Paris Peace Conf. 184.01102/89
Professor A. C. Coolidge to the Commission to Negotiate Peace
[Received February 19.]
Sirs: I have the honor to report that since sending in my Dispatch No. 7356 containing the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles and Lieutenant King, of Major Martin and of Professor Kerner, I have reread the reports, consulted the annexes which I had kept back (and forward herewith),57 and I have carefully considered the whole matter. My own conclusion is that, with certain reservations, I am now ready to accept the conclusions of the first two reports and do not accept those of Professor Kerner for the following reasons.
I believe that the region in dispute has a clearly marked geographical and economic unity and that any arrangement, even if only temporary, which disturbs that unity will do harm to all parties. This unity which is based on natural features has been still further strengthened by the development of modern means of communication, especially by the building of railways. It will be still further strengthened in the future when the rich resources in water power of the Drau River are developed. The fact that so many of the Slovenian inhabitants of the valley wish to belong to Austria rather than to Jugo-Slavia, and that they seem to have got along better with the German speaking population than in some other regions is eloquent testimony to the strength of the economic ties that bind the people together.
I was familiar beforehand with the Austrian assertion that most of the Slovenes in this region wish to remain under Austrian rule, but, though I knew that language and national desires do not always coincide—as for instance in the case of Alsace—I have felt skeptical about the statement in this case and have believed that at least it required to be proved. It now seems to me that the visiting Americans have brought back convincing proof of the truth of the Austrian assertion, though all were incredulous at the start and, if anything, were prejudiced in favor of the Jugo-Slavs. Three of them have returned converted, and even the fourth does not deny the existence of a pro-Austrian sentiment among the Slovenes, although he tends to minimize its extent. I do not believe the majority reports have put their side too strongly; indeed I think they might have made more of the fact that at the present moment, after the defeat and the prostration of Austria and the creation of a new, ardent and aspiring Jugo-Slav State, all the sentimental and moral advantages appear on the side of the latter and would tend to exercise a stronger influence now than may [Page 512] be the case in the future. I therefore regard the pro-Austrian sympathies of at least a considerable portion, and perhaps a majority of the Slovenes of Carinthia, as being proved. In their case the principle of self-determination and language do not coincide, and it is the principle of self-determination which should be observed.
The Slovenes will undoubtedly claim that, even if the above facts are true, the Austrian leanings of their brethren in Carinthia are due to government pressure, schools, propaganda and other methods of Germanization, and that in a few years under the rule of their own people the Carinthian Slovenes would become as loyal to their nationality as the rest of their brethren. This may be so but it is not certain. The economic and other forces may be too strong the other way. It is, too, precisely the argument used by the Germans in regard to the French sentiment of Alsace in the year 1871, and history has shown the falsity of that argument. We are dealing with the way people feel now, not with the way they may be going to feel some day.
Professor Kerner’s dissenting report, though judicious, does not convince me. His division of the inhabitants of Southern Carinthia into six categories tends to confuse the issue. There are always among partisans of any cause some who are more or less zealous and who would accept a solution they disliked rather than another which they disliked still more. The questions put by the party to the people interrogated seem to have been clear cut and the answers capable of being put on one side or the other. Some of Professor Kerner’s other arguments also seem to me rather in the nature of special pleading, though his intention to be scrupulously fair is evident.
But, while accepting in genera] the conclusion of Messrs. Miles, Martin and King, I have some serious reservations to make. These reservations are based on the grounds, not of justice but of expediency. I admit that I do not feel quite as convinced about Region No. 4, the so-called Jaun Thal, as I do about the other three on which they have reported. But even granting that they are right, as I believe they are, I am not sure that the evacuation of this territory by the Jugo-Slav forces will tend to promote the peace of the region. However just and well-founded the decision of the majority of the examining party has been, there is no avoiding the fact that it grants everything that the Austrians demand, and more than most of them hoped for, and confirms the worst fears of the Jugo-Slavs. This may well be due to the present temper and situation of the two parties—the one of them so stricken that it hardly expects the smallest favors and the other so flushed with success as to have lost sight of moderation. Nevertheless such a decision is not without danger. If a permanent line were being drawn one might take into account only principles of justice, but, in a mere temporary arrangement [Page 513] intended to keep the peace, other things have to be considered. The easiest way in such cases is usually the maintenance of the status quo as nearly as possible, for movement means friction. But, granting that in this case the status quo may not be desirable, the less it is changed the less opportunity there will be for untoward incidents where it is hard to fix the blame and which lead to recrimination and ill feeling; and which may lead again to open warfare. If each party had to yield to about an equal extent, there might be much grumbling but acquiescence ought not be difficult. In a decision where all yielding must be done by one side, and that the more excited one, the risk run may be serious.
At the present moment there seems no necessity for haste in publishing any decision. Both the Austrians and the Jugo-Slavs wish to bring in further testimony. The Jugo-Slavs show signs of alarm lest the conclusions reached may be unfavorable to them, in which case they would prefer that the matter drag along. In the meanwhile, both sides are on their good behavior for fear of prejudicing their chances.
The suspense is trying for the unfortunate people on the two sides of what was the firing line, but it must continue whatever temporary arrangement is now made until their final destinies are settled at Paris. I am therefore not purposing to make any public statement for the time being, but shall watch the course of events.
I have [etc.]