723.2515/1335

Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a Conversation with the Chilean Ambassador (Mathieu), June 17, 1922

The Chilean Ambassador called pursuant to appointment. The Secretary said that he had given very close attention to the Ambassador’s memorandum17 and that, as he had stated the day before, he would like to discuss the matter in a wholly informal and personal way. The Secretary said that in exploring the situation he had endeavored to see what was the permissible area of discussion, that is, where were the points of irreconcilable difference and what points admitted of adjustment. So far as Peru was concerned, he had felt that Peru could not contend that the Treaty of Ancon was [Page 474] [a nullity] and demand the return of Tarapacá; that it was quite evident that such a demand would frustrate all the efforts at adjustment as Chile could not concede such a proposition. On the other hand, it was evident to the Secretary that if Chile insisted that there was nothing to be done but to have a plebiscite under Article 3 of the Treaty of Ancon, no agreement would be reached as Peru would never yield to such a contention. The Secretary said that he did not intend to deal with the merits of that question, as that was a matter which would require very close study and an appreciation of many facts, but that he was simply pointing out that it was a question and had been long in controversy and that if Peru [Chile?] insisted that it could only be determined in one way—by holding a plebiscite—such an attitude would, the Secretary believed, terminate the negotiations without result. The Secretary said that when Peru proposed that the question should be arbitrated whether under existing circumstances there should be a plebiscite, he felt that the suggestion was a wholly reasonable one; that this was the question in dispute and as the parties could not agree it should be submitted to arbitration and was susceptible of determination in this manner. The Secretary said that he understood that Peru had proposed that, if the Arbiter decided the plebiscite should be had, he should also determine the manner in which it should be had and this was manifestly a fair proposal. These points, then, in substance, of the Peruvian proposition—the Secretary did not undertake to comment on the form of the proposal—seemed to be well taken. The Secretary also understood that Peru, contemplating the possible contingency of a decision that the plebiscite could not be held had proposed that in that event the arbiter should decide what should be done with the territory in question. The Secretary said that this was a natural and reasonable suggestion from the standpoint of Peru, for if Peru was willing to take the chances on the decision of the arbiter that a plebiscite should be had, and to accept the arbiter’s decision as to the way in which it should be held, it was natural that Peru should ask Chile to agree that if the Arbiter decided against the plebiscite he should determine what should be done with the territory and thus end the long-standing controversy. The Secretary said that it was very important that the matter should be finally disposed of and if Chile were willing to accept such a proposition this would be a manner of effecting a final adjustment. The Secretary said, however, that he realized that Chile might take the position that if the arbiter should decide against the holding of a plebiscite the disposition of the territory would be a matter which could be determined only upon broad political grounds or as a matter of expediency and not according to any standards such as are usually invoked in an arbitration and that Chile might insist that [Page 475] she was unwilling to confer any such broad authority even if Peru was ready to do so. The Secretary said he did not feel free to comment on the practical aspects of such an attitude, in view of the great importance of a final settlement, but that he could understand the grounds upon which such a conclusion could be reached. If Chile felt that she could not give such a broad authority, this would not, in the Secretary’s view, furnish a reason why she should not agree to arbitrate the question whether or not a plebiscite should be held and the determination of this question would be of great importance, for, if it were decided in favor of the plebiscite, it could be had and the matter finally determined and if the arbiter decided against the plebiscite it would be a new point of departure and the question could be considered broadly and not subject to the conditions which had previously been raised.

The Secretary said that he had understood from the Ambassador’s statements of the day before that Chile was willing to have Peru advance before the arbiter her arguments against the holding of a plebiscite and that if this were true the Secretary understood that Chile recognized that the question was one appropriate to be argued and would be appropriate to be decided.

The Secretary then took up the text of the tentative proposition which had been formulated by Dr. Izquierdo and Dr. Porras and rejected by Peru first as to the recital which was to the effect:

“The Plenipotentiaries of Chile and Peru, assembled at Washington pursuant to the invitation of the Government of the United States for the purpose of determining the conditions for the fulfillment of the unfulfilled clauses of the Treaty of Ancon, have reached the following agreement.”

The Secretary pointed out that Peru could not agree to the recital “for the purpose of determining the conditions for the fulfillment, et cetera,” for this seemed to describe the purpose of the Conference as dealing only with the terms of a plebiscite. The Secretary suggested that as this was doubtless unacceptable to Peru the difficulty could be met by making the condition of the invitation of the Government of the United States and the recital read:

“For the purpose of considering the settlement of the long-standing controversy with respect to the unfulfilled provisions of the Treaty of Ancon.”

The Secretary suggested that neither party could object to this as it was the language of the invitation which they had accepted.

Next, with regard to paragraph (a) of Article 1, which in the Izquierdo-Porras memorandum read:

“The difficulties relative to the fulfillment of Article 3 of the Treaty.”

[Page 476]

The Secretary observed that this also carried the idea that the question related only to the “fulfillment”, that is, the holding of a plebiscite, and that doubtless for this reason was unacceptable to Peru. The Secretary suggested the following:

“The questions arising out of the unfulfilled provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of Ancon.”

He pointed out that these questions which necessarily arose as the controversy proved was first whether a plebiscite should be held and if so in what manner. These were substantially the two points of the Peruvian proposal.

The Secretary then said that to avoid the inference that it was intended to submit to the arbiter the broad discretion to decide how the territory should be dealt with in case he held against the plebiscite the Governments of Chile and Peru might exchange notes stating that it was not intended to give this authority and that in case it were decided by the arbiter that a plebiscite should not be held that the question of the disposition of the territory should remain one for negotiation between the two Governments. The Secretary said that the long-standing controversy with regard to the plebiscite would thus be ended and if the contingency occurred that the decision was against the holding of a plebiscite the situation would be that neither party would have title to the territory in question and it would be a subject for negotiation upon broad grounds. The Secretary said that in this event he desired to say, personally, that this Government would be very glad either by itself or associated with it [sic] the Governments of Argentina and Brazil to use their good offices in a manner acceptable to Chile and Peru to aid in the settlement of the problem as to the suitable disposition of the territory.

The Ambassador took notes of the Secretary’s suggestions and expressed himself as hopeful that something might be done. The various points were reviewed and discussed simply in elaboration of what is stated above. …

  1. Supra.