Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, Volume VIII

Paris Peace Conf. 180.03501/84

HD–84

Notes of a Meeting of the Heads of Delegations of the Five Great Powers Held in M. Pichon’s Room, Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Wednesday, November 5, 1919, at 10:30 a.m.

Paris, November 5, 1919, 10:30 a.m.

• Present
  • America, United States of
    • Hon. F. L. Polk
  • Secretary
    • Mr. L. Harrison
  • British Empire
    • Sir Eyre Crowe
  • Secretary
    • Mr. H. Norman
  • France
    • M. Pichon
  • Secretaries
    • M. Dutasta
    • M. Berthelot
    • M. de Saint-Quentin
  • Italy
    • M. de Martino
  • Secretary
    • M. Barone Russo
  • Japan
    • M. Matsui
  • Secretary
    • M. Kawai

Joint Secretariat
America, United States of	Capt. B. Winthrop
British Empire	Capt. G. Lothian SmaU
France	M. Massigli
Italy	M. Zanchi
Interpreter—M. Mantoux

The following were also present for items in which they were concerned:

• America, United States of
  • General Bliss
• British Empire
  • General Sackville-West
  • Commander Lucas, R. N.
  • Mr. A. Leeper
  • Mr. E. H. Carr
• Italy
  • General Cavallero
  • General Marietti
  • M. Vannutelli-Rey
  • Prince Boncompagni
• Japan
  • M. Shigemitsu

1. (The Council had before it a draft telegram to Sir George Clerk (See Appendix “A”).) Telegram to Sir George Clerk

Sir Eyre Crowe wished to remark that he proposed to replace paragraph 2 on page 1 by the following paragraph: “The Roumanian troops shall evacuate Hungary completely and shall withdraw to the other side of the frontier as fixed by the Conference: It is indispensable that they should allow full liberty to the Hungarian elections.” In the following paragraph he suggested that the words, “immediately thereafter” should be omitted. He wished to give Sir George Clerk discretion on the question of the time when the Friedrich cabinet should withdraw. If he were to await the complete evacuation by the Roumanian troops, this might be found too long.

M. de Martino asked that a change be made in paragraph 1 of page 2, so as to follow the suggestion made by the Italian representative at Budapest.

(The text was agreed to read as follows: “Another suggestion had been made which charged the Inter-Allied Military Mission with the supervision of the organization … etc.” (See Appendix “B”).)

Mr. Polk suggested that the beginning of paragraph 3 on page 2 be changed to read as follows: “The Council would like to know whether, after having consulted the Inter-Allied Mission, and after … etc.”

Sir Eyre Crowe wished to add to paragraph 3 of page 2, after the words, “by the Hungarian gendarmerie” the following words, “which might be placed under the Control, direct or indirect, of the Inter-Allied Military Mission.”

(This change was adopted, and it was agreed to put after paragraph 3 of page 2, the paragraph suggested by M. De Martino)

(It was decided:

(1) that Sir Eyre Crowe should send to Sir George Clerk, in the name of the Supreme Council, the telegram as shown in Appendix “B”;

(2) that the telegram sent by the Supreme Council to the Roumanian Government at its meeting of November 3rd, 1919, should be communicated to Sir George Clerk,)¹

2. M. Pichon inquired whether Mr. Polk had received an answer on the subject from President Wilson.

Mr. Polk said that the President would surely issue the convocation of the first meeting of the Council of the League of Nations; the only question was the form of letter which the President should write. This was still open and he expected an answer within a short time. First Meeting of the Council of the League of Nation

Sir Eyre Crowe wished to state that the British Government had agreed upon Paris as the place of the first meeting of the Council.

