convention of January 16, 1919.

(2)

An equivalent restitution in kind, as guaranteed in the other treaties, is especially desirable in the one to be imposed on Bulgaria.

Having invaded our territories at the beginning of hostilities, Bulgaria lived off the occupied territories during the whole time of the war. Not only did it conserve its own stocks of cattle but perhaps it may even have augmented them by the thefts and raids committed on our soil. If it is intended to maintain the conditions proposed by the Commission, Bulgaria would be the only country which would emerge enriched from this war, as may be seen from the following:—

a) Before its entry into the war, Bulgaria carried on trade of all sorts with Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side, and with Turkey on the other, especially trade in contraband of war;

b) The Bulgarian civil and military authorities practiced in Serbia (in two-thirds of our territory) a regime of systematic pillage and of organized robberies, as has been substantiated by an Interallied Commission;

c) According to the most moderate estimates, the Bulgarians have taken from us 600,000 head of cattle, 100,000 horses, and 2,500,000 sheep and ewes (not to mention what the Germans and Austro-Hungarians took). If these figures be added to those of the official Bulgarian statistics on Bulgarian livestock in 1910 (that is, before the expansion of 1913), which totalled 2,000,000 cattle, 600,000 horses and mules, and more than 10,000,000 sheep and ewes, it will then be seen what wealth Bulgaria possesses in these things alone.

We lay claim, however, by way of an immediate advance, to only 18% of the livestock which was carried off and to only 4% of the present Bulgarian stock. What the Reparations Commission has granted us up to the present would be more than laughable if it were not sad, and especially when account is taken of the fact that with us draft animals represent farm equipment and that in this war we have lost 53% of the men mobilized, a loss which represents more than half of the labor in Serbia.

With very good reason, assurances on this score, were given in the treaty with Germany, for deliveries to France of 233,500 head, and to Belgium of 137,400 head of heavy and light domestic animals. We are eminently a farming and stock-raising country. Here too we are not asking a favor; we are claiming equity and an application of identical principles.

(3)

The 2,250,000,000 francs, representing the total of damages for which reparation is due from Bulgaria, are far below its capacity to pay. But by a simple majority of votes in the Commission (in contrast to the principle of unanimity applied to Germany and Austria), it may be released from a portion (perhaps considerable) of this sum, very moderate though it is. And yet, the Serbian, Greek, and Roumanian experts have proved that Bulgaria could pay much more. What is still more astonishing, the Commission on Finance has discharged Bulgaria of its debts to Germany, thus awarding it benefits of more than four billions, according to the figure given by the German newspapers. Our loyalty refuses to believe that the Supreme Council could approve this proposal which would stand as the most shocking act of this war and which would put upon the same footing both Belgium (faithful and martyred) and Bulgaria (felon and traitor) while leaving Serbia a debtor for all its obligations, although they were contracted under compulsion of circumstances and for the purpose of carrying on the fight to the last man at the side of the Allies.

(4)

We do not believe that we are departing from reality in affirming that our country is the one most concerned in the execution of the provisions of the treaty with Bulgaria, as it relates to reparations. Nevertheless, the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is not represented on the Commission created for this purpose and in session at Sofia.

Apart from these special provisions, the execution of the treaty with Bulgaria ought to be guaranteed by appropriate means, by the same stipulations as for Germany, a precaution which calls for a temporary occupation of Bulgarian territory. Moreover, as Monsieur Clémenceau has so judiciously declared: “military occupation constitutes for the Allied and Associated Powers one of the essential guarantees; it cannot therefore, be debated.” It is incomprehensible that Bulgarian disloyalty and treachery could be so quickly forgotten that Bulgarian good faith would be relied upon. The powers who are neighbors of Bulgaria, and who are consequently the most interested in the observance by Bulgaria of its signed engagements, have suffered too much in the most recent past from Bulgar falseness and megalomania to risk being duped by such illusions. The adequate guarantees for a prompt and legal execution of the treaty are more imperatively required in this case than in any other whatever.

