893.51/2286: Telegram

The Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State

2866. T. W. Lamont reports to us as follows for transmission to Breckinridge Long and the American group.

1.
Formation three power consortium. Replying to recent inquiry, French group expresses willingness to undertake formation three power consortium if so requested by its Government but believes that both financially and politically such step is very questionable and should be taken only as last resort.
2.
British group is, if anything, even more doubtful of expediency or workability of three power consortium. Is very hopeful that Japan can be kept in line. Has not yet given categorical reply, Yes or No, to question of willingness to join in three power consortium.
3.
Addis has conferred further with Japanese representatives in London, who are insistent upon their good faith in agreeing with us as to unwisdom of Tokio action, and reiterate their earnest hope that they may be able to change such action.
4.
Odagiri returned to Paris today and states to me again that his personal views as to the unwisdom of proposed Japanese exclusion Mongolia and Manchuria are quite in accord with ours. He intimates that possibly his Government will inquire from British Foreign Office whether Thibet is to be understood as being included within scope of consortium. Odagiri asking Tokio to instruct him to proceed to America next month to discuss situation finally with American group.
5.
Because of personal acquaintance with various officials here of British Foreign Office, have ventured to chat with them entirely unofficially and have secured an impression of their personal views as to Government’s proposed attitude towards Japan. They naturally state that any final decision in matter must emanate from Foreign Office in London. Their own reaction is that Government should take up towards Japan perfectly firm but not threatening attitude. They will consult Addis, whose political judgement they have respect for.
6.
They point out that Chinese situation vis a vis Japan is very delicate just now owing to Shantung incident, etc. They express belief that it may be necessary for British Foreign Office to cable to Ministries at Pekin and Tokio to secure advice upon any note that is submitted to Japanese Government, but as already stated, they incline to view that firmness now by the three Governments on the Chinese consortium will be help rather than hindrance to general political situation.
7.
After these informal discussions that I have had with friends in London and Paris, my impression is that financial groups, both in London and Paris, will be likely to advise their respective Governments in a sense so that Governments would be better satisfied to see the last two sentences in the American note as suggested toned down somewhat so as to intimate nothing as to the possibility of proceeding without Japan. An intimation might [not] be unwise that the plans of the consortium are, as is already well known, to include a Belgian group in the near future, and as soon as a stable government is established in Russia, a Russian group; thus indicating that with the inclusion of Japan there is likely to be constituted [Page 461] in the near future a six power group of strong validity and enduring importance. The obvious inference would be that Japan could not afford to read herself out of such a group for the doubtful possibility of linking up with a discredited Germany.
[8.]
Carter30 has been constantly in touch and has now brought Stettinius31 fully up to date so that those two can carry on after my departure. Stettinius will probably go to London end of next week for informal conversations which I had had in mind. Sailing on George Washington, therefore able to discuss in person with you in near future.
[9.]
Marshall has very clear and intelligent understanding of whole situation and is most competent.
American Mission
  1. J. R. Carter, a representative of the American banking group.
  2. Edward R. Stettinius, associated with J. P. Morgan & Co.