M. Berthelot stated it had been understood between Sir Eric Drum-mond, Colonel House and the French Representative that this meeting should only nominate the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre district. There still remained the appointment of the Commission for the Government of the Sarre district. As soon as the Treaty was put into force, the German Government might ask, to whom should the sovereignty over this territory be transferred. The difficulty might of course be solved by prolonging the military occupation regime until the Commission for the Government of the Sarre had been appointed; but it was important that the Allies should agree on this intermediary solution. From the French standpoint, however, it was quite certain that it would be wiser to appoint the Government Commission at once and that it was to especially please the American and British Governments that this solution might be accepted.

Mr. Polk remarked that he understood that this was the view of his Government.

Sir Eyre Crowe feared that the Germans might cause trouble, if this were not fixed; Sir Eric Drummond however having agreed with his French and American colleagues, he (Sir Eyre Crowe) concluded that M. Berthelot’s solution was correct.

M. Berthelot remarked that of course Germany would be very likely to send notes to the Allies on the subject but as it was only a question of a few weeks at the most, he thought it would be easy to gain the necessary time.

(It was decided:

(1) that Paris should be the place of the first meeting of the Council of League of Nations;

(2) that on the agenda of the first meeting of the Council the only matter taken up would be the appointment of the Commission charged with fixing the boundaries of the Sarre territory;

(3) that the present military occupation of the Sarre territory should continue until the Commission charged with the government of the Sarre district had been appointed.)

3. (The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation (See Appendix “C”).)

(After a short discussion,

It was decided: Request of the Provisional Government of Memel To Be Authorized To Send Representatives to Paris

that Sir Eyre Crowe should notify the Delegates of the provisional Government at Memel that the permission requested could not be granted but that as soon as the Treaty of Peace was put into force the Allied and Associated Powers would welcome the cooperation of the local Officials who are natives of the country.)

4. (The Council had before it instructions to General Niessel, President of the Commission charged with the control of the evacuation of the Baltic Provinces.) (See Appendix “D”.)

Sir Eyre Crowe pointed out that the last phrase of instructions paragraph 1, Section 5 entitled, “Action of the Allied Navy in the Baltic,” beginning with the words, “the Commission will serve as an intermediary” be re-moved. (This was agreed to.) Instructions to the Inter-Allied Commission TO Examine Into the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces

Sir Eyre Crowe also wished to remark that as far as transportation was concerned, the British Government would do all in its power, but could not guarantee transportation.

M. Berthelot stated that General Niessel had already insisted before the Council on his Commission getting the necessary credits; it had adjourned the examination of this question, but General Niessel called the attention of the Council to a case which needed its immediate decision. From the information at hand, it seemed that Colonel Bermondt’s troops would probably be dissolved, and it was important to know what would happen to the Russian troops which made up his forces. Of course every effort would be made to have these troops put under General Yudenitch’s command, but a certain period might elapse before this could take place, and meanwhile it would be necessary to supply them if one did not want to throw them into the hands of the Bolshevists. He thought it necessary to allot a certain amount of money to General Niessel which would be shared between the three Allies.

Mr. Polk wished to state that, as far as America was concerned, it could provide no funds for that purpose.

Sir Eyre Crowe also remarked that he questioned the likelihood of his Government’s participation.

M. Berthelot stated that it was already well understood that each power should stand the expenses of its representatives; but there surely were bound to be common expenses, and it seemed impossible to send this mission without a credit: France might decide to advance the sum for this purpose, it being well understood of course that the other Governments would reimburse it later.

Mr. Polk remarked that the appropriations of the United States Government were so made that it could only pay the share of expenses for its own mission, and for a determined purpose.

M. Berthelot explained that was the reason he suggested a fixed amount. He thought the Council should recognize the importance of the solution.

Sir Eyre Crowe inquired why they should not adopt M. Berthelot’s solution, which was on the same lines as the procedure in the missions of Sir George Clerk and General Gough, where the British Government paid at first and the expenses were later shared.

M. Berthelot agreed that France was ready to follow this procedure, if it was understood that the other Allies would reimburse her for their share.

Mr. Polk stated that his Government could not give a penny towards a Mission of a political nature.