Appendix I to HD–34

M–477

Proposed Communication From the President of the Peace Conference to the Commission of Generals at Budapest

In the event that you are not satisfied that the Rumanians have ceased the seizure of Hungarian grain, live stock, rolling stock, boats and other material, you are authorized to address to the Rumanian authorities with whom you are in contact a communication substantially as follows:

“The conditions of peace with Austria as originally drafted provided that all portions of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including that part proposed to be transferred to Rumania, would be liable to pay by way of reparation a sum to be fixed by the Reparation Commission. In deference to the urgent representations of the Rumanian Peace Delegation, the principal Allied and Associated Powers consented to renounce their right to secure indemnification from enemy resources and population to be transferred to Rumania upon Rumania agreeing to make a moderate fixed contribution toward the cost of liberating enemy territory to be transferred to her. An agreement relative to the payment of cost of liberation²² was, on June 27, 1919 signed by Mr. Antonesco, Rumanian Plenipotentiary, subject to the approval of his Government. In reliance of this agreement, the conditions of peace with Austria were modified so that no reparation liability will attach to enemy territory proposed to be transferred to Rumania.

“The agreement signed by Mr. Antonesco provides, among other things, that Rumania’s contribution toward the costs of liberation will be discharged by offsetting the sum against the first reparation payments which Rumania would otherwise receive on account of damage suffered by her, and ‘no further payments on account of reparation shall be made until the other States to which reparation is due shall have received payments on account of a like proportion of their approved claims for reparation’.

“The action of Rumania in seizing enemy property by way of reparation, prior to other States having received payment on account of their approved claims, is in contravention of the terms of the agreement of June 27th, and cannot be construed as other than a repudiation by Rumania of the agreement of June 27th. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers accordingly reserve full liberty of action with respect to imposing a liability for reparation upon enemy territory proposed to be transferred to Rumania, and these Powers now have under consideration the matter and form for the exercise of their rights in this respect.”

1. Ante, p. 687.
2. HD–15, minute 8, p. 324.
3. Appendix I to CF–37, vol. vi, p. 73.
4. Count Mauryey Zamoiski, Polish Minister at Paris.
5. British Commissioner at Warsaw.
7. Ante, p. 721.
8. Ante, p. 633.
9. Plenary Session of May 31, 1919, vol. iii, p. 394.
10. The numbered documents referred to throughout this report do not accompany the appendix.
11. Appendix G to HD–19, enclosure 5, p. 431.
12. Extract from the report of Colonel Duparquet, dated August 13 (Document No. 4). [Footnote in the original.]
13. Note of General Malcolm, transmitted by the C. I. P. A. on August 9, under No. 1590 (Document No. 5); Note of General Dupont, No. 4865 (Document No. 6); telegram from Stockholm of August 13 (Document No. 7); Extract from the Polish S. B. (Document No. 8). [Footnote in the original.]
12. Section b.

13. We might, moreover, with the same object, invoke these clauses of Article 169 of the Peace Treaty which provide “that within two months after the entrance into force of the present treaty German war material coming from abroad, in whatever state it may be in, shall be surrendered to the Allied Governments, who will determine its destination”.

    From this provision there is evidently derived the right, on the part of the mandatory of the Allied Powers to take cognizance of the distribution of this material, in order to be able when the time comes, to claim, if necessary, and to control its delivery to the said powers. This is moreover the thesis sustained by General Gough. [Footnote in the original.]

13. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
14. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
15. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
16. vol. ii, p. 175.
17. Treaties, Conventions, etc., 1910–1923, vol. iii, p. 3768.
18. vol. vi, pp. 926, 962.
20. Translation from the French supplied by the editors.
21. Convention prolonging the armistice with Germany, signed January 16, 1919, vol. ii, p. 11.
22. For draft text of agreement, see appendix I to HD–37, p. 830.