861.00/4452: Telegram
The Chargé in Russia (Poole) to the Acting Secretary of State
[Received May 9, 3:55 a.m.]
1162. 106 [112] to Paris. The British Commissioner tells me that among despatches of Sir Charles Eliot forwarded to him by the Foreign Office is one dated about a month ago recommending that the Allies recognize the government of Kolchak as the Provisional Government [Page 343] of Siberia. He has taken the occasion of the note of the Archangel government reported in my 1141 May 4, 3 p.m. to support this recommendation with the addition that the provisional authority of the Kolchak government be recognized to extend also to the parts of European Russia controlled by governments subordinating themselves to that of Omsk.
The situation at Archangel has improved during the last two months to an extent which was hardly to be foreseen. The conditions reported from this Embassy and described with some accuracy and a good deal of sensationalism by Frazier Hunt in the Chicago Tribune of February 10th have changed radically. The substantial success of the local mobilization, reflecting certainly a considerable measure of political contentment, is already known to the Department. As shown by the message contained in the Embassy’s 1052, April 9, 6 p.m.67 the general trend of the Government policy is fairly democratic even in the view of its most radical member. This has been emphasized by the addition of Fedorov to the Ministry (Embassy’s 1067, April 12, 10 p.m. [a.m.?]67 and there are other favorable symptoms, see 1048, April 9, 3 p.m.67 Bolshevik agitation among the laborers of Archangel has sunk to little or nothing. The peasants continue as heretofore thoroughly anti-Bolshevik. In sum, the position of the Government is incomparably stronger than it was at the beginning of the year or even in February. If there has been an analogous development in Siberia, as one may suppose from such information as reaches here, the consideration of provisional recognition may be in order, though without adequate knowledge of Siberian affairs I would not make a recommendation.
Recognition would be more important morally than practically, it would work little difference for instance in the projected [actual?] relations between the Archangel government and that of Great Britain. Its main effects would be to give clear definition and therefore strength to Allied policy in Russia and to deal a heavy moral blow to the Bolsheviki. These aspects of the matter move me deeply; quite apart from the question of the recognition at this time of the anti-Bolshevik government, I beg to urge once more the importance of attaining these ends in any case by clear pronouncement against the Bolsheviki. The great vice of Allied policy in Russia has been equivocation. It has tried to run with the hare while hunting with the hounds. The story of last summer in Central Russia is filled with this. The Archangel expedition has been discredited throughout by being engaged actually in doing something different from what it was said to be entering upon. The same sort of thing will [Page 344] continue to vitiate our efforts for Russia until the realities of the situation are accepted and clearly stated. Of these the most fundamental is the impossibility of compromise with the Bolsheviki. With the best will in the world we could never have more than a paper peace with them. Mutual antagonism is instituted [inherent?] in the fundamentals of their program and in the duplicity of their methods. The Bolsheviki are not completely bad just as no one is completely good but a balance cast up with every allowance in their favor, shows incontrovertibly a preponderance of wickedness which corrupts intercourse and challenges the fighting spirit of all right-thinking men. Inevitably we shall continue to oppose them whether we say so or not.
The importance of saying so is in this, that the conflict in Russia is above all a moral conflict. Because the Bolsheviki rely immediately upon force it is necessary to employ force against them. But as has been shown time and time again the battle is moral. The Bolsheviki have had the moral audacity to cheat and lie and betray and murder and then to defy the world with the sophistry, “we represent the working people, hands off.” They have succeeded so far because no one sufficiently powerful has yet had the courage to reply, “they do not represent the working people—they must and shall be put down.” It cannot be answered that it is an affair for the Russians alone. The early and continued interference of the German Imperial Government as well as the aggressive internationalism of the Bolsheviki makes it distinctly an affair also for the Allies and America. To endeavor to escape the responsibility it could shirk the full task of the war, defaulting on our obligation for the three years of essential contribution to victory which was made not by the Czar’s government but by the Russian people. The hesitancy of the United States has long been a reliance of the Bolsheviki—compare my number 1 from Moscow relayed from the Consulate General at Christiania September 14, 1918.69 Possibly it is well that we have waited but surely it is long enough. A clear verdict now will be a mark of moral leadership in the world’s affairs. It will sweep away the sophistries and equivocations which have degraded the gallant work our troops have already done for Russia. It will disclose the truth now obscured that every blow struck at the Moscow government is a blow as necessary and as potent for decency, justice and liberty in the world as those which have been struck on the western front.