Sir Eyre Crowe emphasized that his Government understood the mission to be a reply to the German demand for some body to supervise the German evacuation, and therefore it could not countenance its becoming involved in political activities.

M. Berthelot thought the question was a more complex one.

Mr. Polk said he was quite sure that General Niessel understood that the American representative had strict instructions not to become involved in questions of a political nature.

M. de Martino thought that it might be very difficult to make a difference between political questions and purely military questions; the one might involve the other; and he thought it important that the Generals should get definite instructions in advance on political questions which might come up, so that the action they took should be covered by a common agreement.

M. Pichon answered that it would be for the General to ask the Council for instructions. He summed up that the Commission would be the best judge of what measures it should take, and should they include or involve questions of a political nature, then the Council should be informed immediately and a decision given.

(It was decided:

(1) that in the section of instructions to General Niessel, entitled “Action of the Inter-Allied Navy in the Baltic” the phrase which read, “The Commission will serve as intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Inter-Allied Military Mission,” should be omitted;

(2) that the Commission should keep strictly to the wording of their instructions and should refer to the Supreme Council any questions of a political nature involved in the carrying out of these instructions.

5. (The Council had before it a list of questions prepared by the French Delegation.) (See Appendix).²

M. Berthelot read and commented upon this list. He wished to remark that on the list submitted, certain questions might not belong to the Supreme Council and could be treated through ordinary diplomatic channels. He suggested that each delegation prepare a revised list on these lines, and the Secretary-General would coordinate all the lists handed in. Recapitulation of Questions Still Remaining To Be Taken Up by the Supreme Council

(It was decided:

that each Delegation should prepare a list of all questions which still remain to be taken up by the Supreme Council, and that the Secretary-General of the Conference should collate these lists for the Council’s examination.)

6. Mr. Polk stated that the Supreme Council had made a decision on the question of the tank ships on September 27th;³ this decision stood, but he personally had decided without knowledge of the full facts, wished to have the question raised at a later date when he had all available information. He simply wished this set upon the record. German Tank Ships

(The meeting then adjourned.)

Hotel Crillon, Paris , November 5, 1919.

Appendix A to HD–84

Paris, November 5, 1919.

Draft of a Telegram From the Supreme Cotmcil to Sir George Clerk, Budapest

The Supreme Council has taken note of your various communications⁴ and is willing to comply with the principle of your suggestions. It is of the opinion that:

1st. —The Rumanian troops must withdraw; it is indispensable that they allow full liberty to the Hungarian elections;

2nd. —The Friedrich cabinet must resign immediately thereafter, and be replaced by a really different Government, comprising Democratic elements, Governments which would hold the elections, and the recognition of which by the Allies you would be now authorized to guarantee.

The Council was presented with a suggestion that, in order to prevent the elections and the Hungarian Government from being influenced by the local police, which is under the authority of Friedrich, and by the small army of Admiral Horthy, whose tendencies are plainly reactionary, the Rumanian military force should be replaced by an Allied military force capable of inspiring confidence in the population and to strengthen the moral authority of the commission of the generals and of the conference itself; the facts seemed to demonstrate that, without being supported by armed force, their decisions ran the risk of remaining unexecuted.

Another suggestion has been made that the control of the Hungarian army of Horthy by the commission of generals should be considered as sufficient.

It must not be forgotten that on one hand the Allies do not wish to hinder the expression of the free will of the Hungarians, but that on the other hand they have decided to prohibit the re-establishment of the fallen dynasty, either in a direct or indirect form.

The Council desires to know whether, after having considered all authorized views, you think that the Rumanian force should be replaced by an Inter-Allied force, or whether the assurances of Admiral Horthy and the guarantee of order represented by the Hungarian gendarmerie can be trusted.

The question of sending an Inter-Allied force raises the following difficulties: As the great powers have no force available, they consider sending two divisions of Czecho and Serbian soldiers and subaltern officers, commanded by English, Italian, American and French superior officers, under the command of an energetic general, nominated by the Supreme Council.

The Italian Delegation objects to sending any Jugo-Slavs on account of the state of mind of the Hungarian population. On the other hand, all delegations realize the inconveniences which might result from the presence of contingents from small countries, neighbors of Hungary, and hostile, even under a firm Allied command. The essential question is to know whether the presence of a force at the disposal of the Allies is not necessary.

The Supreme Council, trusting to your judgment and your information on the ground, asks you for precise and prompt advice.

Appendix B to HD–84

November 5, 1919.

Telegram

From: Supreme Council.

To: Sir George Clerk, Budapest.

The Supreme Council has taken note of your various communications⁵ and is ready to adhere, in general, to your suggestions. It esteems that:

1st —The Rumanian troops must completely evacuate Hungary and withdraw beyond the frontiers fixed by the conference; it is indispensable that the Hungarian elections be conducted with full liberty;

2nd —The Friedrich Ministry must withdraw to make room for a really different government comprising the democratic element. This Government would proceed with the elections, and you would be authorized to guarantee its recognition by the Allies.

The Council was presented with a suggestion tending to emphasize the necessity, in order to prevent the elections and the Hungarian Government being subject to the influence of the local police which is in the power of Friedrich, and by the small army of Admiral Horthy whose tendencies are openly reactionary, of replacing the Rumanian military force by an Allied military force capable of inspiring confidence in the population and strengthening the moral authority of the Commission of Generals and of the Conference itself. These facts appear to indicate that without material force their decisions are liable to remain non-executed.

On one hand, the fact that the Allies do not in any wise wish to impede the expression of the free will of the Hungarians must be clearly understood, but on the other hand they have decided to prevent the restoration of the fallen dynasty, in any form, either direct or indirect.

The Council would like to know if after consultation with the Commission of Generals, and having had recourse to all the authorized advice with which you are surrounded, you are convinced that the Rumanian forces ought to be replaced by Inter-Allied forces, or whether the assurances of Admiral Horthy and the guarantee of order represented by the Hungarian Gendarmerie can be trusted, which might perhaps be placed under the direct or indirect control of the Commission of Generals.

Another suggestion was made to the effect of entrusting the Commission of Generals with the supervision of the organization of the Hungarian army, and to see that it is not employed for political purposes contrary to the views of the Allies. The Commission of Generals should also see that the occupation of the Capital and of the country be conducted without excesses and without disturbing public order.

The question of sending an Inter-Allied force presents the following difficulties: as the Great Powers have no effectives available, they would be envisaged with the sending of two divisions of Czech and Serbian non-commissioned officers and soldiers, commanded by English, Italian, American and French superior officers under the orders of an energetic General nominated by the Supreme Council.

The Italian Delegation objects to sending any Jugo-Slavs, owing to the state of mind of the Hungarian population. For that matter, all Delegations realize the inconveniences which might result from the presence of contingents from the small neighboring hostile countries of Hungary, even under a firm Allied command. The main question is to ascertain whether the presence of a force at the disposition of the Allies is not necessary.

The Supreme Council, confident in your judgment and your local information, asks you for precise and prompt advice.

Appendix C to HD–84

Note by the British Delegation for Submission to the Supreme Council

The British Delegation has received through the British Mission at Berlin the following telegram:—

“Oberbürgermeister Altenberg and three representatives of the provisional Government of Memel request permission to proceed to Paris from Berlin to lay their case before the Supreme Council. German Foreign Office do not object. May permission be granted?”

The delegation proposes to reply that the permission requested should not be granted but that the Delegates may be assured that, in the execution of the Treaty of Peace at Memel, as elsewhere, the co-operation of local officials who are natives of the country will be welcomed by the Allied and Associated Powers.

4 November, 1919.

Appendix D to HD–84

[Instructions to the Interallied Commission To Examine Into the Evacuation of the Baltic Provinces]

1. Decision of the Supreme Council

The persistent violation, on the part of the German Government and the German Generals operating in the Baltic provinces, of the prescriptions of Article 12 of the Armistice of November 11, 1918 (confirmed by Article 433 of the Peace Treaty of June 28, 1919, with Germany) has caused numerous protests from the Supreme Council, and a resolution, under date of October 10th deciding upon the constitution of an Interallied Commission to supervise the evacuation of the Baltic provinces by German troops.⁶

2. Composition of the Interallied Commission

General Niessel is selected to exercise the Presidency of this Commission, which shall comprise the following members:

British Representative:	Brigadier General Turner
American Representative:	Brigadier General S. A. Chenay
Italian Representative:	Brigadier General Marietti
Japanese Representative:	Major G. Takeda, Infantry

3. Evacuation Supervision

The German Government alone is held responsible for the execution of the evacuation.

The Interallied Commission is authorized to exercise, with full liberty of action wherever it may judge necessary, control of the execution of the evacuation measures ordered by the German Government.

To this end, the Commission:

a) shall acquire full knowledge, through the German Government at Berlin, of the measures taken by Germany with a view to establishing the conditions of the evacuation.

b) shall receive communication of the instructions given by the German Command of the Baltic regions concerning the application of these measures.

c) shall, should it judge necessary, after a local examination of the situation, address any proposal to the German Government of a nature to facilitate, insure and hasten the execution of the evacuation.

d) the German Government shall accord to the Commission, as well as to its agents, full authorization to circulate within the territories occupied by German troops.

4. Conditions Governing the Evacuation

The execution of the provisions of Article 12 of the Armistice implies not only the retreat of the constituent German units now located in the Baltic Provinces with their staffs and full service, but also the recall of all German military who, after demobilization, individually or in groups, entered the service of the Russian corps organized in the said provinces.

The Diplomats, as well as the German Civilian functionaries shall also leave the Baltic Provinces simultaneously with the troops, with the exception of those who shall be approved by the Esthonian, Lettish and Lithuanian de facto Governments.

The supervision shall cover not only the execution of the evacuation movements, but, as well, the verification of the material accompanying the German troops, in order to prevent the removal of any material or supplies which do not belong to these troops.

5. Action of the Allied Navy in the Baltic

The Commission shall establish relations with the Interallied Maritime Command in the Baltic, which shall furnish information relative to the naval operations undertaken, either to support the liberation of Petrograd, or to block the provisioning of the Bolshevists by sea, in conformity with the decisions of the Conference. The Commission will serve as an intermediary between the Supreme Council and the Allied Navy.

The Allied Navy shall furnish the Commission with all necessary means of transportation, and shall assure the transmission of telegrams.

6. Powers of the Commission

In order to accomplish its mission, the Allied Commission shall have at its disposition the personnel of the Military Missions of all the Allied and Associated Powers now operating in Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with a view to preventing any isolated initiative or divergence of action.

The Commission may appeal to the personnel of the French Military Mission in Poland if need be, and in accord with General Henrys.

The Commission, in accord with the Baltic Governments at Reval, Riga and Rowno, shall be assured of the cooperation of the local authorities if such assistance is deemed necessary.

The General, President of the Commission, shall determine the location of his headquarters in the Baltic Provinces. He shall have free use of the telegraphic and radio-telegraphic lines and stations for his communication.

7.

It is further decided that the Commission shall leave as soon as possible and shall commence the labors with which it is entrusted, without awaiting the political instructions which may be sent ulteriorly after discussion and approval by the Supreme Council.

1. See appendix D to HD–82, p. 920.
2. An appendix containing a list of questions prepared by the French Delegation does not accompany the file copy of HD–84. For such a list, see appendix H to HD–89, vol. ix, p. 118.
3. HD–62, minute 1, p. 403.
4. For text of the communication of November 1, 1919, see appendix B to HD–83, p. 947.
5. For text of the communication of November 1, 1919, see appendix B to HD–83, p. 947.
6. HD–67, minute 4, p. 536.